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Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring (1999) was a landmark US Supreme Court
decision holding that unjustified segregation of people with disabilities is impermissible
discrimination; specifically, if the clinician and client believe community integration to
be appropriate, the state must have reasonable accommodations in place for the client to
be in the community. Enforcement of the Olmstead decision for people with serious
mental illness has taken many shapes, from the DOJ’s settlement agreements requiring
substantive development of community mental health services and aggressive community
integration protocols, to the Third Circuit approach which requires only lower census
numbers in the state psychiatric hospital (SPH). This dissertation, through legal research,
identified five distinct Olmstead response types (DOJ, Third Circuit, Ninth Circuit,
Minnesota, Florida) created by litigation in ten states. Using growth curve models, the
present study explored connections between those five response types and fifteen
dependent variables: SPH census; state budgets for SPH, community treatment, police,
judiciary, and corrections; incarceration rates; suicide rates; employment rates; disability
benefits applications, approvals, and recipients; community treatment rates; readmissions
to inpatient care within 30 days; and data collection trends.

All states decreased SPH census numbers, but only Minnesota showed an increase
in community treatment rates; however, both changes were happening primarily before
Olmstead litigation. The Ninth Circuit states had lower rates of people on disability
benefits, while the Third Circuit had a significant increase in filings for disability benefits
immediately after litigation. Suicide rates were much lower in Florida but showed
alarming increases in the DOJ state of New Hampshire. Minnesota had greater increases
in employment rates after litigation, and all states had slower incarceration rates after
litigation. States managed their budgets in different ways after litigation, but overall,
there was not an increase in funding for community mental health treatment after
litigation outside of DOJ states. DOJ states, the Third Circuit, and Florida had the
highest rates of missing data across all variables, while Minnesota had the lowest rate of
missing data. Implications, limitations, and future directions are discussed, as well as
ideological and ethical considerations for applying Olmstead’s requirements with a
recovery orientation.
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CHAPTER 1: THE OLMSTEAD RULING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring (1999) is a United States Supreme Court decision
from 1999, written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, interpreting Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012).
Specifically, the Court held that if a person who has been institutionalized for
developmental, mental, or physical disability wants to move into a less restrictive setting
and is found to be appropriate for that level of care by a mental health professional, the
state must have reasonable accommodations in place to allow that person to do so.
Failure to comply with these standards is a violation of the ADA, and not justified solely
by a lack of state resources.
Many states subsequently implemented “Olmstead plans,” especially after the
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice began aggressively enforcing
Olmstead through litigation in 2009 (Civil Rights Division, 2011). Not all circuits
interpreted the Olmstead case similarly, creating nationally disjointed criteria for a
“good” Olmstead plan (Tidwell, 2009). Courts also assumed their criteria set would lead
to a variety of desired outcomes, which may or may not be true (Tidwell, 2009).
Subsequently, Olmstead plans vary widely in requirements, outcome objectives,
adherence to scientific evidence, and overall quality.
Additionally, much of the litigation around Olmstead has focused on people with
developmental disabilities or failed to distinguish between people with developmental
disabilities and people with serious mental illness. This is problematic; disability policy
cannot be effective if it is approached with a monolithic mentality. Implementing
Olmstead effectively for people with serious mental illness should be done differently
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than for people with developmental disabilities, due to differences in clinical needs. In
particular, serious mental illness tends to be chronic but episodic, with a reserved place in
the treatment continuum for recovery-oriented hospitalization services, either short or
long-term, to support people through first episodes or relapses, and back into the
community (Spaulding, Montague, Avila, & Sullivan, 2016).
However, for some states, the plans or policies put forward in response to
Olmstead seem to be merely extensions of the deinstitutionalization policy that gained
traction nationally in the 1950s by requiring only long-term hospitalization bed reduction.
In fact, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals even looked to the state’s “progress” since the
1950s, measured only by institutional bed closings, when evaluating Pennsylvania’s
compliance with Olmstead (Tidwell, 2009, p. 712). This evaluation criteria, if used by
itself, is problematic, especially in the context of serious mental illness. While all
consumers are negatively impacted by insufficient funding for community treatment
options, if courts interpret Olmstead to require primarily, or only, a decrease in available
hospital beds, this disparately impacts the treatment of people with serious mental illness,
for whom the lack of a continuum of appropriate, recovery-oriented treatment services
can mean high utilization of crisis services, homelessness, or incarceration.
As the Olmstead plans are enacted, consumers can be shuffled between long-term
hospitalization settings, short-term hospitalization settings, assisted-living facilities
(which fluctuate in degrees of structure and restrictiveness), and living independently in
the community with often unreliable access to outpatient care. Since Olmstead has been
primarily enforced in the courts, examining the relationships between factors on which
the courts focused allows for an empirical evaluation of the driving force behind
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Olmstead disability policy. The objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the
relationships upon which the courts rely, as well as possible unintended potential side
effects, specifically within the context of serious mental illness. The over-arching
hypothesis is that while the state may achieve the markers the court has identified as
relevant, there are still vital treatment considerations not being fully examined, possibly
creating unintended collateral damage, similar to that seen during the
deinstitutionalization movement of the mid-twentieth century in the United States.
Using data culled from publicly available documents and datasets, the researcher
will examine the relationships between state policies and outcomes, both intended and
unintended. The empirical question is two-fold: first, do the relational assumptions the
courts have made between the criteria they set and the outcomes they demand hold true?
Is there evidence the plans could work as the courts expect? Second, if so, are those
relationships being enacted at the expense of other outcomes the courts are not
considering? Is there evidence the plans are an overall good idea? If the plans do not
work, states are expending significant resources to still be subject to liability. If the plans
do work, but with unintended collateral damage, states may be creating more challenging
situations for all involved.
Consistent with the researcher’s interdisciplinary training in clinical psychology
and law, this dissertation will contain legal research, psychological research, an empirical
analysis, and a legal analysis all related to Olmstead and its subsequent impact on mental
health law and policy. Chapter 2 will narrowly define and describe the population of
interest: people with serious mental illness. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 will outline legal
research on federal mental health policy, as indicated by case law and legislation, leading
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up to and including the Olmstead case and its subsequent litigation. Chapter 6 will
review psychological literature related to Olmstead and its outcomes, while Chapter 7
will introduce the methods for the empirical portion of this dissertation. Chapter 8 will
present the results of the empirical analysis and Chapter 9 will analyze those results and
their meaning within the current legal framework, as well as acknowledging this
dissertation’s limitations and possible directions for future research. Chapter 10 provides
recommendations in light of the findings of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 2: SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS – IMPACT AND DEFINITIONS
Mental illness continues to be a pervasive public health problem around the
world. The DSM-5 defines a mental disorder generally as, “a syndrome characterized by
clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or
behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental
processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated with
significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important activities”
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013, p. 20). In the United States alone, it is
estimated that approximately fifty percent of people will experience mental health
symptoms meeting diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder over the course of their
lifetime (Mental Health First Aid [MHFA], 2016). Each year, approximately thirty
percent of people are experiencing a diagnosable mental disorder (MHFA, 2016). Four
of the ten leading causes of disability are mental illnesses; the leading cause of disability
worldwide is depression (MHFA, 2016). Sadly, people tend to go ten years, on average,
from the onset of symptoms before seeking treatment (MHFA, 2016), and only one of
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every three people with a mental illness ever seeks treatment (World Health Organization
[WHO], 2001).
Within this discouraging, larger context of high prevalence rates and low
treatment proportions of mental illness, exists a small, subpopulation of individuals with
serious mental illness (SMI). Definitions of SMI are reliable only in their variation from
setting to setting (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
[SAMHSA], 2016); however, theoretically, the purpose of defining a “serious” group
within the population of people with mental illness is to differentiate those with the most
significant need for clinical intervention (Goldman & Grob, 2006). In the context of this
dissertation, the purpose of an SMI definition is to accurately identify the subpopulation
of people with mental illness who are most likely to be impacted by Olmstead-related
policies; this would include people who have been in or are at risk for long-term
hospitalization, frequent or prolonged usage of short-term hospitalization or partial
hospitalization, or living in facilities focused on providing environments with varying
degrees of structure primarily to people with mental illness (e.g., assisted-living facilities,
transitional living facilities, independent living facilities, etc.).
Typically, organizations rely on either the federal definition or their state’s
definition, as codified in statute, to make these distinctions in their policies. The federal
SMI definition applies only to adults and requires a current or recent (i.e., past year)
diagnosis of a mental, behavioral, or emotional illness other than a substance use or
developmental disorder resulting in “serious functional impairment, which substantially
inferences with or limits one or more life activities, such as maintaining interpersonal
relationships, activities of daily living, self-care, employment, and recreation.”
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(SAMHSA, 2016, p. 2). Alternatively, the state of Nebraska has legislatively defined
SMI as
“any mental health condition that current medical science affirms is caused by a
biological disorder of the brain and that substantially limits the life activities of
the person with the serious mental illness … includ[ing] but … not limited to
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder, bipolar disorder,
major depression, and obsessive compulsive disorder”
(Nebraska Revised Statutes § 44-792, 2002). The common thread is intended to be
severity – while all mental disorders create significant distress or disability (APA, 2013,
p. 20, emphasis added), the label of SMI should be reserved for those whose experience
of mental illness substantially impacts their ability to perform daily life activities.
While these definitions narrow the field substantially, they are still too broad to
accurately identify the subpopulation of people with mental illness who are likely to be
impacted by Olmstead-related policies. For example, SAMHSA’s definition (2016) and
label of “serious mental illness” have been explicitly edited to avoid the words “chronic,”
“severe,” and “persistent” as a conscious choice to expel any connotation that serious
mental illness is intractable or unresponsive to treatment (p. 1). The definition was
purposefully broadened to include any mental illness (p. 2-3) and to not be limited to
chronic conditions (p. 1). While the attempt to dispel perceptions of SMI as untreatable
is noble and broadening the criteria may be helpful for some policy discussions, when
examining Olmstead policies and their impact, it would be most helpful to carefully
consider the population most likely to be affected. Additionally, use of a narrower
definition avoids a common criticism of SAMHSA’s definition – that it has become so
broad as to be essentially useless, losing sight of the actual SMI population in a deluge of
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those with less chronic, less severe, and less persistent mental illness (Torrey, 2015;
U.S.G.A.O., 2014).
For these reasons, this dissertation will encourage a narrower definition of SMI,
and employ it when evaluating policies. Rather than only requiring substantial inference
in life activities, more precise SMI definitions include aspects of SMI associated with
impaired functioning and symptom intensity, such as high rates of service utilization,
engagement with partial hospitalization or higher level of services, and length of illness
history. One such definition was crafted by Charlwood and colleagues (2000, p. 94) and
requires a mental disorder diagnosed by a mental health professional and either a score of
4 (severe/very severe problem) on at least one, or a score of 3 (moderately severe
problem) on at least two, of the Health of the Nation Outcome Scale (p. 99-104; not
including outcome number five, which is “physical illness or disability problems”),
during the previous six months or a significant level of service usage over the past five
years (e.g., a total of six months in a psychiatric ward or day hospital, three admissions to
hospital or day hospital, or six months of psychiatric community care with more than one
worker or the perceived need for such care).
This definition is preferable to the broader definitions for the purpose of
identifying a subgroup of those with mental illness in higher need of clinical
interventions, more chronically experiencing disability, and subsequently, more likely to
be a population needing the protections of Olmstead. This definition has the advantage
of specificity by narrowing “substantial impairment,” a relatively broad description, to a
higher threshold of need for services as indicated by problem severity and number.
Additionally, by using level of services and time engaged in high levels of service, such
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as hospitalization or partial hospitalization, the possibility of including false positives,
people with mental illness of a less disabling impact, 1 is diminished. The SMI group is,
now by definition, the group within people with mental illness who are using higher
levels of service over longer periods of time while facing more problems of intense
severity.
It is also worth noting here that while psychiatric diagnostic categories may be the
most ubiquitous method of categorizing mental illness, such categorization has many
criticisms and is not particularly useful when trying to identify those with SMI and the
highest need of services. The modern method of categorizing mental illness by diagnosis
is encapsulated in the American Psychiatric Association’s publication of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual, fifth edition (DSM-5; APA, 2013). The DSM-5, and modern
psychiatry generally, have their roots in the work of a German psychiatrist from the turn
of the 20th century, Emil Kraepelin (Allik & Tammiksaar, 2016; Andreasen, 2007).
Kraepelin is best known for being the originator of the nosology preceding the DSM
(Andreasen, 2007). Kraepelin’s categories identified discrete symptom combinations
with a specific illness course, creating a “proto-disease” approach to categorizing mental

When evaluating definitions of SMI and trying to parse out “more disabling”
experiences from “less disabling” experiences, the purpose is not to be dismissive of the
impact and suffering created by non-SMI, or “less disabling” experiences of mental
illness. All experiences of mental illness deserve to be met with compassion, dignity, and
access to high-quality, comprehensive treatment services. By attempting to identify those
with greatest need for clinical intervention, the goal and purpose of such categorization is
to ensure all people with mental illness have access to high-quality services, not just the
easy-to-treat members of the population. Further, it tends to be the more chronically and
severely disabled population that faces abuses at the hands of the system, whose voice
advocating for herself is most often drowned out, and who most rely on the protections of
the Americans with Disabilities Act.
1
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illness, partially inspired by the development of bacterial theories of physical diseases
(Kendler & Engstrom, 2017).
When the first two versions of the DSM did not show substantial interrater
agreement among clinicians attempting to determine diagnosis, the third and subsequent
versions replaced general descriptions with specific diagnostic criteria to create discrete
symptom combinations, due in no small part to the revivers of Kraepelin’s approach to
mental illness – the “neo-Kraepelinians” (Andreasen, 2007). Unfortunately, those
categorical, discrete symptom combinations are somewhat arbitrarily defined by
contributors to the DSM, without empirical data to show clustering of symptoms or to
validate cut-points for diagnosis (e.g., needing five out of nine symptoms as opposed to
four or six out of nine symptoms, et cetera) (Insel, 2013). Therefore, while these
nosological approaches may increase interrater reliability, they reflect increased
agreement on constructs with limited accuracy and clinical utility.
Recently, many researchers and clinicians have begun routinely challenging the
usefulness of psychiatric diagnosis and shifting to more functional assessments of mental
illness and its impact (e.g., Spaulding, Sullivan, & Poland, 2003). Furthermore, even
federal agencies have begun challenging the assumed utility of the neo-Kraepelinian
nosology; the National Institute of Mental Health announced in 2013 they would no
longer fund research proposals based strictly on DSM-5 criteria, but would instead prefer
research examining specific symptoms, such as anhedonia or psychomotor retardation,
across diagnostic categories (Insel, 2013). Additionally, recent editions of the DSM have
been criticized for overpathologizing normal experiences as abnormal (Frances &
Widiger, 2012).
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Not only does psychiatric diagnostic categorization have many criticisms of its
utility as an organizational framework for understanding differences in the experience of
mental illness, it is even less useful as a tool to parse out more chronic and disabling
conditions from those with a lower impact on functional impairment. For example, SMI
is typically associated with cognitive deficits, such as memory and attention problems,
comprehension, motor skills, social skills, executive functioning, and verbal skills, that
are directly related to the mental illness but distinct from the clinical symptoms, such as
mood dysregulation, hallucinations, or delusions (Medalia & Revheim, 2012). However,
such deficits are associated with a range of mental illness diagnoses, including
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, panic disorder, and obsessive-compulsive
disorder (Iyer, Rothmann, Vogler, & Spaulding, 2005). These deficits can directly
interfere with one’s ability to complete day-to-day activities, such as transporting oneself,
planning ahead to navigate complex situations, problem-solving, and maintaining
stability in employment, financial resources, and housing.
Overall, while the narrowly-defined SMI population is a relatively small subset of
the general mental health population, their experience of mental illness is significantly
more impactful and disabling. Furthermore, they are the population most likely to
participate in the treatment settings impacted by Olmstead and its subsequent litigation,
such as state psychiatric hospitals and assisted-living facilities. Consequently, this
dissertation will focus on the SMI population, as defined here, and the impact of
Olmstead on their outcomes.
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CHAPTER 3: FEDERAL POLICIES ON MENTAL HEALTH BEFORE OLMSTEAD
This chapter will briefly review the federal government’s approach to addressing
mental health issues over time. While a comprehensive discussion of this topic is beyond
the scope of this dissertation, there are several turning points in history that are relevant
to the questions addressed by this dissertation. Specifically, this chapter will describe the
historical background to the Olmstead decision, including the context of
deinstitutionalization and three major pieces of federal legislation impacting mental
health services: the Community Mental Health Act of 1963, the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Mental health treatment in the United States predates the federal government;
there were two major treatment facilities for people with mental illness before America
was officially the United States of America. The first psychiatric hospital opened in 1752
(National Institute of Health [NIH], 2006), approximately twenty-four years before the
Declaration of Independence was signed (Hubenschmidt, 2017). It was established by
the Quakers and was quickly required to add additional space due to the influx of
admissions (NIH, 2006). Approximately twenty years later, the Virginia legislature
appropriated funds for a small, state-run hospital in Williamsburg (NIH, 2006). This
hospital was the first of many state psychiatric facilities to come and is still operating
today as Eastern State Hospital in a suburb of Williamsburg (NIH, 2006). For the
majority of America’s history, that is exactly where mental health treatment, especially
for the SMI population, took place – in the state psychiatric hospital, without influence or
funding from the federal government (Grob, 1983).
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State psychiatric hospitals were originally designed as “small, pastoral”
therapeutic environments that attempted to provide a “warm, familial atmosphere” with
structured, regular activities, including religious and recreational activities (Morrissey &
Goldman, 1986, p. 15). In some parts of the world, the mental health system still reflects
this approach to treatment (Chen, 2016). However, for most countries, particularly the
United States, small, residential units for mental health treatment quickly morphed into
larger, custodial institutions, and just as quickly, began encountering shortages of
resources, including funding, staff, and space (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).
By the start of the twentieth century, there were around 150,000 people in state
psychiatric hospitals (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986). This swelled to 512,000 by 1950, a
growth rate nearly twice that of the general population in the United States, and up to the
historical apex of the state hospital census at 559,000 in 1955 (Morrissey & Goldman,
1986). This meteoric rise in hospital population was partially due to calculated moves by
local officials to transfer aged, chronic, or senile individuals from the locally-financed
almshouses to the state-financed psychiatric hospital (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).
This changed the state hospital population from those in need of acute care and typically
hospitalized for fewer than twelve months to “individuals suffering from a variety of
diseases and conditions that required custodial care on a life-long basis rather than
treatment by specific psychiatric therapies” (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986, p. 19).
Unsurprisingly, almshouses disappeared during this time (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).
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Deinstitutionalization and the Community Mental Health Act of 1963
The combination of the rapidly growing hospital population with the lack of
resources contributed to the state psychiatric hospitals diminishing significantly in quality
and positive outcomes, ultimately leading to the major, national shift in mental health
policy known as deinstitutionalization (Grob, 1983). Deinstitutionalization was intended
to move people out of the state psychiatric hospitals, which had begun to be seen as
inhumane and ineffective, and into the community (Lamb & Bachrach, 2001).
Transferring people out of the deteriorating hospitals and into the community was
perceived as a moral imperative, an urgent need, and an axiomatic method of improving
the quality of life and treatment outcomes of people with SMI (Lamb & Bachrach, 2001).
Consequently, deinstitutionalization was not preceded by empirical testing of its
assumptions, and mistakes were made in the implementation of the exceedingly wellintentioned national policy on mental health (Lamb & Bachrach, 2001).
While the deinstitutionalization movement was wildly successful at directly
decreasing the number of people hospitalized, from approximately 559,000 in 1955
(Bassuk & Gerson, 1978) to approximately 49,000 in 2003 (Bloom, Krishnan, & Lockey,
2008), most professionals agree it was implemented without adequate safeguards to
ensure access to appropriate community services. Without adequate safeguards, such as
forcing funding to follow people from the hospitals into the community (Kofman, 2012),
many people were shifted into assisted living facilities (Geller, 2000), became homeless
(Taylor, 1987), or became participants in the trend of prisons and jails housing
increasingly high percentages of people with mental illness (Petersilia, 2003). While it is
unlikely deinstitutionalization directly caused these issues (Prins, 2011), the lack of
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comprehensive community-based services to bolster those coming out of long-term
institutions has certainly created obstacles to community integration among those who
need the most support (Lamb, 1984).
Comprehensive community-based services continue to be lacking, particularly for
those with SMI; it is estimated that 85% of people with SMI are not receiving adequate
treatment (Wang, Demler, & Kessler, 2002). This section on deinstitutionalization is
included in this dissertation as it offers a useful parallel for the potential trajectory of
Olmstead plans – laudatory intentions for people with SMI, executed without adequate
empirical grounding, leading directly to the primary goal of fewer consumers physically
residing in the state hospitals, while unfortunately contributing to a host of unintended,
negative consequences.
While arguably the most potent catalyst for deinstitutionalization was the federal
legislation creating community mental health centers (Cutler, Bevilacqua, & McFarland,
2003), the state psychiatric hospital population actually peaked about eight years prior to
federal intervention, in 1955 with an average daily census of about 559,000 nationally
(Grob, 2005). By 1963, the average daily census of the nation’s state psychiatric
hospitals was around 500,000 2 (Grob, 2005). This gradual, pre-federal intervention
decline in the hospital population was largely due to two major players in the field of
mental health treatment: the military and psychopharmaceuticals (Cutler, Bevilacqua, &
McFarland, 2003; Grob, 2005; Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).

2

In 1963, President Kennedy addressed Congress and stated that the state psychiatric
hospital census was about 600,000 for people with mental illness and about 200,000 for
people with developmental disabilities (American Presidency Project, n.d.). However,
academic sources agree the peak was in 1955 at around 559,000 (e.g., Grob, 2005;
Bassuk & Gerson, 1978, Morrissey & Goldman, 1986, et cetera).
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At the time, the United States military and Veterans Administration (VA) were
noted for their high quality of care and ability to successfully treat mental illness outside
a hospital setting – advancements that were necessitated by the increase in soldiers
suffering from mental health concerns after World War II (Smucker, 2005; Morrissey &
Goldman, 1986; Cutler, Bevilacqua, & McFarland, 2003; Grob, 2005). Additionally, the
1950s into the early 1960s saw the advent of several major classes of
psychopharmaceuticals, including lithium carbonate (mood stabilizer), monoamine
oxidase inhibitors (anti-depressant), haloperidol (typical anti-psychotic), clozapine
(atypical anti-psychotic), and benzodiazepines (anti-anxiety), among others (Baldessarini,
2014). These advances combined contributed to the decreasing hospital population
starting in the 1950s, opening deinstitutionalization.
However, the Community Mental Health Act (CMHA) signing in 1963 marked a
turning point (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986). The CMHA’s main promise was to provide
federal grants to build and maintain community mental health centers (CMHCs) for four
and a half years, after which it was hoped the CMHCs would be self-sustaining (CMHA,
1963). The grants were provided directly to CMHCs, which were in turn required to
deliver a variety of services, including outpatient therapy, short-term inpatient, partial
hospitalization, and crisis services (CMHA, 1963).
President Kennedy’s original vision was grand; he hoped the CMHA would lay
the groundwork for all people to receive comprehensive treatment in the community,
including the severely mentally ill, and for their families to receive supportive services
(American Presidency Project, n.d.; Cutler, Bevilacqua, & McFarland, 2003). He hoped
the new network of providers would eventually replace state hospitals completely. While
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the goal of wholly eliminating state hospitals is problematic, his intentions seem both
noble and born from personal experience; he had family members who had experienced
hospitalizations related to mental health concerns.
Unfortunately, President Kennedy’s vision for the CMHA was eviscerated before
the legislation even reached his desk for signing; due to political concerns of anything
resembling “socialized” medicine, negotiations to pass the legislation resulted in funding
only being provided for the brick and mortar buildings – no staffing funds were stipulated
(Cutler, Bevilacqua, & McFarland, 2003). Within a month of signing the CMHA,
President Kennedy was assassinated, leaving supplemental legislation for the CMHA to
the Johnson administration. Finally, almost two years later, in 1965, amendments were
passed to fund staff for the CMHCs and applications for the grants began rolling in. By
this point, the national state psychiatric hospital census on an average day was about
475,000 (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).
Once CMHCs started appearing around the country, there continued to be
problems with their implementation. For instance, the CMHC grants were provided
directly to the grant recipient without any required coordination with existing state
psychiatric hospitals or state government, leading to disjointed provision of services
(Cutler, Bevilacqua, & McFarland, 2003; Shern, Surles, & Waizer, 1989). One major
consequence of this was that as people were released from the state psychiatric hospital,
their transition to care in the community was often not well coordinated (Bassuk &
Gerson, 1978).
Additionally, many CHMCs began serving segments of the general population
who had been previously untreated, rather than identifying and prioritizing the people
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typically receiving services from the state psychiatric hospital (Morrissey & Goldman,
1986). Furthermore, while the CMHCs were supposed to become self-sustaining after
the initial grant period of four years, the assumption that funds would follow individuals
from the state hospital into the community was proven false (Bassuk & Gerson, 1978).
By the late 1970s, a little over five hundred CMHCs were providing services in the
community (Bassuk & Gerson, 1978). By 1980, the nationwide state psychiatric hospital
census was approximately 139,000, or a reduction of nearly seventy-five percent from the
apex in 1955 (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986). Its estimated that in order to successfully
serve that population in the community, there should have been more than three times as
many CMHCs as there were (Bassuk & Gerson, 1978).
Despite all of these arguably foreseeable complications, the CMHA had required
in the original legislation that the number of state psychiatric hospital beds be cut in half
within twenty years (CMHA, 1963), a benchmark which was swiftly met, well before the
deadline (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986). Unfortunately, while deinstitutionalization was
wildly successful at cutting funding and space in the nation’s hospitals, it failed in
creating appropriate spaces and resources for people with SMI in the community. This
led to the lamentable situation of transinstitutionalization – the transfer of the population
who historically received services in the state psychiatric hospital to other institutions,
such as nursing homes, assisted-living facilities, and the criminal justice system. While
people were exiting the state hospitals at high rates, the national rate for people in all
institutional settings did not fluctuate (Scherl & Macht, 1979).
Transinstitutionalization was created by a number of mechanisms, each enabling
different pathways to alternative institutions. For example, when Medicaid was
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implemented in the 1960s, consistent with prevailing federal policy encouraging people
to receive treatment in the community, the funds were ineligible for use at psychiatric
hospitals, but commonly used at nursing homes, creating a financial incentive for people
to transfer from state psychiatric hospitals (Grob, 2005). While nursing homes were in
the community, and therefore ideologically preferable, they were not typically housing
people with SMI, creating difficulties in delivering high-quality care (Bassuk & Gerson,
1978).
Additionally, people with mental illness have become increasingly
overrepresented in our criminal justice system and are currently present at two to four
times the rate of the general population (Prins & Draper, 2009). This overrepresentation
could stem from a number of etiologies. The stress of interacting with the criminal
justice system could exasperate preexisting mental health symptoms or genetic
vulnerabilities (Ingram & Luxton, 2005). Alternatively, people with mental illness
sometimes draw the attention of law enforcement personnel, becoming a part of the
criminal justice system, rather than receiving treatment in the community, where services
are typically underfunded and disjointed (Petersilia, 2003). Often, law enforcement
personnel are called, even by mental health providers, to address abnormal or
maladaptive behavior and police may have few alternatives to an arrest (Teplin, 2000).
To add insult to injury, once people with mental illness are part of the criminal justice
system, they are more likely to fail community supervision than their general population
counterparts (Skeem & Eno Louden, 2006), keeping them in the system for longer and
with potentially compounding severity of sentences.
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Beyond the fact that deinstitutionalization was essentially untested and hastily
implemented national policy on mental health treatment, a major contributor to its
complicated, long-term impact on people with SMI was that its’ advocates and planners
failed to adequately take into consideration the heterogeneous needs of an SMI
population. SMI is typically associated with cognitive deficits, such as memory and
attention problems, comprehension, motor skills, social skills, executive functioning, and
verbal skills (Medalia & Revheim, 2012). These deficits can independently interfere with
one’s ability to complete day-to-day activities, such as transporting oneself, problemsolving, and maintaining stability in employment, financial resources, and housing.
Therefore, they must be accounted for in any policies attempting to help people with SMI
function more independently in the community.
Overall, deinstitutionalization was a well-intended shift in national mental health
policy, but its implementation resulted in a fragmented system, complicated by
transinstitutionalization. While this dissertation is certainly not advocating a return to the
treatment model of the 1950s and prior, it is advocating policymakers learn from the
mistakes of the past. Many people benefitted from deinstitutionalization, and CMHCs
did provide valuable treatment services to a section of the population who had been
untreated previously. However, many people with SMI fell through the cracks and into
our nursing homes without access to comprehensive psychiatric care, or into our jails and
prisons with their liberty still restricted, but now in a non-therapeutic environment.
The disparity between the promise of deinstitutionalization and its long-term
impact is perhaps best illustrated by comparing two quotes from one man, Dr. Robert
Felix, the director of the NIMH in 1964 (Lyons, 1984). In 1964, he was quoted as
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saying, “The needs of the mentally ill are urgent, however, and the public demand that
they be met is so widespread that it is impossible to await completion of comprehensive
planning before initiating other facets of the program to meet the needs and the
demands.” Twenty years later, he reflected, “Many of those patients who left the state
hospitals never should have done so. We psychiatrists saw too much of the old snake pit,
saw too many people who shouldn’t have been there and we overreacted. The result is
not what we intended, and perhaps we didn’t ask the questions that should have been
asked when developing a new concept, but psychiatrists are human, too, and we tried our
damnedest.” As Olmstead plans are designed, implemented, and evaluated, savvy
policymakers should be mindful of these lessons from deinstitutionalization.

Rehabilitation Act of 1973
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to review every piece of federal
legislation proposed or passed related to mental health in the twentieth century and
beyond, after deinstitutionalization and the CMHA, there were two major pieces of
federal legislation laying the groundwork for the Olmstead case: the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,
1999). The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are complimentary pieces of legislation that
fit together to provide comprehensive protections against discrimination for people with
disabilities (Leuchovius, 2003). The Rehabilitation Act preceded the ADA temporally
and the ADA functioned essentially as an extension of the protections that were first
codified in the Rehabilitation Act (Leuchovius, 2003). Not only are both acts discussed
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individually in the Olmstead opinion, but their language differences are used as a source
of information in the Olmstead case to interpret Congressional intent regarding the ADA.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 has its roots in federal legislation as far back as
1917 (Steffen, 2010). To aid soldiers returning from World War I experiencing “shell
shock” or trying to readjust to life after a major injury, such as the loss of a limb,
Congress passed three major laws in relatively quick succession: the Vocational
Education Act of 1917, the Soldier’s Rehabilitation Act of 1918, and the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act in 1920. The latter established the Office of Vocational
Rehabilitation. State participation in the programs was not mandatory, but by 1920,
three-quarters of the states were participating in the vocational rehabilitation program,
and by 1930, a total of forty-four of the then forty-eight states were participating. The
program was made permanent in 1935.
Over time, the vocational rehabilitation programs expanded not only their
geographic span, but also their participation eligibility guidelines (Steffen, 2010). In
1940, the requirements broadened to more generally included people with physical
disabilities and those who were currently employed, but who could benefit from services
to maintain continued employment. In 1943, this was further extended to include people
with mental illness.
The office of vocational rehabilitation enjoyed consistent congressional support
over the years, and in 1973, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act was replaced by the more
comprehensive Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 2012). Congress
explicitly stated that its intent in replacing the Vocational Rehabilitation Act was to
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expand vocational rehabilitation grants for the states while carefully reserving resources
and services for those experiencing the most debilitating disabilities.
While the majority of the Act is outlining expected administration of services and
funding within the state vocational rehabilitation offices, such as requiring studies of
services provided and individualized treatment plans, the portion most relevant to
Olmstead is Title V, specifically § 504 (Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 2012). Title V
generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of a disability in employment in the
federal government or its contractors, and § 504 specifically states,
“no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, [defined as
any individual who (a) has a physical or mental disability which for such
individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment and (b)
can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational
rehabilitation services], shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”
Title V as a whole was an important expansion upon prior versions of vocational
rehabilitation legislation because it extended beyond just authorizing and funding
services to actively requiring non-discrimination in both employment and access to
services by federal agencies, federal contractors, and organizations receiving federal
funds (Leuchovius, 2003). While its protections were clearly limited by being applicable
to only federal or federally funded agencies, it was an important civil rights protection
law for people with disabilities that laid the groundwork for the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (Leuchovius, 2003).
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Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The ADA was heavily influenced by the Rehabilitation Act, particularly § 504
(Leuchovius, 2003). Congress determined that the Rehabilitation Act alone, especially in
light of its limitation in applicability to only federal and federally funded agencies, was
inadequate protection against the discrimination faced by people with disabilities
(Leuchovius, 2003). Using its power under the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution, “power to enforce the fourteenth amendment,” and any other power within
“the sweep of congressional authority,” Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 (Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 2).
Where the Rehabilitation Act offers people with disabilities protections in their
interactions with federal and federally funded agencies, the ADA offers protections in
their interactions with state, local, and private organizations with at least fifteen
employees (Leuchovius, 2003). Title I prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability
in employment, Title II prohibits discrimination in public services, including
transportation, Title III prohibits discrimination in public accommodations and services
operated by private entities, and Title IV prohibits discrimination in telecommunications
(Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012). Title V contains miscellaneous
provisions, such as allocation of responsibility for attorney’s fees, barring someone who
is facing employment consequences due to drug use from being included in the definition
of “individual with handicaps,” and excluding homosexuality, bisexuality, and
“transvestites” from inclusion as disabilities (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
2012, §§ 501-514).
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Congress explicitly stated in its findings that the approximately 43 million people
with disabilities in the United States “are a discrete and insular minority” with a history
of “political powerlessness” exposed to “purposeful unequal treatment” due to
characteristics beyond their control, and the association of those characteristics with
stereotypes about the individual abilities of people with disabilities (Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 2).3 Furthermore, Congress described the isolation and
segregation of individuals with disabilities to be a form of discrimination that
“continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social problem” in many areas, including
institutionalization, housing, health services, and access to public services (Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 2). In articulating the purpose of the Act, Congress
pronounced their intention to be, inter alia, “to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities” (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 2).

3

Here, Congress is invoking language associated with Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence (U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5). In United States v. Carolene Products
Company (1938), United States Supreme Court Justice Harlan Stone added a famous
footnote to the Court’s analysis. While the main analysis of the Court in that case
involved minimal scrutiny, in footnote four, the Court indicated that if a “discrete and
insular minority” – essentially, a group without power in the political process to protect
themselves – was being negatively impacted, the level of scrutiny applied by the Court
may need to be heightened to ensure the protection of the vulnerable group. “Discrete
and insular minority” evolved over time to include factors such as whether the group has
been historically mistreated or discriminated against, if they are being categorized based
on immutable characteristics (characteristics that are not changeable, like race, or should
not be required to change, like religion), or if the categorization reflects a prejudice rather
than a permissible government objective (Strauss, 2011). The reasoning behind
heightened scrutiny for this population is that if they are historically mistreated by the
government and unable to protect themselves through the political process, the Court may
need to be more aggressive in its consideration of the constitutionality of laws impacting
them, triggering a stricter scrutiny.
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As the Olmstead case arose under subtitle A of Title II (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring, 1999), this review will focus on that section, and examine others only insofar as
they are enlightening comparisons. The Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
(DOJ) was tasked with regulating and enforcing Title II, subtitle A (Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 204). Congress used remarkably broad language, which
the DOJ interpreted as “intended to extend to ‘anything a public entity does’” (Eyer,
2005, p. 276). Public entity was defined as any state or local government, including all
instrumentalities of state and local governments (Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 2012, § 201).
Qualified individuals with a disability were described as people with a disability
who meet the essential eligibility requirements for receipt of services from a public entity
or participation in public programs, with or without reasonable accommodations
(Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 201). Title II decrees that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity” (Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 202). It is noteworthy that the language is almost
exactly the same as § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (see Table 1). The most
prominent difference between the two is the omission of the word “solely” in the ADA’s
language regarding the cause of discrimination (“solely by reason of” versus “by reason
of”).
Title II refers back to the remedies outlined by the Rehabilitation Act for
violations of § 504 (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 203), which in turn
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refers back to the remedies from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 2012, § 505). Available remedies include injunctions and appropriate affirmative
action, which can be pursued as part of a civil action filed by the Department of Justice or
the aggrieved person (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2012, §§ 706, 717; Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 2012, § 505; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 203). In the event
the plaintiff is successful in their lawsuit, if they are a private citizen, they may recover
reasonable attorneys’ fees and associated litigation costs (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2012,
§§ 706, 717; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 2012, § 505; Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 2012, § 203).4
Finally, before leaving the ADA, it is worthwhile to note the difference in
language between the prohibition of discrimination in public services in Title II and the
prohibition of discrimination in employment in Title I, as dissenters in the Olmstead
opinion used this distinction to bolster their argument. In Title I, discrimination based on
disability in employment is prohibited by a “general rule” barring discrimination “against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other” aspects of employment (Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 102). The subsection on the general rule is immediately

4

Subsequent to the passing of the ADA and the Olmstead decision, the Supreme Court
endorsed an as-applied approach to determining whether a private litigant can overcome
state sovereign immunity when suing under Title II of the ADA (see Tennessee v. Lane,
2004). For some areas of Title II’s applicability, a private litigant may be unable to
overcome the state defense of sovereign immunity, although in some areas, such as
access to the courts, the ability of private litigants to sue has been upheld (Tennessee v.
Lane, 2004). However, nothing in this line of cases impacts the ability of the Department
of Justice to sue states over Title II violations.
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followed by a subsection on construction, which details that the term “discrimination” in
the general rule subsection is intended to include, inter alia, “limiting, segregating, or
classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities
or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or
employee” (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 102, emphasis added).
The construction subsection goes on to expound the ways in which an employer
could potentially discriminate against a job applicant or employee, including participating
in a contract that subjects the person with a disability to discrimination, discriminating
against a qualified person because of their relationship to a person with a disability, or
using qualification standards that tend to screen out people with disabilities, if those
qualification standards are not related and necessary (Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 2012, § 102). The construction of “discrimination” actually extends liability for
discrimination beyond just the employer-employee relationship into the relationships of
the employer with other businesses and the employee’s personal relationships. Where
Title I’s construction subsection is rather comprehensive, Title II does not have a
construction subsection – only a comparable general rule against discrimination
(Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 202; see Table 1 for exact language
from Title II).
Title II, subtitle A is remarkably brief overall, especially when compared to other
titles in the ADA. It contains only the definition of a public entity and a qualified person
(§ 201), a general prohibition of discrimination (§ 202), a reference back to the
Rehabilitation Act for available remedies (§ 203), a section tasking the Department of
Justice with developing appropriate regulations (§ 204), and an effective date (§ 205)
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(Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, §§ 201-205). Perhaps its brevity is
partially responsible for the difficulty the United States Supreme Court had in agreeing
on its interpretation.

CHAPTER 4: THE SUPREME COURT’S OLMSTEAD RULINGS
Over forty years after the start of deinstitutionalization, twenty-six years after the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and nine years after the ADA, the United States Supreme
Court decided the Olmstead case (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999). Olmstead
arose from the situation of two plaintiffs in Georgia. The first plaintiff, L.C., was
previously diagnosed with schizophrenia and voluntarily admitted to Georgia Regional
Hospital (GRH) in Atlanta in May 1992. A year later, her treatment team determined she
was sufficiently improved to warrant treatment in a state-run community-based treatment
program. However, the State failed to actually move her into a community-based
treatment program for nearly three more years, until February 1996.
The second plaintiff, E.W., was also voluntarily admitted to GRH, but with a prior
diagnosis of a personality disorder. She arrived at GRH in February 1995 and one month
later, GRH attempted to discharge her to a homeless shelter. This attempt was stopped
short after her attorney filed an administrative complaint. Her treatment team also
determined she was sufficiently improved to warrant treatment in a state-run communitybased treatment program within a year. However, the State also failed to actually move
her into a community-based treatment program for over a year, “until a few months after
the District Court issued its judgment in this case in 1997” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring, 1999, p. 593).
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Procedural History
In May 1995, L.C. filed this lawsuit alleging her continued institutionalization
against her will and the advice of her treatment team violated, inter alia, Title II of the
ADA.5 She requested access to the community-based treatment program and “treatment
with the ultimate goal of integrating her into the mainstream of society” (Olmstead v.
L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 594). E.W. soon joined the lawsuit with matching
allegations and requests. 6
At the District Court level, the plaintiffs won via partial summary judgment (see
Figure 2 for visual depiction of procedural history). The court agreed the State was in
violation of Title II of the ADA because “unnecessary institutional segregation of the
disabled constitutes discrimination per se” under Title II (1997 WL 148674, p. 37a). The
lower court rejected the State’s argument they were not discriminating on the basis of
disability, but merely out of funds (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, emphasis
added). The court not only spurned the State’s attempt to use its limited funds to prove
there was no discrimination, but it also barred the fact of limited funds from sustaining an

L.C.’s initial complaint also alleged her continued institutionalization under these
conditions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 588, 593). However, the lower
court decided the case by interpreting the ADA and never reached the constitutional
claim or the § 1983 claim. Subsequently, the appeals were confined to consideration of
the alleged ADA-based violation.
6 The Court noted that while both E.W. and L.C. were receiving community-based
treatment by the time this case came before the Court, “the case is not moot. As the
District Court and Court of Appeals explained, in view of the multiple institutional
placements L.C. and E.W. have experienced, the controversy they brought to court is
‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p.
594, footnote 6).
5
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affirmative defense that the required transfers were not “reasonable modifications” as
they would “‘fundamentally alter’ the State’s activity” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,
1999, p. 594). In reaching its decision against the affirmative defense offered, the lower
court noted Georgia had state-run community-based treatment programs that required
fewer financial resources per consumer than the state hospital. 7
The State appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
decision of the lower court in part. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court
on the issue of discrimination, and further specified that when a treatment team
recommends a community-based treatment program, “the ADA imposes a duty to
provide treatment in a community setting – the most integrated setting appropriate to that
patient’s needs” (138 F. 3d 893, p. 902).
However, the appeals court rejected the lower court’s response to the State’s costbased affirmative defense. The District Court’s response seemed to ban any argument
that the financial burden of services would fundamentally alter the State’s programs.
Instead, the appeals court indicated the District Court, on remand, should consider
“whether the additional expenditures necessary to treat L.C. and E.W. in communitybased care would be unreasonable given the demands of the State’s mental health
budget” (138 F. 3d 893, p. 905).
Prior to the District Court’s opportunity to reconsider the case on remand, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari “in view of the importance of the

In the plaintiffs’ brief to the United States Supreme Court, they noted that the federal
Department of Health and Human Services approved up to 2109 Medicaid home and
community-based care waiver slots for Georgia, but the state only used 700 (Olmstead v.
L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 601).
7
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question presented to the States and affected individuals,” at least partially because
twenty-two states and the territory of Guam all formerly requested the Supreme Court
grant certiorari (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 596). Between the Court
granting certiorari and deciding the case, the District Court decided the original case on
remand, using the broader consideration of the fundamental alteration defense required
by the appeals court. Unsurprisingly, when considering the cost of treating two people in
light of the State’s entire mental health budget, the change in treatment was not
considered “unreasonable” or fundamentally altering the services (Olmstead v. L.C. ex
rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 596, footnote 7). The State also appealed that decision, which was
pending before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals at the time the United States
Supreme Court announced its opinion on the original case.

Majority and Plurality Opinion
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the opinion of the Court. The opinion she
wrote is divided into multiple parts. Only the first four of the five sections of her opinion
received the necessary five votes, and thereby, represents a majority opinion of the Court.
However, six Justices voted in favor of the final judgment. Additionally, there are
several concurrences and dissents, indicating a high level of disagreement on the Court
for the proper resolution of this case.
In the brief introduction, the issue in the case is described as “concern[ing] the
proper construction of the anti-discrimination provision contained in the public services
portion (Title II) of the [ADA]” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 587). The
Court also briefly stated its ultimate conclusion – affirming the decision of the appeals
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court in substantial part, but also remanding “for further consideration of the appropriate
relief, given the range of facilities the State maintains for the care and treatment of
persons with diverse mental disabilities, and its obligation to administer services with an
even hand” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 587).
After this introduction, the Court reviewed the relevant portions of the ADA upon
which it would rely in reaching its decision in Part I. Part I received five votes (Justices
O’Connor, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens joined Justice Ginsburg) and is considered part of
the opinion of the Court. The Court noted Congress had made several germane findings
in the introduction to the ADA, including that historically, people with disabilities have
often been segregated from society, that discrimination endures in the area of
institutionalization, and that such “forms of discrimination… continue to be a serious and
pervasive social problem,” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 588-589). The
Court acknowledged Congress’s intent for the ADA to abolish discrimination against
people with disabilities. The Court also quoted the general prohibition of discrimination
in public services from Title II, as well as the definitions of public entity and qualified
person, and the section tasking the Department of Justice with issuing regulations
enforcing this subtitle of the ADA.
In footnote one, the Court recognized that the ADA builds upon and extends the
Rehabilitation Act as well as other prior legislation but is the first time Congress has
explicitly recognized segregation and institutionalization as domains of discrimination
against people with disabilities. The Court additionally noted that Title II, subtitle A of
the ADA is entwined with the Rehabilitation Act in several important ways, including
similar remedies and required regulatory coordination. The Attorney General was
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responsible for both sets of regulations, and in both sets, there is an emphasis placed on
providing services “in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of” the person
with a disability (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 591-592). In the Title II
regulations, the Attorney General further specified that an integrated setting is one where
the person with a disability is able “to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest
extent possible” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 592).
Another Title II regulation compels any entities providing public services to
engage in reasonable modifications to prevent discrimination. A modification is not
considered reasonable if it “would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program,
or activity” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 592).8 Finally, in footnotes, the
Court quickly touches on the ADA definition of disability, remedies available, and the
other portions of Title II, related to transportation.
Part II also received five votes (Justices O’Connor, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens
joined Justice Ginsburg) and is considered part of the opinion of the Court. Here, the
Court provided the facts of the case, including its procedural history. Part III is divided
into three subparts: an introduction, subpart A, and subpart B. The introduction and III-A
received the same five votes as Part I and II of the Court’s opinion, but III-B lost Justice
Stevens’s vote, although the final judgment of the Court did receive six votes. Part III-A
addressed the question of whether there was discrimination in this case, while Part III-B
tackled the limits of the “fundamental alteration” defense.

8

The Court noted that while the controversy in the case touches the regulations, it is
about the interpretation of the regulations, not their validity or the appropriate amount of
deference to the agency providing them (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 592).
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Justice Ginsburg began Part III by noting the Attorney General’s two key findings
in creating regulations for Title II: 1) that a lack of integration is a form of discrimination
based on disability, and 2) that while the State had a responsibility to avoid
discrimination, that charge is limited to reasonable modifications. In Part III-A, the Court
held that continued institutionalization against the will of the person with a disability and
against the recommendations of their treatment team was unjustified segregation, which
the Department of Justice has consistently argued is discrimination under the ADA. As
the Department of Justice is the regulating agency for the relevant portion of Title II, “its
views warrant respect” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 598), and “may [be]
properly resort[ed to] for guidance” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 598,
quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 1944, p. 139-140).
The Court rejected the argument of the State and the dissent that there was no
discrimination in this case because the plaintiffs “were not denied community placement
on account of [their] disabilities” and there is no comparison group of similarly situated
individuals without a disability who received preferential treatment – only some people
with disabilities receiving treatment in the community while some remain in an
institution (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 598). The dissent further argued
“this Court has never endorsed an interpretation of the term ‘discrimination’ that
encompassed disparate treatment among members of the same protected class” (Olmstead
v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 616).
The Court responded with three counterpoints to rebuff the arguments of the
dissent and the State. First, the Court looked to Congressional intent for the statute in
question and its regulations. The ADA escalated its language from prior similar
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legislation to include mandatory, rather than hortatory, language as well as extending the
definition of discrimination to include inappropriate segregation itself, and specifically
noted that institutionalization is an area of persistent discrimination. Additionally, the
regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice clearly indicate that integration is a
requirement of the ADA in its mandate to eliminate discrimination against people with
disabilities. Essentially, unjustified segregation, as evidenced by the facts in this case, is
banned discrimination per se due to the language of the statute and its regulations.
Second, the Court argued there is a similarly situated group receiving preferential
treatment: people with physical disabilities. While people with mental health related
disabilities are essentially being required to receive treatment in an institution, people
with physical disabilities are often able to receive treatment in the community. The Court
noted this difference in treatment is particularly troubling in light of how
comprehensively living in an institution reduces one’s ability to participate in social
relationships, professional development, and community life more generally.
Third, in responding to the dissent’s assertion that discrimination has never been
shown by demonstrating differential treatment between members of the same protected
class, the Court provided examples in a footnote to show “the dissent is incorrect as a
matter of precedent and logic” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 598, footnote
10). For the first example, the Court cited to O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., (1996) a case on age discrimination which held that employees over forty years
old are protected, even if the person who was favored over them is also over forty,
provided the plaintiff was discriminated against based on age. The Court also noted the
case of Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Assn. (1980) which held that
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discrimination against black females can be proven even against the context of no
discrimination against black men or white women.
In the final point for this section of the Court’s opinion, the Court unequivocally
stated that nothing in the ADA, its regulations, or this opinion “condones termination of
institutional settings for persons unable to handle or benefit from community settings…
the State generally may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in
determining whether an individual ‘meets the essential eligibility requirements’ for
habilitation in a community-based program” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p.
601-602). Additionally, the Court stressed that there is no federal requirement that
people with disabilities who do not want to be in the community must be placed in
community-based treatment programs. The emphasis is on prohibition of discrimination
via unjustified segregation, not closing every state psychiatric hospital and moving every
person with a mental health disability into the community.
In Part III-B, Justice Ginsburg addressed the affirmative defense of fundamental
alterations, and was joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer. This is the only
portion of the opinion that substantively differs from the lower courts’ holdings in this
case, but it does not have the full weight of an official Court opinion with five Supreme
Court Justice votes. Justice Ginsburg argued that the test put forth by the Court of
Appeals advocating balancing the treatment cost of only the plaintiff(s) against the
State’s mental health budget “would leave the State virtually defenseless,” as the cost for
even several people would almost never be unreasonable in light of the entire State
budget for mental health services (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 603).
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Alternatively, Justice Ginsburg submitted that the fundamental-alteration test
should permit a State to successfully defend on the grounds that the State’s obligation to
care for a large and diverse population of people with mental disabilities would be
inequitably administered, were they required to provide immediate relocation for the
plaintiffs. Essentially, Justice Ginsburg is allowing states to acknowledge the full picture
of their mental health treatment system when arguing they are being faced with a
fundamental alteration to the way their mental health treatment system functions. She
noted that while the District Court was correct in surmising that the State had lower cost
per client when providing treatment in a community-based program as compared to
treatment in an institution, such a “simple comparison … overlooks costs the State cannot
avoid… [such as] increased overall expenses by funding community placements without
being able to take advantage of the savings associated with the closure of institutions”
(Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 604).
Here again, Justice Ginsburg insisted that the ADA does not require States to
close all institutions and “plac[e] patients in need of close care at risk,” nor does it require
States to discharge consumers to any other setting, such as homeless shelters (Olmstead
v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 604). One method of showing a state is “maintain[ing] a
range of facilities and… administer[ing] services with an even hand” is to develop and
implement a plan for moving willing individuals clinically determined to be appropriate
candidates for community placement into less restrictive situations (Olmstead v. L.C. ex
rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 605). Having a waiting list for these community placements was
not prohibited, provided the waiting list moved at a reasonable pace and was not
influenced by a motivation to keep all institutional beds full.
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Concurrences
Justice Stevens concurred in substantial part and in the judgment, but ultimately
withheld his vote from Part III-B. While he agreed there was discrimination in the case,
he cited concerns over appropriate reviewing procedure by the Court regarding the
State’s defense. Justice Stevens argued that since the appeals court had remanded the
case to the District Court for consideration of the State’s “fundamental alteration”
defense, and the District Court’s subsequent decision was pending before the appeals
court, if the Court wanted to correct the application of the defense, the proper method
would have been to take the later iteration of the case on appeal.
Justice Kennedy wrote a two-part concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer joined
him in the first part. He began by noting that despite remarkable advances in treatment
science and advocacy by professionals, people with severe mental illness continue to be
treated at inadequate rates, at least partially due to historic mistreatment and lack of
consistent public resources. He briefly noted that while deinstitutionalization was
executed with “benign objectives,” and was beneficial for many people, it was also “a
psychiatric Titanic” for many others (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 608-609,
quoting Torrey, 1997, p. 11). He unequivocally stated the ADA should not continue the
mistakes of deinstitutionalization:
“It would be unreasonable, it would be a tragic event, then, were the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) to be interpreted so that States had some
incentive, for fear of litigation, to drive those in need of medical care and
treatment out of appropriate care and into settings with too little assistance and
supervision. The opinion of a responsible treating physician in determining the
appropriate conditions for treatment ought to be given the greatest of deference…
States may be pressured into attempting compliance on the cheap, placing
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marginal patients into integrated settings devoid of the services and attention
necessary for their condition.”
(Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 610). He acknowledged Justices Ginsburg’s
careful treatment of this issue in the opinion of the Court and exhorted lower courts to be
judicious in their application of this decision.
In Part II, he explained why he did not join the majority opinion. He did not
interpret the ADA to define unjustified segregation as discrimination per se but did
endorse the possibility that the plaintiffs may be able to show discrimination via
preferential treatment of a similarly situation group – people with physical disabilities.
He recommended the Court remand the case to the District Court in order for there to be
a factual inquiry if there was differential treatment between the two groups, and thereby,
discrimination.

Dissent
The dissent was written by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia. The dissent argued there was no discrimination in this case. Using
the dictionary definition of discrimination, Justice Thomas contended there was no
evidence of differential treatment between people with disabilities and people without
disabilities. They rejected the majority’s contention that Congress intended to broaden
the definition of discrimination to include unjustified segregation by noting the
differences in language between the definitions section of Title I and Title II.
Specifically, as noted in the earlier subsection on the ADA in this dissertation, Title I has
language instructing that “discrimination” should be construed to include unjustified
segregation, among other things. Meanwhile, Title II does not have a section on
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construction. The dissent averred this distinction means that Congress did not intend for
discrimination to be construed as broadly in Title II as in Title I; instead, Congress
intended discrimination to have its plain meaning when applied in Title II.
Additionally, the dissent looked to prior Supreme Court cases interpreting
comparable sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act to support their contention that discrimination could only be shown by identifying a
similarly situated group given preferential treatment. The dissent also cited concerns
about federal overreach into state organization of mental health systems and states being
repeatedly sued for not immediately providing each individual with a disability with the
treatment they desire. The dissent does not address the role of the Department of Justice
regulations in interpreting Title II of the ADA. As discussed in more depth above, the
majority answered these contentions by citing case law where discrimination was noted
between members of the same protected class, using the Department of Justice
regulations for guidance in interpreting the ADA, and relying upon the strongly worded
findings section to decipher Congressional intent for the ADA’s application.
Overall, the Olmstead decision was a milestone in disability law, particularly for
people with developmental disabilities and mental health concerns. Olmstead continues
to reverberate in federal and state policies shaping mental health treatment systems. Its
ultimate mandate is that states must provide community-based treatment programs to
people who are clinically determined to be appropriate for that level of services and who
desire to receive treatment in the community, provided that provision of such treatment
does not require the State to fundamentally alter the way they provide services. Its final
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legacy will be determined by the effectiveness with which states modify their mental
health systems in response to its mandate.

CHAPTER 5: OLMSTEAD RULINGS IN THE U.S. CIRCUIT & DISTRICT COURTS
After Olmstead was decided in 1999, several states proactively took action to
develop what became known as Olmstead plans. By 2004, twenty-nine states, including
Georgia, had developed Olmstead plans (Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, 2004). As U.S.
Supreme Court decisions tend to do, the Court left open several important questions
about precise implementation in its decision, including how to define “a reasonable pace”
and exactly what outcomes indicate a State has an effective plan. Naming a plan
“Olmstead” does not ensure its compliance with the Court’s ambiguous requirements,
leaving even well-intentioned states unsure if their plans were sufficient. Predictably,
lawsuits ensued. Initially, those lawsuits were typically filed by advocacy agencies or
classes of plaintiffs. In 2009, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
started aggressively enforcing Olmstead by suing states with inadequate plans (USDOJ
Civil Rights Division, 2011). This chapter will review the different approaches taken by
courts across the country to apply Olmstead’s vague requirements to state performance.
The subjects of Olmstead plans vary widely, as the ADA defined discrimination
very broadly. State policies may include considerations for people with physical
disabilities, people with developmental disabilities, and people with disabling mental
illness, or any combination thereof. Subsequently, many Olmstead plans are highly
diverse in their efforts to incorporate people with disabilities into the community.
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Reviewing all Olmstead-related litigation for all policies for all people with
disabilities is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, this chapter, and this
dissertation overall, focuses on Olmstead policies related to people with SMI, for two
primary reasons. First, that is the area of study of the author. Second, as is argued in the
first and second chapters of this dissertation, people with SMI are often abandoned in
major policy shifts for easier-to-treat populations, as was seen in deinstitutionalization,
and they often do not have much political capital with which to protect themselves.
Therefore, this chapter’s review of litigation subsequent to the Olmstead decision is
limited to cases applicable to people with SMI, specifically in their search for access to
treatment services in the community to avoid unjustifiable segregation.
First, this chapter will review the only two federal appellate circuits to articulate
the qualities of an “effective Olmstead plan” in the context of moving people from
institutions into the community. Next, relevant district court decisions from other circuits
will also be examined. Finally, relevant Department of Justice lawsuits, particularly the
terms of their settlement agreements (i.e., consent decrees), will be discussed. As the
United States Supreme Court has not revisited Olmstead or further clarified its
requirements in this regard, looking to the style of enforcement by the courts will provide
instructional sets of evaluative criteria, which will be examined in the empirical section
of this dissertation.

Appellate Court Decisions
While many courts around the country have sought to interpret several of the legal
grey areas surrounding the Olmstead decision and the ADA, only the Third Circuit and
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the Ninth Circuit have evaluated state plans for “continuing deinstitutionalization,” and
they came to markedly different conclusions.

Third Circuit
The Third Circuit includes the states of New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania.
The relevant case that was ultimately decided by the appellate court began in 2001 and
arose initially from the situation of four adult plaintiffs: Frederick L., Nina S., Kevin C.,
and Steven F. (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2001). These four plaintiffs were
hospitalized at Norristown State Hospital (NSH) in Pennsylvania. One plaintiff,
Frederick, had been recommended for discharge from the state hospital in July 1997,
while another, Kevin, had been recommended for discharge in February 1999. Steven
had also been recommended for discharge, but the date is not noted in the court’s
opinions. Nina had not yet received any such recommendations, but the court seems to
attribute this to the observed tendency of NSH professionals to be unaware of services
available in the community (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2001, p. 514).
Furthermore, the court noted that potential discharges from NSH are only evaluated for
community readiness “based on the capacity of the individual to fit – however awkwardly
– into existing programs,” as opposed to considering their community readiness had more
comprehensive and inclusive community services been available (Frederick L. v. Dept. of
Public Welfare, 2001, p. 514).
The lawsuit overall survived a motion to dismiss, but not without a few casualties;
some counts were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but some ADA and all
Rehabilitation Act claims were able to proceed (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare,
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2001). Over the next four years, the case was decided by the district court, then appealed,
vacated, and remanded, decided by the district court again, and then appealed, vacated,
and remanded yet again (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005). Both district
court decisions found in favor of the defendants, holding they had established the
affirmative fundamental alteration defense described by the Court in Olmstead (Frederick
L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002; Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004b).
The first district court decision included recitation of several relevant facts. First,
the class of plaintiffs had grown from four individuals to three hundred members
(Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002). All individuals hospitalized at NSH for
non-forensic reasons were included as members of the plaintiff class. This group of
individuals is observed to be most commonly diagnosed with schizophrenia (52%),
followed by schizoaffective disorder (30%). Members of the plaintiff class tended to fall
into one of two categories: about one-third of individuals are hospitalized for a short term
(less than two years) and about two-thirds are at NSH for a long term (more than two
years), with the average length of stay being ten months and 12.5 years, respectively.
The court noted, “defendants admit that at any given time, NSH treatment professionals
consider approximately one third of NSH’s civil patients clinically stable and ready for
discharge” (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 591). At the time of initial
trial, that would have included approximately one hundred members of the plaintiff class.
The court also made several important observations about the structure of funding
for mental health services in Pennsylvania (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare,
2002). The Department of Public Welfare (DPW), as part of the executive branch,
develops and proposes an annual budget, which is submitted to the legislature for

45
approval or modification. DPW then receives back funds that are explicitly earmarked
for particular programs within the budget, with no discretionary funds or authority to
modify funding allocations. Under state law, individual counties are responsible for
developing community mental health services. The county sends needs assessments and
annual budgets to DPW for funding. Overall, DPW and its annual legislatively approved
budget account for approximately eighty percent of the costs for state psychiatric
hospitals and ninety percent of the costs for the county community mental health
services.
Additionally, discharge procedures at NSH are described by the court as
somewhat haphazard. NSH declined to develop and manage a waiting list of individuals
ready for discharge, ostensibly because “discharge planning is an individualized process”
and discharge readiness may change while waiting for placement (Frederick L. v. Dept.
of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 586). The length of waiting time for a community placement
is seen as highly variable, due to rare vacancies in community programs and
unpredictable acceptance rates by community providers. There is no evidence presented
by the defense that there exists a comprehensive plan for efficient movement of
discharge-ready individuals into less restrictive settings; in fact, the court noted that a
defense witness explicitly admitted there was no such plan at trial (Frederick L. v. Dept.
of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 587).
As the court began its Olmstead analysis, it is undisputed that the allegation of
discrimination under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act via unjustified segregation is
valid; the only real question is whether the changes to the system to reduce this
discrimination would be reasonable modifications or a fundamental alteration of the
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state’s mental health programs (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002). The
plaintiffs requested the defendants be required to develop at least sixty community
placements per year, with an estimated cost of approximately $6.7 million per year. The
court acknowledged that while community-based services are less expensive than
hospitalizations, oftentimes, states face the cost of developing community-based services
while maintaining hospitals, creating a substantial financial burden. The court
additionally recognized that states have a floor effect on how much money they can save
by increasing discharges from the state hospital, as the state hospital must remain open,
and so has fixed costs.
The court described the plurality decision by the Olmstead Court on the
fundamental alteration defense as explicitly rejecting both a simple comparison of the
cost of the plaintiffs’ integration to the whole of the state’s mental health budget (which
would result in the plaintiffs winning almost every time), as well as rejecting a finding
that any increase in costs “constitutes a fundamental alteration per se” (which would
result in the state winning almost every time) (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare,
2002, p. 592). Rather, the fundamental alteration defense requires a more moderate
analysis: if the requested accommodation is reasonable, while “taking into account the
resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities”
(Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 592, quoting Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring, 1999, p. 603). The court clarified that “resources available to the State” means
only the state’s allocated mental health budget.
Within this analytical context, the court finds for the defendants. The analysis
seems to be driven by two factors: DPW’s established track record of increasingly
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developing community placements over time and the inadequacy of the financial
resources allotted to DPW. The court showed deference to DPW and its consistent
efforts “to establish more and more community-based programs… to the extent possible,
given fiscal realities” (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 593). However,
the court only noted the financial limitations DPW was restrained to work within, and did
not comment or criticize further, as the mental health budget of the state was approved by
the legislature, and not subject to judicial review.
Essentially, the court seemed resigned that DPW had an insufficient budget but
had a record of making the best of a bad situation, which assured the court DPW would
continue to do so in the future. As the court could only review DPW’s decisions on how
to use the funds appropriated for it by the legislature, not the legislature’s decision on the
amount of funds to be appropriated, the court concluded, “simply, absent an increase in
funding, there is no way for Defendants to provide the relief sought by Plaintiffs without
depriving others of mental health care” (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002, p.
593). The court noted that not only are the plaintiffs discontented, but the defendants and
the court are frustrated as well.
Fortunately, the plaintiffs appealed (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare,
2004a). The appeal drew the appellate court’s attention to three claims primarily. First, a
fundamental alteration defense could not be established solely by claiming an immediate
net increase in cost. Second, it was an err for the District Court to not review DPW’s role
in the budget development, specifically prior to the submission of the proposed budget to
the legislature. Third, DPW had failed to provide anything resembling a comprehensive
plan for future efficient movement of appropriate individuals into the community, instead
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only claiming that as DPW had, in the past, developed community placements as
proactively as they could with allotted appropriations and any budget excess, they would
continue to do so in the future.
First, the court agreed with the appellants that a fundamental alteration defense
could not be established solely by claiming an immediate net increase in cost; however,
the court held that DPW had provided evidence that it had repeatedly and unsuccessfully
attempted to procure additional funds for its community placements as well as spending
any budgetary excess for that purpose. Additionally, the court rejected the appellants’
argument that the majority of the cost for additional community placements would
eventually be tempered by savings from hospital bed closures as the exact “reductive cost
comparisons” the Olmstead plurality had renounced (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public
Welfare, 2004a, p. 497). The Third Circuit also agreed with the District Court that the
legislative process by which annual budgets are set is beyond judicial scrutiny. Overall,
in response to the contention that DPW should have managed its funds other than it did,
the Third Circuit described the requested cost shifting as exactly the type deemed to be a
fundamental alteration by the Olmstead plurality – that which would require the state to
unfairly and inequitably administer services, ultimately at the expense of non-plaintiff
service recipients.
Finally, the order to vacate and remand the case rested only on the final
contention by the appellants: DPW had not done enough in providing a plan for the future
to sustain a fundamental alteration defense. The Third Circuit agreed with the District
Court that Pennsylvania could be given credit for its progress in deinstitutionalization
since the 1950s; however, the Third Circuit further required “a commitment to action in a
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manner for which it can be held accountable by the courts” in the future (Frederick L. v.
Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004a, p. 500).
The District Court, on remand, reviewed the planning practices of DPW to
determine their sufficiency for a fundamental alteration defense (Frederick L. v. Dept. of
Public Welfare, 2004b). The guidance provided by the Third Circuit was relatively
vague, requiring primarily the ability to hold the state accountable with only three
additional concrete parameters: 1) a piece of paper was not required to have a plan, 2)
NSH’s current practices of monthly reviews of hospitalized individuals was insufficient,
and 3) ordering DPW to develop sixty community-based residential slots each year was
too extreme a requirement (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004b, p. 5).
Plaintiffs contended that nothing less than a “‘concrete plan’ with ‘measurable outcomes’
and a ‘timeline for the discharge of unnecessarily institutionalized class members’”
would suffice (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004b, p. 7). However, the court
explicitly rejected this argument, noting that if such specific parameters were required,
the Third Circuit could have easily expressed that.
Instead, the court focused on the state’s general planning efforts. Essentially, the
court found that since February 2000, the state had been developing comprehensive plans
based on formal needs assessments, organized by the geographic service areas of the nine
state psychiatric hospitals. The plans had clearly articulated goals of developing more
community services and reducing reliance on the state psychiatric hospitals as primary
providers of mental health care services in the state. The court also noted the
development of county level planning initiatives, and an overall trend of
deinstitutionalization in the state in recent years, including over half of the plaintiffs in
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the original lawsuit. Overall, DPW’s plan for the future was declared to be sufficient for
a fundamental alteration defense, given that it was “comprehensive, holistic, and forwardlooking… [offering] a full range of mental health services, with an emphasis on not only
discharging current hospitalized patients, but also seeking to avoid hospitalization…
demonstrat[ing] DPW’s central and long-term commitment that all reasonable steps will
be taken to continue the past progress” (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004b,
p. 7).
Turns out, the Third Circuit actually agreed with the plaintiffs, criticizing DPW’s
approach as “a vague assurance of the individual patient’s future deinstitutionalization
rather than some measurable goals for community integration for which DPW may be
held accountable” (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 156). The Third
Circuit was particularly disparaging of DPW’s failure to turn the plans for the nine
service areas into a state-wide plan, and the final plans including “amorphous, i.e., nonspecific goal of closing up to 250” hospital beds per year (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public
Welfare, 2005, p. 158). In perhaps the most scathing sentences of the opinion, the court
wrote,
DPW remains silent as to when, if ever, eligible patients at NSH can expect to be
discharged. Instead, DPW proffers general assurances and good faith intentions
to effectuate deinstitutionalization. General assurances and good-faith intentions
neither meet the federal laws nor a patient’s expectations. Their implementation
may change with each administration… they are simply insufficient guarantors in
light of the hardship inflicted upon patients through unnecessary and indefinite
institutionalization.
(Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 158).
Ultimately, the Third Circuit held that states must have written plans with specific
and measurable goals of fewer state psychiatric hospital beds by particular dates. The
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court seemed to view brightline markers, such as lower bed numbers by certain dates, as
crucial elements of accountability. While the Third Circuit respected Pennsylvania’s
“strong commitment in the past to deinstitutionalization,” as it had decreased the hospital
population from 40,000 to 3,000 in the fifty years preceding, the court clearly articulated
concerns about that trend continuing in the face of changing leadership without clearly
articulated expectations (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 156). Rather, a
specific date of discharge for an approximate number of people, along with discharge
eligibility requirements and “a general description of the collaboration required between
the local authorities and the housing, transportation, care, and education agencies to
effectuate integration into the community” was necessary for a state’s fundamental
alteration defense (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 160).9

Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit includes the states of Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon,
California, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, and Arizona. Both Washington and California have

9

The Third Circuit also decided a remarkably similar case in 2005, a few months before
issuing their second opinion on Frederick L (Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc.
v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 2005). A nursing home that served
almost exclusively the elderly population discharged from the state psychiatric hospitals
was challenged as violating the ADA’s integration mandate after staff reported to DPW
that “80% of its residents ‘could function in the community now if the necessary
community support services were in place and operational’ and that none of its residents
were precluded from leaving ‘due to serious medical problems that cannot be met in the
community’” (Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department
of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 378). The appellate court’s opinion in that case is effectively
an encore to their first opinion on Frederick L.; DPW failed “to demonstrate a reviewable
commitment to action… and thus DPW’s fundamental alteration defense must fail”
(Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare, 2005, p. 383).
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had cases reviewed by the Ninth Circuit to evaluate the sufficiency of the state plan in
establishing a fundamental alteration defense by proactively reducing the unjustifiable
segregation of people with disabilities (Sanchez v. Johnson, 2005; Arc of Washington
State, Inc. v. Braddock, 2005).10 In both cases, the challenges were related to the
administration of Medicaid waiver program to aid states in providing services in the
community. Specifically, in both cases, plaintiffs contended that the waiver program was
insufficient because the state should have requested additional waivers from Medicaid, as
there were eligible individuals unable to move from the institutions into the community
due to lack of program slots.
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit found that due to the state’s enthusiastic use of the
existing program along with other proactive endeavors to protect and grow the outpatient
services options, even in the face of budget cuts for other programs, provided a sufficient
basis for a fundamental alteration defense. Unlike the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit
does not require written plans or specific discharge dates for approximate groups of
people but does require more than just lower hospital populations (Sanchez v. Johnson,
2005; Arc of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock, 2005). The Ninth Circuit requires
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Both cases had as plaintiffs people with developmental disabilities or private
organizations that served only people with developmental disabilities, or both. The
programs being challenged were directed by an administrative arm of the state executive
branch dedicated to providing services only to people with developmental disabilities.
However, the court made no distinction in its analysis specific to the type of disability of
the plaintiffs, indicating they would likely use the same approach to evaluate a similar
lawsuit involving people with SMI, meaning this decision is also shaping Olmstead
policy for people with SMI indirectly. As will be seen throughout this chapter, there is
relatively little litigation directly dealing with the original Olmstead issue – the
responsibility of the state to create and maintain a comprehensive plan that effectively
moves individuals with SMI who are determined to be ready for discharge by themselves
and their treatment team into the community – so, states and researchers must take their
cues from any relevant and applicable decisions.

53
significant budget increases in community services and community-based waiver
programs, despite fiscal constraints.
In California, the Ninth Circuit seemed particularly impressed that “California
ha[d] a successful record of personalized evaluations leading to a reasonable rate of
deinstitutionalization” coupled with strong support of community-based treatment
programs (Sanchez v. Johnson, 2005, p. 1068). In particular, the appellate court
applauded California’s database of people currently institutionalized and the services they
would likely need to be successful in the community, along with the individualized plans
to connect the person to those resources in the community and develop the skills in the
person. Perhaps most convincingly, the Ninth Circuit found that California had increased
funding for community-based treatment services, including the waiver program, and
concomitantly decreased its hospital population over the past several years.
Similarly, when Washington’s Olmstead plan was challenged, it also survived
primarily because of the state’s focus on funding community treatment alternatives (Arc
of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock, 2005). While many state agencies had their
funding decreased in the 1990s, Washington more than doubled its investment in
community-based treatment programs for people with disabilities during that same time.
Washington concurrently increased the available slots in its waiver program and
decreased its institutional population.
The Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that an expansion to a state’s administration of
a Medicaid waiver program was not a per se fundamental alteration, and could, in
unspecified circumstances, be a reasonable modification. However, the court emphasized
that it would not “tinker with” a state’s “comprehensive, effectively working plan”
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especially if its opportunities for community treatment are continually increasing both in
budget and real number of program slots, it consistently uses all available community
treatment opportunities, and it shows evidence of a continuing trend of
deinstitutionalization (Arc of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock, 2005, p. 621, quoting
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 605). The court described as unnecessary a
hypothetical statewide plan that provided for immediate community placement as soon as
an individual became eligible, citing back to Olmstead’s acceptable of a reasonable
waiting list (Sanchez v. Johnson, 2005, p. 1068, quoting Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,
1999, p. 606).

District Court Decisions
There is relatively little litigation directly dealing with the original Olmstead issue
– the responsibility of the state to create and maintain a comprehensive plan that
effectively moves individuals with SMI into the community once they are determined to
be ready for discharge by themselves and their treatment team. The most pertinent cases
arose in Florida, Minnesota, and Maryland. However, there are several additional cases
which, even if addressing slightly different issues, contribute meaningfully to our
understanding of how courts are approaching the application of Olmstead to people with
SMI as they try to integrate into the community following hospitalization.

Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit includes the states of Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. Twelve plaintiffs, all diagnosed with a traumatic
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brain injury or developmental disability, filed suit against a state hospital in Maryland,
alleging they could receive appropriate care in the community and the state’s failure to
provide such placements for them violated the ADA inter alia (Williams v. Wasserman,
2001). Several of the plaintiffs waited for months for a community placement after their
treatment team labelled them ready for a less restrictive service setting. Several plaintiffs
had also gone back and forth between community and institutional placements, as the
intensity of their clinical needs changed over time. The District Court ultimately held
there were distinct periods of unjustifiable segregated in violation of the ADA, but the
state successfully mounted a fundamental alteration defense.
In coming to its conclusion, the court relied heavily on the state’s history of
deinstitutionalization. Specifically, the court noted the state has gradually closed several
institutions over the past ten years while concurrently expanding community programs,
including both residential programs, such as group homes or staff drop-ins for private
residences, and complementary day programming, such as vocational or educational
programs (Williams v. Wasserman, 2001). The court also observed that state “mental
hospitals” went from a population of 7,114 residents in 1970 to approximately 1200 in
1997, while community treatment services throughout the state increased, including the
state’s extensive utilization of Medicaid “waiver” programs (Williams v. Wasserman,
2001, p. 634). The court applauded the state for also having used savings from hospital
closings to grow community programs while prioritizing those community programs over
institutional programs anytime a budget shortage loomed.
Interestingly, the court quoted the Olmstead acknowledgement of the dynamic
nature of many individual’s clinical needs: “Some individuals ‘may need institutional
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care from time to time to stabilize acute psychiatric symptoms’ … the ADA is not
reasonably read to compel a State to put patients at risk by closing its institutions or to
drive a State to move institutionalized patients into ‘inappropriate’ settings” (Williams v.
Wasserman, 2001, p. 636-637, quoting Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 605).
For Maryland, testimony from an administrator in the Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene approximated the needed number of on-going hospital beds to be between 1100
and 1200 - very close to the overall available beds in Maryland at the time of litigation.
The court noted that the plaintiffs themselves have periodically benefitted from
rehospitalizations as their needs have fluctuated.
Overall, Maryland successfully defended on fundamental alteration grounds due
to its historical trend of deinstitutionalization down to the limit advised by the chief
administrator of the state mental health system, combined with an observed focus on
developing diverse community placement opportunities, even at the potential expense of
institutional programs (Williams v. Wasserman, 2001). This approach seems quite
consistent with the approach espoused by the Ninth Circuit, with its emphasis on a trend
of deinstitutionalization coupled with the distinct development of varied community
placement opportunities.

Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit includes the states of Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas, Minnesota,
Missouri, North Dakota, and South Dakota. In 2009, a group of individuals with
developmental disabilities sued the state of Minnesota for inappropriate use of restraint
and seclusion (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2015). In 2011, the parties

57
jointly submitted a settlement agreement, which was accepted by the court, with the
condition of the court’s temporarily continued supervision to ensure initial compliance
with the terms of the agreement (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2011).
The settlement agreement terms included all people with disabilities, stretching beyond
the original plaintiff group.
While generally, the terms of a settlement agreement are primarily determined by
the parties, the court’s involvement elevates the agreement beyond the status of a
voluntary contract to a judgment of the court; it “places the power and prestige of the
court behind the compromise struck by the parties” (Williams v. Vukovich, 1983, p. 920).
The Minnesota court in this case took that charge seriously and reviewed the terms of the
settlement agreement meticulously.
One of the settlement agreement terms was “System Wide Improvements” specifically, the development of “a comprehensive Olmstead Plan to improve the lives of
individuals with disabilities” (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2015, p.
1070). The court demanded that within eighteen months, Minnesota not only develop but
implement this plan, which must use “measurable goals to increase the number of people
with disabilities receiving services that best meet their individual needs and in the ‘Most
Integrated Setting,’” in accordance with the Olmstead decision (Jensen v. Minnesota
Dept. of Human Services, 2015, p. 1070). More than three years after the settlement
agreement was accepted, and after rejecting four prior versions, the court finally found
Minnesota’s proposed plan to be sufficient on September 29, 2015 (Jensen v. Minnesota
Dept. of Human Services, 2015).
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The court cited three specific attributes as imperative to the plan’s acceptability.
First, the revised plan had “concrete, measurable goals with corresponding time lines” in
contrast to the “vague assurances of future integrated options” previously offered by the
state (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2015, p. 1072). The goals include
baseline data with annual improvement targets for multiple domains. Additionally,
missing data for relevant goals were explicitly identified for future collection.
Second, the goals of the revised plan were pertinent to the Olmstead mission with
“specific and realistic strategies for achieving each goal,” and clearly indicated which
agencies were responsible for each goal (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services,
2015, p. 1073). Finally, the revised plan also included an annual review and formal
amendment process to ensure the plan was a “dynamic roadmap” that could be
responsive to newly identified needs while committing to reaching the pre-identified
goals (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2015, p. 1073). Interestingly, in the
last paragraph of the discussion, the court explicitly directs the state, with unambiguous
language, to treat these commitments as “a top priority… The Court wishes to strongly
emphasize that the State must prioritize its allocation of funding to meet and achieve the
Olmstead Plan’s goals. The State may not rely on the excuse of insufficient funding to
avoid following through on the important commitments it has made” (Jensen v.
Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2015, p. 1074, emphasis added).
A review of the document submitted by the state of Minnesota to the court in
2015 reveals a number of service areas, each given a set of measurable goals, with
baseline data and annual improvement targets, realistic and specific strategies for
proposed improvements, and clearly identified agencies responsible for the changes
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(Minnesota Olmstead Subcabinet, 2015). Service areas include person-centered
planning, transition services, housing services, employment, lifelong learning and
education, waiting lists, transportation, healthcare and healthy living, positive supports,
crisis services, and community engagement. Each service area has a section on defining
the services and needs of people with disabilities, a vision statement, the current situation
in that area, and specific, measurable goals by annual improvement rate with exact
baseline data.
The plan that finally survived the scrutiny of the District Court seems to be a
combination of the approaches used by the Ninth and Third Circuit. Similar to the Third
Circuit, the court requires more than vague assurances of good faith, but specific goals to
which the state can be held accountable. However, unlike the Third Circuit, the court
seem unfazed at commandeering the state’s annual budget development by demanding
compliance with its obligations under the settlement agreement. Similar to the Ninth
Circuit, the court emphasized the concurrent development of community resources rather
than only lower numbers in the state hospital census. Ultimately, the court enforced a far
more comprehensive and intricate standard for a plan than has been seen in other courts.

Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit includes the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia. In Florida,
a class of currently or formerly hospitalized individuals brought suit against a state
psychiatric hospital, G. Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital (GPW) alleging violations of the
US Constitution, the ADA, and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA;
Johnson v. Murphy, 2001). The majority of the approximately 350 individuals
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hospitalized at GPW were adults with SMI; 85% were civilly committed. Every month,
GPW has approximately thirty people admitted and thirty people discharged. After a
month-long trial, the District Court found in favor of the defendants on all allegations. In
regard to the ADA claims specifically, the District Court held the plaintiffs did not prove
that GPW violated the ADA by failing to place clients in the most integrated setting
appropriate, given their clinical needs.
In coming to this conclusion, the court seemed to focus on several GPW policies
and facts related to planning and performance of patient discharge (Johnson v. Murphy,
2001). First, the court found GPW’s preparation for patient discharge to begin at
admission and proceed satisfactorily until actual discharge. Upon admittance at GPW,
both treatment and discharge planning began immediately, were updated regularly based
on individual changes, and involved communication with people in the community who
would support the individual upon discharge, including community case workers, family,
and community mental health providers. There are usually few people awaiting
discharge from GPW, with an average wait time of thirty to sixty days (Johnson v.
Murphy, 2001, p. 9).
Second, the court found the options for community placement to be sufficient in
terms of both being geared towards a diverse array of patient needs and being reasonably
successful at meeting those needs. Once treatment providers believe an individual may
be ready for community placement, there are a variety of community placement options
available, including assisted living facilities and private apartments, of which “few, if
any, of them operate at full capacity” (Johnson v. Murphy, 2001, p. 9). Community case
managers are heavily relied upon to help connect recently discharged individuals to local
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services. Additionally, GPW has a community outreach program “based on” an
Assertive Community Treatment Team model through which GPW strives to support
people as they are discharged (Johnson v. Murphy, 2001, p. 8). The majority of those
discharged from GPW go to family homes or private apartments, with about 20% going
into group living situations, such as assisted-living facilities. After discharge, most
people are able to remain in the community.
In this case, unlike the cases from the Ninth, Fourth, and Third Circuits, the court
did not find evidence of discrimination via unjustified segregation. The average wait
time for discharge after determination of eligibility in this case was thirty to sixty days, in
stark contrast to the multiple years waited for discharge in the Olmstead and Frederick L.
cases. Therefore, there was no need for the state to try to defend on the grounds that the
requested accommodations were unreasonable as a fundamental alteration of the state’s
mental health system.

Other Developments in the District and Appellate Courts
There are several cases, at both the district court and appellate court levels, that
outline a few cornerstone principles for how courts are approaching the application of
Olmstead. First, in agreement with similar holdings described earlier in this chapter, it
seems universally accepted that vague financial concerns are not sufficient to support a
state’s fundamental alteration defense. In Makin v. Hawaii (1999), a class of people with
developmental disabilities sued the state for ADA violations, inter alia, alleging the state
had not provided sufficient community placements, as evidenced by their extended tenure
on a stagnant waiting list. The state contended that providing the requested increase in
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community placements could only be accomplished through the creation of an
“unlimited” state fund for community mental health services. The district court was not
persuaded by the state’s argument, holding that a vaguely-defined potential funding
problem was not adequate to protect the state against ADA violations. Additionally, in
Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority (2003), the Tenth Circuit declared that
allowing any alteration of services requiring the state to shift or increase funding to
qualify as a fundamental alteration would effectively eviscerate the integration mandate
of the ADA.
Second, while appellate courts have held that the ADA does not require states to
develop new programs for people with disabilities (Rodriguez v. City of New York, 1999),
the Ninth Circuit held that requiring the extension of a current program to a new, more
integrated location was not the creation of an entirely new program (Townsend v.
Quasim, 2003). The court indicated that allowing merely the location of service
provision to dictate whether the program in question was new would render the
integration mandate meaningless as more integrated settings tend to be in different
locations, almost by definition.
Third, the protections of Olmstead are not limited to those currently
institutionalized, but also apply to state policies that increase an individual’s risk for
institutionalization, such as capping the number of monthly prescriptions covered (Fisher
v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority, 2003) or denying access to supportive medical
devices that make independent living more achievable (Davis v. Shah, 2016).
Fourth, Olmstead cannot be applied in reverse; while it is discriminatory to hold
someone able and willing to live in the community unjustifiably segregated in an
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institutional setting, it is not discriminatory to discharge someone who does not want to
be discharged. In Illinois (Illinois League of Advocates for the Developmentally Disabled
v. Illinois Department of Human Services, 2015) and New Jersey (Sciarrillo v. Christie,
2013), two cases were decided against the plaintiffs when they sued claiming the closure
of their state institution and subsequent forced discharge into the community was
discrimination under the ADA. Essentially, the ADA only prohibits unjustifiable
segregation, not unwanted integration, so the protections of the ADA are never triggered.
Finally, Olmstead simply does not apply to individuals who do not want to live in
the community or whose treatment teams do not agree they are ready to move into the
community, as those are individuals who are not unjustifiably segregated; therefore, the
protections of the ADA are not triggered. Nothing in Olmstead requires states to override
the clinical judgment of its treatment professionals to place an individual in an integrated
setting if their treatment team is not confident the individual could be appropriately
treated in that setting (Black v. Department of Mental Health, 2000). Similarly, if an
individual objects to a transfer to a more integrated setting, the state may not justify their
actions by citing Olmstead, as Olmstead was meant to protect those who want to move
into the community, not force people with disabilities into alternative settings over their
objection (In re Easly, 2001).

Department of Justice
The Department of Justice has been aggressively involved in Olmstead related
litigation for almost a decade, resulting in multiple amicus curiae briefs, joined lawsuits,
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and solo lawsuits about policies affecting people with a diverse array of disabilities.11
Four states had settlement agreements (i.e., consent decrees) particularly relevant to the
issue of people with SMI integrating into the community after hospitalization on a scale
large enough to require comprehensive state mental health policy modification: Georgia,
Delaware, North Carolina, and New Hampshire. The requirements of the settlement
agreement for each state are reviewed here.
The Department of Justice took a relatively consistent approach to their settlement
agreements, although its approach was decidedly different than the Third or Ninth
Circuits, or even Minnesota’s long disputed settlement agreement. The Department of
Justice often required specific infrastructure and mental health system development,
centering around Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) teams and crisis services,
rather than a focus on census numbers in the state hospital or funding shifts. Most
developments are required stepwise over time (e.g., a quarter of the total required is due
every year over a four- to five-year period), but for the sake of brevity only totals are
presented here. See Table 2 for a summary and below for a comprehensive discussion of
the major terms of the four primary settlement agreements.

Georgia
Georgia was sued by the Department of Justice in early 2010, after an
investigation in 2009. The settlement agreement was reached by October 2010 and

11

All information in this section is from documents publicly available on Olmstead
enforcement page of the Department of Justice website
(https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/olmstead_enforcement.htm). A database of documents,
including court filings, settlement agreements, and annual court reports was compiled and
reviewed for trends in settlement agreement requirements to inform this section.
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targeted both people with SMI and DD. The provisions in the settlement agreement
pertaining to people with DD mainly required closing down the state institution within 4
years and moving all individuals to the community through creation of 1150 home and
community-based waivers, along with development of family support and crisis services.
The provisions in the settlement agreement pertaining to people with SMI targeted
approximately 9000 individuals total, including those in the state hospitals, frequently
admitted to the state hospitals or local emergency rooms, chronically homeless, or soon
to be released from prisons or jails. This target population included people with SMI
who also have a forensic status, provided the proper court has authorized community
placement, although the settlement agreement explicitly states those who must register as
sex offenders may understandably require additional time to place in the community.
Crisis Services
Georgia was required by the settlement agreement to establish a number of crisis
services, including walk-in crisis centers, crisis stabilization programs, community-based
psychiatric hospital beds for short-term stabilization, a crisis hotline, crisis apartments,
and mobile crisis response teams. Within about 4.5 years, Georgia needed to create six
physical locations for crisis walk-in psychiatric and counseling services, staffed twentyfour hours a day and seven days a week. Within about 3.5 years, Georgia needed to
provide three crisis stabilization programs that provided community residential services
for psychiatric stabilization and detoxification with sixteen beds each. Additionally, the
state was required to fund thirty-five psychiatric beds in community hospitals for shortterm psychiatric stabilization to prevent readmittance to the state hospital.
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Georgia was also to develop and maintain a toll-free crisis hotline to provide
information about community resources, along with eighteen crisis apartments staffed by
peer specialists and paraprofessionals within 4.5 years to accommodate those who might
need respite but not necessarily hospitalization or residential services. Each apartment
should be sufficient to serve two individuals. Finally, Georgia was required to develop in
the following 4.5 years adequate mobile crisis response teams to be able to respond to
individuals experiencing a mental health crisis anywhere in the state within an hour. The
crisis teams had to be operational to reach ninety-one of Georgia’s one hundred fifty-nine
counties within an hour and ten minutes within 2.5 years, and then incrementally expand
its reach and decrease its response time over the next two years.
ACT
Georgia was required to have 22 ACT teams within approximately 2.5 years that
can include a psychiatrist, nurse, psychologist, social worker, substance abuse specialist,
vocational rehabilitation specialist, and peer specialist. Each team can have between
seven and ten of these professionals, but the only required category is peer specialist.
The team is to operate in fidelity with the Dartmouth model, be available 24/7 for crisis
response to prevent hospitalization, and offer case management, assessment, psychiatric
services, employment/housing assistance, family support and education, substance abuse
treatment, along with crisis services. Each team is to have no more than ten clients per
ACT Team member.
Case Management
Georgia needed to develop eight Community Support Teams (CSTs) within about
2.5 years to meet with individuals in their homes to connect individuals to resources in
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the community to prevent hospitalization. CSTs needed to have at least three team
members, including a nurse, a peer specialist, and one or two paraprofessionals, and serve
no more than twenty clients per team member in rural areas and no more than thirty
clients per team member in urban areas. CSTs were intended to operate in areas where
there was a lack of mental health professionals or in concert with ACT services.
Georgia also needed to develop fourteen Intensive Case Management (ICM)
teams within about 3.5 years. ICM teams would each have ten full-time case managers
per team to connect individuals to resources in the community to prevent hospitalization
through service coordination. These teams were to be supervised by a licensed mental
health professional and serve no more than twenty clients per team member in rural areas
and no more than thirty clients per team member in urban areas. Finally, Georgia was
also to hire forty-five individual case managers within about 4.5 years to work with
clients who already had services and supports in place. Each case manager was to have
no more than fifty clients.
Supported Housing
Within 4.5 years, Georgia was required to have the capacity to provide supported
housing opportunities to any of the approximately nine thousand people with SMI in the
target population who need housing support, including an estimated 2000 individuals
who were unable to qualify for other benefits (e.g., federal disability). The Department
of Justice described supported housing as permanent housing with all the regular tenancy
rights of rental properties but augmented by opportunities to voluntarily participate in
flexible psychosocial support programs.
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Half of the supported housing units were required to be “scatter-site housing”:
housing units in buildings where no more than twenty percent or two units, whichever is
greater, are supported housing units, as opposed to grouping multiple units into one
building. Of the total supported housing units, only sixty percent could be two-bedroom
apartments; the remaining forty percent were required to be one-bedroom apartments.
Georgia was also required to provide bridge funding to support individuals who were
eligible for other benefits to fund their supported housing. The bridge funding could be
used for rental deposits, household necessities, or living expenses to help the individual
transition smoothly to supported housing.
Supported Employment
Georgia was required to provide supported employment services to 550
individuals within 4.5 years and do so in accordance with an evidence-based supported
employment model, such as that outlined by the SAMHSA Supported Employment
toolkit.
Family and Peer Supports
Within 3.5 years, Georgia was required to not only provide peer support services
to individuals also receiving ACT and CST services, but to an additional 835 individuals
as well.
Transition Planning
Georgia was required to hire one case manager and one transition specialist per
state psychiatric hospital within 1.5 years whose sole mission was to coordinate transfers
of individuals out of the state psychiatric hospital into the community. The services of
these case managers and transition specialists were to be engaged particularly in cases
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were the individual has a behavioral or medical history that indicated they may be more
challenging than average to discharge, or if the treatment team either does not
recommend discharge or cannot agree upon a discharge plan. The transition specialist
was also tasked with review of the transition plan for anyone who had been in the state
psychiatric hospital for more than forty-five days.
Improper Admissions
Under the settlement agreement, people cannot be transferred from the state
psychiatric hospital to an assisted living facility or skilled nursing facility without
informed consent or necessity due to a medical condition.
Quality Assurance
Georgia was also tasked with developing a quality assurance system within 1.5
years to conduct annual quality reviews of all community services provided in response
to this Agreement. The annual quality reviews were to include in-person interviews of
clients and staff, review of treatment records, review of injury or incident reports, and
review of outcome data. Additionally, Georgia was to perform an annual network
analysis of the system of qualified community providers developed and trained to provide
the services required by the settlement agreement. This network analysis should
determine the availability of services and monitor costs to inform reimbursement rates.

Delaware
Delaware was sued by the Department of Justice in early 2011, after an
investigation in 2010. The settlement agreement was reached by July 2011 and targeted
people with SMI, prioritizing those who were currently hospitalized, in private
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institutions, had high emergency room utilization rates, criminal justice involvement, or
chronic homelessness.12 Those with SMI and forensic status were also included in the
target population, with the Department of Justice going further than its stance in Georgia
by stating that not only should they be included, but the state should strive to educate
judges and advocate for community placement when the treatment team thinks the
individual is appropriate for treatment in the community. This settlement agreement also
required more development overall than the settlement agreement with Georgia, with the
only exception being the crisis services network.
Crisis Services
Delaware was required by the settlement agreement to establish a number of
“recovery-consistent” crisis services, including walk-in crisis centers, a short-term crisis
stabilization unit, a crisis hotline, crisis apartments, and mobile crisis response teams.
Within about a year, Delaware needed to add a physical location for crisis walk-in
psychiatric and counseling services to its already existing crisis center, staff them both
twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, and ensure the staff were willing to take
individuals brought there for services by the police. Within about a year, Delaware was
required to ensure that its short-term crisis stabilization unit, where an individual could
stay up to fourteen days, had intensive support service providers meeting with the
individuals within twenty-four hours of admittance to begin planning for discharge back
to the community. Interestingly, the settlement agreement also set goals for a reduction
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Chronic homelessness was defined here as one full year or at least four episodes of
homelessness in the last three years.
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by one-third in inpatient days in the acute inpatient unit within three years of the
settlement agreement, and by half within five years.
Delaware was also to develop and maintain a toll-free crisis hotline to provide
information about community resources within six months, along with four crisis
apartments staffed constantly by peer specialists and with clinical mental health
professionals on call within 2 years to accommodate those who might need respite for up
to seven days. Finally, Delaware was required to develop, within a year, adequate mobile
crisis response teams to be able to respond to individuals experiencing a mental health
crisis anywhere in the state within an hour. The crisis teams could respond to a request
from the police or the crisis hotline.
Community Education
The Department of Justice required the state to publicize the crisis hotline through
print materials to every hospital, police department, homeless shelter, and correctional
facility within six months of it becoming operational. Within a year of the new crisis
walk-in center and the mobile crisis response team becoming operational, the state must
train all law enforcement officers on the availability of those resources and to take people
experiencing a mental health crisis to the crisis centers instead of local emergency rooms.
Within a year of the execution of the settlement agreement, the state must have an
education program for both judges and law enforcement officers describing services in
the community for those with forensic status.
ACT
Delaware was required to have 11 ACT teams within approximately 4 years that
could include a psychiatrist, nurse, psychologist, social worker, substance abuse

72
specialist, vocational rehabilitation specialist, and peer specialist. Each team can have
between seven and ten of these professionals. The team is to operate in fidelity with the
Dartmouth model, be available 24/7 for crisis response to prevent hospitalization, and
offer case management, assessment, psychiatric services, employment/housing
assistance, family support and education, substance abuse treatment, along with crisis
services. Each team is to have no more than ten clients per ACT Team member.
Case Management
Delaware also needed to develop four Intensive Case Management (ICM) teams
within about 1.5 years. ICM teams would each have ten full-time case managers per
team to connect individuals to resources in the community to prevent hospitalization
through service coordination. These teams were to be supervised by a master’s level
licensed mental health professional and serve no more than twenty clients per team
member. Finally, Georgia was also to hire twenty-five individual case managers within
about 4 years to work with clients who needed less support than those on intensive case
management. Each case manager was to have no more than thirty-five clients, and each
clinical supervisor was to have no more than fifteen case managers to supervise.
Supported Housing
Within 5 years, Delaware was required to have the capacity to provide supported
housing opportunities to the whole target population, using any government benefit
programs, whether state or federal. Delaware was to adjust the number of vouchers
provided based on waiting lists, estimates of people with SMI who were homeless, and
any individuals waiting on stable housing to be discharged from the state psychiatric
hospital or any other IMD. The Department of Justice described supported housing as
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permanent housing with all the regular tenancy rights of rental properties but augmented
by opportunities to voluntarily participate in flexible psychosocial support programs.
Individuals could not be rejected based on medical need or substance use history.
All of the supported housing units were required to be “scatter-site housing”:
housing units in buildings where no more than twenty percent or two units, whichever is
greater, are supported housing units, as opposed to grouping multiple units into one
building. The apartments could be one or two bedrooms, but no more than two people to
an apartment and each much have their own bedroom. Each person must be able to select
their own roommate, if they have one. Delaware was also required to provide bridge
funding to support individuals who were eligible for other benefits to fund their
supported housing. The bridge funding could be used for rental deposits, household
necessities, or living expenses to help the individual transition smoothly to supported
housing.
Supported Employment
Delaware was to provide supported employment to 1100 individuals within 4
years, not including those receiving supported employment through their ACT teams, as
well as general rehabilitative services to 1100 individuals within 4 years. However,
unlike Georgia, there was no mention of an evidence-based model for supported
employment. Rehabilitative services were described as including educational services,
treatment for substance misuse, volunteer opportunities, recreational and leisure
activities, or any activity to improve functional skills in a community setting.
Family and Peer Supports
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Within in 4 years, Delaware was to provide family and peer support services to
1000 individuals.
Transition Planning
Delaware was also required to develop comprehensive transition planning
services for those currently in the state psychiatric hospital or any institution considered
an IMD. The transition planning services were to be executed by a team, including
clinical staff, peer specialists, and a community provider, and be based on the assumption
the person can successfully live in the community. Transition planning was to be personcentered, with the hospitalized individual playing the primary role in planning and their
ability to be self-determinant protected throughout the process. Discharge planning was
to begin immediately upon admission, with the team meeting within five days of
admission to identify supportive services needed to return to the community, even if
those services were not currently available. The team should reassess every thirty days
and be actually discharging people within thirty days of an appropriateness
determination. If someone is determined to not be eligible for discharge, the specialized
transition team was to be consulted, and then the court monitor, to see if a resolution
could be found.
Quality Assurance
To ensure the quality of these developments, Delaware was required to take
several steps. First, if someone were to transition out of an institution and experience
harm, a root cause analysis must be conducted within ten days and future preventative
measures implemented. Every contract with a community provider had to be
performance based, with each provider being reviewed at least once every other year to
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determine if they were providing the services and achieving the outcomes desired.
Outcomes will be tracked by the state aggregating and analyzing several variables that
community providers are required to track and report. If the state determined that overall,
there is not increased integration, access to stable housing, and decreased hospitalization,
then the state must assemble a team with the court monitor and a representative from the
Department of Justice to address any barriers. The state must also annually publish a
report documenting the number of people being served in each service category, gaps in
services in the community, and a review of service quality.

North Carolina
North Carolina was sued by the Department of Justice in 2012, and a settlement
agreement was reached by August 2012. While the two prior settlement agreements
reviewed in this chapter were primarily targeting adults with SMI in the state psychiatric
hospital, in North Carolina, the Department of Justice was focused on adults with SMI
who were housed in adult care homes or other IMDs (Group 1), people with SMI who
were homeless or with unstable housing (Group 2), or people with SMI who were not
admitted to an adult care home as a result of this agreement (Group 2). For some
services, Group 1 had a higher quota or was otherwise prioritized over Group 2. Overall,
the target population was about 3000 adults with SMI who were either currently housed
in an adult care home or at risk of admission to an adult care home. While the state was
required to provide services to any member of the target population for which they are
eligible, services under this agreement for those outside the target population were
limited to funding availability.
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In this settlement agreement, the structure, rate of development, and exact
numbers of several services were left open, unlike in Delaware and Georgia, where there
was a high degree of specificity. Conversely, this settlement agreement had increased
specificity in regard to discharge planning. There were increased requirements to
document any disinclination to move from the adult care home into the community. This
may be due to an anticipated increase in reticence in clients and guardians for a client to
leave an adult care home, as opposed to leaving the state psychiatric hospital.
Crisis Service
North Carolina was required to develop and maintain a crisis hotline, walk-in
clinics, short-term community hospital beds, and mobile response teams. Unlike Georgia
and Delaware, there are fewer specifics in this settlement agreement about timelines and
actual number requirements. The agreement stated the state should monitor its crisis
services to identify and amend any gaps.
Community Education
Similar to Delaware, printed materials in English and other common languages
should be made available, along with training, to hospitals, community providers, police,
homelessness service organizations, and correctional facilities to ensure public
knowledge of the crisis response network.
ACT
North Carolina was required to develop fifty ACT teams that operate with fidelity
to the Dartmouth model or the TMACT model within seven years.
Case Management
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North Carolina was required to develop community support teams and case
management services.
Supported Housing
North Carolina was required to provide at least 3000 supported housing slots
within 8 years, 2750 of which must be scatter-site, with the remaining acceptable in
“disability-neutral” buildings with up to sixteen units. None of these housing slots can be
in any building that requires a license to operate. The Department of Justice described
supported housing as permanent housing with all the regular tenancy rights of rental
properties but augmented by opportunities to voluntarily participate in flexible
psychosocial support programs. The settlement agreement expressed a strong preference
for single-occupant housing, but roommates were permissible as long as the individual
was able to choose their own roommate and remained eligible for a single occupancy
housing situation as soon as one became available.
Supported Employment
Support employment services must be increased from 100 to 2500 recipients
within seven years, using an evidence-based model with a fidelity measure such as the
SAMHSA toolkit.
Family and Peer Supports
North Carolina was to offer peer support services as well as psychosocial
rehabilitation services.
Transition Planning
Transition planning should be person-centered, with an emphasis on selfdetermination, and based on the assumption the individual could be successful living in
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the community with the appropriate supports. For the first time among the settlement
agreements reviewed in this chapter, psychiatric advance directives and crisis plans were
mentioned as crucial elements of a comprehensive transition plan. Every person in an
adult care home or state psychiatric hospital should have a written discharge plan that
was developed by their transition team. Each transition team should have members who
are familiar with local community services, experts in the treatment of people with SMI
(“subject matter expertise”), linguistically and culturally competent members, and peer
specialists.
An individual was to be assigned to a transition team immediately upon admission
and discharge should be completed within ninety days of team assignment, provided a
housing slot is available. In addition to local transition teams, there should be a state
level transition team to consult on challenging cases. Overall, each hospitalized
individual should have a written plan with individual strengths, preferences, goals, and
needs that is reassessed at least every quarter for readiness for discharge. The plan
should also document any services that would benefit the individual, even if they are not
currently available, factors that led to past readmissions, necessary steps for discharge
and their timeframes, and any lingering barriers to discharge; a barrier cannot be simply
the existence of a disability or its severity.
Improper Admissions
The state was to also make arrangements that any person, prior to admittance to
an adult care home, was screened for the presence of SMI by an independent screener,
and subsequent eligibility for mental health services was determined. Based on this
information, a community integration plan was to be developed, with the person in the
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primary planning role, as an alternative to admission to an adult care home. This
planning process should be analogous to the discharge planning process. Should the
person decline to go into the community and instead express a preference for an adult
care home, after being informed of the community options, the state must extensively
document how the person was informed, implement strategies to alleviate any concerns
or objections to proceeding with the community integration plan, and continue to monitor
the person in the adult care home while providing regular transition planning services.
Client & Guardian Counseling
Transition planning should be pursued aggressively through counseling of clients
and guardians on community integration options. The stated goal in the settlement
agreement was to ensure all are fully informed about services in the community. North
Carolina was required to provide at least quarterly “in-reach” to all those in adult care
homes or state psychiatric hospitals – informative interactions with community providers
about community mental health services, including interactions with those currently
receiving the community services and visits to the sites of community service provisions.
In-reach must start within 180 days of the settlement agreement and can only be
suspended if the waiting list for community housing waivers more than doubles the
number of available waivers for the current and next year. Should an individual decline
to go into the community and instead express a preference to stay in an adult care home,
after being informed of the community options, the state must extensively document how
the person was informed, implement strategies to alleviate any concerns or objections to
proceeding with the community integration plan, and continue to monitor the person in
the adult care home while providing regular transition planning services.
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Quality Assurance
North Carolina was also required to develop an extensive quality assurance
program. The first requirement was to ensure there are enough community providers to
manage all the services required under this settlement agreement for the entire target
population. A transition oversight committee was to be formed to evaluate the overall
success of the settlement agreement terms by reviewing several outcome variables semiannually. Quality of life surveys were also to be administered three times to every person
making the transition from an adult care home or state psychiatric hospital to a more
integrated setting – prior to transition, eleven months after transition, and twenty-four
months after transition. Finally, North Carolina was required to publish an annual report
on its DHHS website, including several of the outcome variables. If North Carolina
seems to not be meeting the long-term goals of the settlement agreement, then the state
must reassess and take remedial measures.

New Hampshire
The Department of Justice sued New Hampshire and reached a settlement
agreement in 2013. The target population included those currently institutionalized at
either the state psychiatric hospital or a large nursing home for people with SMI, and
those at risk for being institutionalized in either location. Those at risk of
institutionalization were defined to include those who, within the last two years, had
multiple admissions to the state psychiatric hospital, used mental health crisis or
emergency services, were involved with the criminal justice system due to their mental
health symptoms, or were otherwise unable to receive the mental health services they
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need in the community. The settlement agreement did prioritize those who were
currently institutionalized over those who were at risk for institutionalization.
Crisis Service
New Hampshire was required to develop a crisis services network to help prevent
hospitalizations. Three major regions were identified within New Hampshire, each
centering around a large population area (Manchester, Concord, and Nashua). For each
region, a mobile crisis team was established that could respond within its region within
one hour, available twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. The mobile crisis
team consisted of at least one peer specialist and one clinician with a psychiatrist on-call.
The team could respond to law enforcement calls as well as general calls, and the goal
was to respond to the individual and keep them in their community, with up to seven days
aftercare to help them connect to services.
Additionally, New Hampshire developed four community crisis apartments for
respite care, with two beds each. Clinical and peer specialist staff were to be available
onsite at all times. People requiring the crisis apartments could stay up to seven days,
and transportation was to be provided.
ACT
New Hampshire was required to develop ACT teams to offer case management,
psychiatric services, employment/housing assistance, substance use treatment, and crisis
intervention. If an individual had an ACT team, the team responded to any crisis rather
than the mobile crisis unit. ACT teams should include a psychiatrist, nurse, masters level
clinician, functional support worker, and a peer specialist. ACT teams were permitted a
ratio of ten clients per team member, not including the psychiatrist. The immediate goal
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for New Hampshire was to expand their current ACT teams to be able to provide services
to 1500 people, with the intention to assess for future service needs so all eligible persons
could have access to ACT services.
Supported Housing
Supported housing was also a major component of New Hampshire’s settlement
agreement. The state was to begin with a goal of 600 supported housing slots, and then
adjust to increasing with demand, such that a comprehensive waiting list is established
and when twenty-five or more people have waited for two months, the state must add
housing slots to avoid individuals experiencing a six month wait. All housing must be
scatter-site, and roommates were only acceptable if the individuals preferred to live with
a roommate and they had separate bedrooms. The Department of Justice modified their
definition of scatter-site here to be even more restrictive – only 2 units in the building or
10% of the building units, whichever is greater. The settlement agreement also clearly
stated these requirements only had to be met by future community placements; people
currently living in community residences with more than four people could stay if they
desired or move if they desired.
Individuals in the nursing home with medically complex healthcare needs could
be cared for in a residential setting in the community if they could not be adequately
served in a cost-effective manner in supported housing. Each residential home was to
provide housing and coordination of healthcare services for up to four individuals. The
state started with a goal of sixteen such housing slots initially, and then developed a
waitlist and protocol similar to that for general supported housing.
Supported Employment
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New Hampshire was also required to develop a working supported employment
service model, using the Dartmouth evidence-based model. While all people
participating in ACT should be receiving supported employment services from their
employment specialist team member, New Hampshire was to develop services for an
additional 1000 people, then create a waitlist and plan to accommodate future demand
reasonably.
Family and Peer Supports
New Hampshire was to provide family support services, including education for
family members on skills and strategies to support their loved one with SMI.
Additionally, New Hampshire was to provide three peer support centers open forty-four
hours a week in each of the mental health regions in the state.
Transition Planning
Transition planning was to be person-centered and based on the assumption all
can successfully live in the community with the proper supports. The individual should
be supported in transition planning by a team that included members with appropriate
cultural competence, members with experience treating people in the community, and
members with experience in removing barriers to discharge. Each person’s transition
planning process should produce a written document that identified all barriers to
discharge, services needed to overcome those barriers regardless of current availability,
and a timeframe for each step to discharge. A new component of transition planning in
New Hampshire was a schedule of post-transition visits by the community providers to
the individual in their community housing to assess for adaptive adjustment.
Improper Admissions
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The state was charged with no longer placing people in nursing homes unless
unavoidable. Every potential admission to a nursing home must be pre-screened. In the
event someone is still admitted, the state must document why they were not placed in the
community as well as any barriers to community placement, and strategies to overcome
those barriers.
Client & Guardian Counseling
New Hampshire was required to arrange for “in-reach” for all currently in a
nursing home, at least quarterly, including community visits, opportunities to mingle with
those currently living in integrated settings, and information about community mental
health services. Individual meetings could be held for anyone expressing reticence to
move into the community. If a client or guardian continued to be hesitant to move into
the community, the attempts and objections must be fully documented, strategies must be
developed to address their concerns, and they should be re-contacted at least annually.
Quality Assurance
A quality assurance system was also required to ensure community services were
being offered with high quality and that the state was reaching its overarching goals of
greater community integration and lower levels of hospitalization. The first stage was to
confirm there were enough qualified community providers to handle the influx of
formerly institutionalized individuals into the community. Each provider should be
reviewed at least once every two years, and contracts renewals only given for those
meeting performance-based standards congruent with the settlement agreement. The
settlement agreement also required regular quality service reviews to assess common
barriers to transition as well as factors in both successful and unsuccessful transitions to
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plan for future improvements. Consumers, family members, and community providers
should be regularly interviewed to identify gaps in services or where access is insufficient
to meet demand. Finally, all information should be given to the court monitor annually.

CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE IMPACT OF OLMSTEAD ON MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEMS
This chapter will review empirical literature related to Olmstead published in
peer-reviewed journals. Considering the ubiquity and depth of the Olmstead decision’s
impact on the mental health system, there is relatively little germane empirical literature
available currently. To conduct this literature review, the author searched for “Olmstead”
in any field except author name in PsycINFO, PsycCRITIQUES, and PsycARTICLES.
Only 49 articles published in scholarly, peer-reviewed journals in 1999 or after were
found.13 Among those, several addressed only people with developmental disabilities or
only Olmstead’s implications in employment settings, both of which are beyond the
scope of this dissertation. Even more were commentaries wherein the authors described
the implications of Olmstead for various mental health programs or policies. Nine
relevant articles with an empirical analysis were identified for inclusion in this chapter.
Of the nine, most examined changes in service settings, perceptions of Olmstead or its
success, or even how its litigation is typically settled.

13

The search initially returned 326 articles, but the author noted the majority of these
were flagged due to authors with the last name “Olmstead.” After adding a search
parameter eliminating those red herrings, the number dropped to 49. Even within the 49,
there were several false alarms that could only be sorted out by hand, such as an article
about autopsies in Olmstead County, Minnesota.
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Overall, the literature seems to indicate the number of people receiving services in
institutions is decreasing, although not necessarily at a faster pace than pre-Olmstead.
Smith, Lakin, Larson, & Salmi (2011) found that while there was a 21% increase
between 1999 and 2009 in the number of people receiving residential services, there was
an overall 28% decrease in the people receiving services in an institution. Salzer,
Kaplan, & Atay (2006) found that while national rates of psychiatric hospitalizations
continue to decrease overall, the years immediately following Olmstead actually showed
a slower pace of deinstitutionalization as compared to the national rate in the 1990s.
Similarly, Lakin, Prouty, Polister, & Coucouvanis (2004) noted that 2001 to 2003 saw the
smallest reduction in state institutional populations in thirty years, both in absolute
numbers and percentage decrease.
Seekins et al. (2011) surveyed 165 centers for independent living to assess their
efforts to aid nursing home patrons moving into the more integrated centers for
independent living, a common initiative of disability advocacy groups following the
Olmstead decision. In a one-year time period, participants reported aiding nearly four
thousand people in attempts to move into a more integrated setting, such as a center for
independent living, and successfully moving over 60% of those patrons, with only 4%
returning to a nursing home setting during the study period. Authors did not provide
information on the disability type of the patrons being transitioned. Miller (2011) found
that states with higher investment in home and community-based services had lower rates
of use for nursing homes for people over 65, but that relationship did not hold for people
aged 30-65.
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Olmstead related litigation has been noted to be most commonly resolved by
settlement (Ng, Wong, & Harrington, 2014). Bartels, Miles, Dums, & Levine (2003)
surveyed clinicians and older adults with SMI in nursing homes and compared their
perceptions of whether consumers could be appropriately receiving services in a more
integrated setting. Consumers generally agreed with their clinicians at a rate no better
than chance.
Only two articles addressed policies in a multistate context, and they focus on
perceptions and elements of Olmstead plans. Zubritsky, Mullahy, Allen, & Alfano
(2006) did a multistate survey and found that stakeholders from many states reported
positive outcomes from Olmstead plan implementation, despite implementation
limitations due to budget shortfalls. Consumers concurrently identified different
understandings of Olmstead goals, but similar positive perceptions of outcomes. Both
stakeholders and consumers agreed that more funding, housing options, and community
support services were needed. Christensen & Byrne (2014) conducted an analysis of
multiple Olmstead plans to gage the appreciation of built environment’s role in
community integration for people with all types of disabilities. They found that most
states addressed housing and transportation, but not to the extent needed.

CHAPTER 7: THE PRESENT STUDY: HYPOTHESES AND METHODS
Missing from the available literature currently is a multi-state survey assessing the
types of policies implemented and their outcomes, particularly in the context of SMI. As
the courts are proving to be the primary battleground for determining Olmstead policy, an
understanding of the legal framework’s connection to policy outcomes is imperative.
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The objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the relationships upon which the courts
rely, as well as potential unintended side effects, specifically within the context of SMI.
Consistent with the author’s interdisciplinary training in clinical psychology and law, this
dissertation empirically tests legal assumptions. The overarching hypothesis is that while
the state may achieve markers the court has identified as relevant (e.g., lower numbers in
the state psychiatric hospital), there may be unintended collateral damage (e.g., increased
rates of incarceration), similar to that seen during the deinstitutionalization movement of
the mid-twentieth century.

Olmstead Response Types
The independent variable in this study is Olmstead Response Type – the way the
court interpreted the application of Olmstead to the litigated mental health policies, either
through court opinion or acceptance of a proposed settlement agreement (see Table 4 for
a summary of the Olmstead response types). To date, only two appellate courts have
decided cases addressing the issues examined by this dissertation. The Third Circuit’s
requirements for a “good” Olmstead plan are simple but rigid: 1) written, with 2) set
dates by which 3) an approximate number of people will be discharged from state
hospitals, according to 4) explicit discharge criteria, and 5) “a general description of the
collaboration required between the local authorities and the housing, transportation, care,
and education agencies to effectuate integration into the community” (Frederick L. v.
Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 160). The theory behind these requirements is that the
state can be held accountable to clear benchmarks, and therefore, is more likely to reach
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the appellate court’s ultimate goal of fewer people in state hospitals. This is the first
Olmstead response type, and it is represented by Pennsylvania.
Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit took a more nuanced view of Olmstead’s purpose.
Rather than requiring written, specific discharge plans, the Ninth Circuit’s requirements
for a “good” Olmstead plan are: 1) increases in funding for community-based services,
including waiver programs, despite budget constraints, 2) regular, personalized
evaluations assessing readiness for transition to the community as well as 3) support
services needed in the community, and 4) a general trend towards fewer people in
institutional settings. The theory behind these requirements is that the state is actively
working towards fewer people in institutional settings, showing success at decreasing the
hospital population, and setting people up for success in the community through increases
in funding and personalized assessments to connect people to necessary resources. This
is the second Olmstead response type, and it is represented by California, Washington,
and Maryland.
The Department of Justice took a different approach in its settlement agreement
requirements, focusing on infrastructure development of crisis services, ACT teams, and
other supportive services, along with process development for transition planning and
quality assurance. There were no requirements in the settlement agreements to show a
reduction in the number of people in the state psychiatric hospitals, nursing homes, or
assisted living facilities to a particular number or by a particular time. Rather, the focus
was on creating the services in the community and the process by which to move people.
An overarching goal of decreased deinstitutionalization in favor of increased
integration is stated, but with no specifics. The processed developed to move people into
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the community is more than assertive – its aggressive; after the first settlement agreement
detailed in this dissertation, only scatter-site housing is available to people leaving the
state psychiatric hospital or assisted living facility, and people who decline to move into
such housing are relentlessly pursued. The theory behind these requirements could be
described as extreme integration, based on the belief it is best for all people to be
scattered throughout the community, while provided with supportive services and
treatment. This is the third Olmstead response type and it is represented by Georgia,
Delaware, New Hampshire, and North Carolina.
Minnesota took its own approach. Now only was there intensive development
that could rival a Department of Justice settlement, but there was also an emphasis on a
trend of deinstitutionalization, consumer involvement in development of services, and
consumer choice among services in each domain. The theory behind these requirements
was that to access to services and choice for consumers was the best method for
integration. This is the fourth Olmstead response type, represented by Minnesota only.
Florida was the only state to ultimately not be held as having violated the ADA,
and therefore no requirements for a state plan adequately to supply a defense were
outlined by the court. Their state psychiatric hospital was described as initiating
discharge planning upon admission, coordinating with community care providers, and
discharging people within thirty to sixty days of the treatment team determining they
were eligible for community treatment. This is the fifth Olmstead response type,
represented by Florida only.

Hypotheses
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There are 5 major hypotheses for this dissertation, some broken into smaller, more
specific hypotheses.
1) Most states, regardless of plan type, will be successful in reducing the
institutionalized population in their state.
2) Olmstead plans will differ in their effects on budgets for community providers
and state psychiatric hospitals.
a) Unless an Olmstead plan includes specific requirements for increasing
community-based treatment financial resources, such as required by the
Ninth Circuit, community-based services will be funded the same or less,
despite expected increases in their service population due to
deinstitutionalization.
b) On average, states will decrease funding for state psychiatric hospitals
over time.
3) The numbers served in the community will not show a significant increase,
despite a significant deinstitutionalization trend (Hypothesis 1), leaving open the
possibility of transinstitutionalization or people with SMI otherwise not being
adequately treated in the community.
4) The Third Circuit plan, as it only requires continued deinstitutionalization, will be
associated with more negative outcomes than other plans, like the Ninth Circuit or
Minnesota, which required substantial funding and development of community
resources that promote consumer choice and engagement. DOJ states, which
limit consumer choice to a narrow, proscribed model of community treatment,
will also be associated with some negative outcomes, such as increased suicide
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rates and rehospitalization rates, while not showing an increase in employment
rates. The following variables will be examined:
a) Disability benefits, including percentage of the general population
receiving disability benefits, the application rate for disability benefits,
and the approval rate for disability benefits.
b) Suicide rates
c) Readmission rate after discharge from the state psychiatric hospital to any
psychiatric hospital within thirty days
d) Employment rate for mental health clients, out of those who are employed,
unemployed, or not in the workforce, (e.g., receiving disability benefits)
e) The state budget for the judiciary, police, and corrections
f) Incarceration Rate
5) Many states will fail to collect data on outcomes other than the institutionalized
population in their state, especially if that is the only/primary outcome required by
their court or noted in their Olmstead plan.

Data Sources
The dependent variables for this study are outcome measures either explicitly
related to court goals for Olmstead policies (e.g., fewer people in the state psychiatric
hospital over time, greater funding for community services, etc.) or possible collateral
effects of Olmstead policies (e.g., employment rates among mental health consumers,
suicide rates, etc.). All data were gathered from publicly available sources. 14

14

A spreadsheet documenting each piece of data used for these analyses and their sources,
including individual URLs, is available from the author.
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Uniform Reporting System. State mental health agencies must annually report
multiple variables to SAMHSA’s Center for Mental Health Services, as a requirement of
the Community Mental Health Block Grant. NRI, Inc., the Research Institute for the
National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors, collaborates with
SAMHSA to analyze this data, along with some of SAMHSA’s other public data sets.
From 2007 to 2017, these data are available on SAMHSA’s public data website as
Uniform Reporting System PDFs for each state, each year. Prior to 2007, some of these
variables are available in spreadsheets on NRI’s public data website, also organized by
state and year. Variables include numbers, rates, and demographics of those served in the
state psychiatric hospital and in the community, use of evidence-based practices,
insurance use, rehospitalization rates for the state psychiatric hospital or any hospital,
employment and housing status, expenditures on services, and some diagnostic
information. For this study, data on the following variables were collected: annual state
budget for community mental health resources, annual state budget for state psychiatric
hospitals, employment rate among mental health consumers accessing state mental health
agency services, people served by the state psychiatric hospital, people served by
community mental health resources, and the readmission rate after discharge from the
state psychiatric hospital to any psychiatric hospital within thirty days. These data are
used in testing hypothesis one, two, three, and four.
SSA Disability Claims. The federal government maintains a website dedicated to
increasing public access to a plethora of municipal, county, state, and federal databases:
data.gov. One of the datasets available on this website contains information about SSA
Disability claims from 2001 to 2015. For this study, data on the annual rate of people
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receiving disability benefits, the annual filing rate, and the annual approval rate were
collected. These data are used in testing hypothesis four.
CDC National Vital Statistics System. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has
several public datasets available on its website, including the National Vital Statistics
System (NVSS). The NVSS is maintained by communications between the CDC’s
National Center for Health Statistics and individual municipal, county, or state agencies
that track events such as births, marriages, divorces, and deaths. Information gathered
includes cause of death. Data on suicide rates were gathered from this data source,
including all available years (1999 to 2016). These data are used in testing hypothesis
four.
Bureau of Justice Statistics. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), a subdivision
of the Department of Justice, puts out multiple publications series, reports, and datasets
on issues such as corrections, law enforcement, and the court system. This study used
two particular BJS datasets: the Justice Expenditure and Employment publication series
(JEE) and the National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPSP). These two datasets had data
available for decades, but 1996 was chosen as the starting point for two reasons – 1996
was at least five years prior to the earliest Olmstead litigation for the states in this study
and starting at 1996 provided at least twenty years of information for the study (JEE’s
most recent available year was 2015 and NPSP’s most recent available year was 2016).
For this study, data were collected on the following variables: total annual state budget,
annual state budget for the judiciary, annual state budget for the police, annual state
budget for corrections, and incarceration rate. These data are used in testing hypothesis
two and four.
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U.S. Census Bureau. Annual population estimates for each state were gathered
from the U.S. Census Bureau to calculate per capita spending or instances of an
occurrence of interest (e.g., suicide or incarceration) per a set number of members of the
general public. Some JEE reports included population from the U.S. Census Bureau;
similarly, the CDC calculated suicide rates using information from the U.S. Census
Bureau. Otherwise, the information was gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau’s website
directly. These data are used in testing hypothesis one, two, three, and four.

Dependent Variables
When appropriate, per capita rates, instances per 1,000 or 100,000 members of the
general population, or percentage of the population rates were chosen over absolute
numbers to improve interpretability of statistical tests; this method minimizes the
limitations of comparing states of significantly different size (e.g., California and New
Hampshire) while still allowing for examination of variation over time. See Table 5 for a
summary of dependent variables, their corresponding model (organized by hypothesis
number), and information about the data source.
Hypothesis 1 - The dependent variable for this hypothesis was the number of
persons served in the state psychiatric hospital in the past year per 1000 people in the
general population, as reported in the NRI/SAMHSA data. Data were available for 20012017.
Hypothesis 2 - The dependent variables for Hypothesis 2 are per capita
expenditures for state psychiatric hospitals and community mental health services for
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each of the relevant ten states in 1990, 1997, and 2001-2016, except for 2008. Per capita
expenditures were typically available in the NRI/SAMHSA data, but when they were not,
they were calculated using either the population estimate used in the NRI/SAMHSA
databases to calculate other per capita rates for that state and year, or the population
estimate for that state and year available on the U.S. Census website.
Hypothesis 3 - The dependent variable for this hypothesis was the number of
persons served by community mental health providers in the past year per 1000 people in
the general population, as reported in the NRI/SAMHSA data. Data were available for
2001-2017.
Hypothesis 4 - Model 4Ai had as its dependent variable the percentage of the
general population receiving SSA disability benefits in a given fiscal year. Model 4Aii
had as its dependent variable the percentage of individuals who filed for disability
benefits in a given fiscal year. Model 4Aiii had as its dependent variable the percentage
of received applications that were approved in a given fiscal year. Data were available
for 2001-2015.
Model 4B had as its dependent variable the annual suicide rate per 100,000
members of the state general population, 1999-2016. Model 4C had as its dependent
variable the readmission rate within thirty days to any psychiatric hospital after discharge
from the state psychiatric hospital. Model 4D had as its dependent variable the state’s
employment rate for mental health clients, out of those who are employed, unemployed,
or not in the workforce, (e.g., receiving disability benefits). For models 4C and 4D, data
were available from 2007-2017.
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Model 4Ei had as its dependent variable the per capita rate of total state
expenditures for the judicial system from 1996-2015, whether originating in the state
budget, county budget, or city budget. Model 4Eii was the same, but for law enforcement
spending. Similarly, Model 4Eiii looked at correctional spending. The per capita rate
was calculated using annual general state population census from the U.S. Census Bureau
via BJS Justice Expenditure and Employment publication series, except 1999-2001,
which is from the U.S. Census Bureau directly.
The dependent variable for Model 4F is the annual state prison incarceration rate,
1996-2016, calculated as the number of prisoners per state with a sentence of more than 1
year per 1,000 residents of that state. The annual end-of-year inmate census numbers are
from the BJS National Prisoner Statistics Program, while the annual general state
population census is from the U.S. Census Bureau via BJS Justice Expenditure and
Employment publication series, except 1999-2001 and 2016, which is from the U.S.
Census Bureau directly. The California count includes all inmates in their custody, not
jurisdiction. The Delaware count includes those incarcerated in local jails, as they have
an integrated system. All counts include those housed in private facilities. In Florida,
administrators modified the methods by which they counted inmates between 2006 and
2007.15 Georgia numbers in 1999 and 2005-2010 are underestimates because they
exclude a number of individuals committed to the state correctional system waiting for
transfer in the local jails. In Washington, numbers are overestimates because a state law

15

Florida did have a significant jump between 2006 and 2007 that is not accounted for
by the linear slope of time (𝛽21 = .631, t(8) = 2.711, p = .027). The jump was present
only for Florida, not for any other states or on average across states (𝛽20 = .006, t(8) =
.35, p = .735). Results for Florida on this variable should be interpreted cautiously, with
this limitation in mind.
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made effective in 1999 allowed some individuals with a sentence of less than a year to be
housed in the state correctional system.
Hypothesis 5 - The dependent variable for Hypothesis 5 was the rate of missing
data for the other four hypotheses.

Data Analysis Strategy
For Hypotheses 1-4, data were analyzed using piecewise growth curve modeling
(GCM) techniques in HLM 7.0 software (Bryk & Raudenbush, 2002). GCM is
advantageous for examining changes in trends over time because it accounts for the
interdependence of repeated measures, which are nested within states. A piecewise GCM
with a deviation slope was chosen for these analyses as it allows for a comparison of
distinct time periods within the overall model, such as pre- and post-litigation. Time was
measured in years and coded so the intercept is the most recent year for which there are
data available at the time of these analyses. The primary slope was defined by the time
variable, which when modeled alone shows the average change over all years (Hoffman,
2015). However, when the time variable is modeled with the deviation slope (defined as
the period post-litigation for each state), time becomes the pre-litigation slope (Hoffman,
2015, p. 238). All models were also tested for a potential “jump” (variation in linear
change not adequately accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in
the dependent variable the year after litigation.
The final model to be tested for each dependent variable (outcome), except the
budget variables, is:
Level-1 Model
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OUTCOMEti = π0i + π1i*(TIMEti) + π2i*(POSTLITSti) + π3i*(JUMPti) + eti
Level-2 Model
π0i = β00 + r0i
π1i = β10 + r1i
π2i = β20 + β21*(RESPONSEi) + r2i
π3i = β30 + β31*(RESPONSEi) + r3i

The final model to be tested for each budget dependent variable is (TOTSTPC =
total state budget per capita):
Level-1 Model
OUTCOMEti = π0i + π1i*(TIMEti) + π2i*(POSTLITSti) + π3i*(JUMPti) +
π4i*(TOTSTPCti) + eti
Level-2 Model
π0i = β00 + r0i
π1i = β10 + r1i
π2i = β20 + β21*(RESPONSEi) + r2i
π3i = β30 + β31*(RESPONSEi) + r3i
π4i = β40

There are no missing data at Level 2 (state level) for any analyses. Membership
in each of the 5 Olmstead response types was individually coded as a binary Level 2
variable. Level 1 (repeated measures) had multiple missing data points. For Hypothesis
1, no data were available for 2003 on any states, along with eight additional missing data
points, for a total of 10.5% missing data (152/170). For each model in Hypothesis 2,
3.5% (6/170) of data at Level 1 are missing. In Hypothesis 3, a total of 16% of the data
are missing (143/170). For Hypothesis 4, only Models 4C, 4D, and 4Ei-4Eiii were
missing data at Level 1; for 4C, 50% of the data were missing (55/110). For Model 4D,
only three data points were missing for a total of 2.73% (3/110). For Models 4Ei-4Eiii,
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BJS reports for 2001 and 2003 were inexplicably missing the variables used for this
analysis in both the PDFs and the spreadsheets, so two of the twenty years were missing
(10%). For more information on missing data, please see the results of Hypothesis 5.
Data analysis was conducted in two phases. First, descriptive statistics (see Table
6) and basic analyses were conducted to screen for problematic data patterns or
contraindications to proceeding with the planned analyses. Second, a step-by-step
modeling building approach was used to create each model, and each step in the
modeling building process is reported in the results section. As the model building
approach involved comparing nested models that varied on fixed effects, full information
maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used, until the final model was reached. For
the final model, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). Due to the small
number of Level 2 units (N = 10), robust standard error estimates for fixed effects were
not available. However, the dependent variables’ distributions did not deviate so far from
normality as to require a transformation (see Table 6).
For Hypothesis 5, rates of missing data from the other four hypotheses’ dependent
variables will be examined. There were no missing data for Hypothesis 5.

CHAPTER 8: THE PRESENT STUDY: RESULTS
For descriptive statistics for Hypotheses 1-4, see Table 6.

Hypothesis 1
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model (no
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predictors) of the hospitalization rate for the state psychiatric hospital provided statistical
support for using GCM. Specifically, there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in
the mean hospitalization rate over time (χ2(9) = 121.699, p < .001), which was .533
instances per 1000 people in the state. Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for
Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in per capita spending rates attributable to
between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .423 (Davis &
Scott, 1995).
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2017. Time was a significant predictor
of change in hospitalization rates, such that on average across states, each year brought a
decrease of .032 instances per 1000 people (t(142) = -7.285, p < .001), with the average
in 2017 being .276. In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ 2) was
.09382, which was reduced to 0.06831 (residual variance) by the addition of time to the
model, indicating time explains 27% of the variance at Level 1. Additionally, a nested
model comparison supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(2) = 45.048, p < .001).
When the effect of time was allowed to vary randomly across the states, there was
significant variation (χ2(9) = 276.179, p < .001), indicating states did not change their
hospitalization rates over time at the same pace. A nested model comparison also
supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states (χ2(2) = 120.694, p <
.001). The residual variance was reduced by an additional 47% (σ2 = 0.02388).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type
(Level 2 predictor), each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and
slope across all years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and
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examined individually in its own model; they were coded so a value of 1 indicated
engagement in that response type. None of the results were significant, although the DOJ
states approached significance for a faster rate of decline over time (the nested model
comparison was significant (χ2(2) = 23.742, p < .001). See Table 7 for additional details
on these analyses. State psychiatric hospitalization rates over time are shown graphically
in Figure 3.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead
litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the
pre-litigation slope. In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior
to litigation brought a decrease of .054 hospitalizations per 1000 people (t(9) = -3.438, p
= .007), but post-litigation, this rate of deinstitutionalization slowed significantly (𝛽20 =
.032, t(132) = 2.396, p = .018), for an average in 2017 of .297. The residual Level 1
variance was only slightly reduced to 0.02349, but a nested model comparison did show
significant improvement (χ2(1) = 5.075, p = .023). This indicates that on average, states
changed their trajectory of deinstitutionalization after litigation.
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it became
insignificant (t(9) = 1.296, p = .227). However, there was significant between state
variation (χ2(6) = 36.396, p < .001), indicating states vary in the degree to which
litigation impacted their deinstitutionalization rate. A nested model comparison was also
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significant (χ2(3) = 31.447, p < .001). The Level 1 residual variance was reduced by an
additional 5% (σ2 = 0.01876). The potential for a “jump” (variation in linear change not
adequately accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in
hospitalization rates the year after litigation was tested, but not supported when fixed (𝛽30
= -.044, t(122) = -0.981, p = .329) or allowed to vary (χ2(6) = 26.305, p > .5; nested
model comparison: χ2(5) = 2.029, p > .5), so the more parsimonious model with only two
slopes was retained.
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s deinstitutionalization trajectory by Olmstead response type, each approach was
tested for a significant impact on the post-litigation deviation. Each response type binary
variable was entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were
coded so a value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type. Only the DOJ states
had significant results, such that, on average, the DOJ states had a faster rate of
deinstitutionalization after litigation than the other states (nested model comparison: χ2(1)
= 7.723, p = .006). See Table 8 for additional details on these analyses.
For the final model, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood
was used because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). The average
pre-litigation slope showed significant decline over time of approximately .07 instances
per 1000 people per year. Non-DOJ states slowed, almost significantly, from this pace
after litigation; however, DOJ states, did not slow their rate of deinstitutionalization.
There remained significant variation between states in the average rate of hospitalization
in 2017 (χ2(6) = 32.934, p < .001), average rate of change pre-litigation (χ2(6) = 186.898,
p < .001), and average rate of change post-litigation (χ2(5) = 58.194, p < .001),
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encouraging consideration of additional factors. A total of 80% of the Level 1 variance
was explained by the final model (σ2 = 0.01958). See Table 9 for more details on the
final model.

Hypothesis 2
General descriptive statistics for covariates and dependent variables are available
in Table 6. Table 10 shows correlations between per capita spending on community
mental health, state psychiatric hospitals, and the total state budget.

Model 2A
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model (no
predictors) of the per capita spending rate for community mental health services provided
statistical support for using GCM. Specifically, there was significant variation by state
(Level 2) in the mean amount of spending on community mental health services over
time (χ2(9) = 255.922, p < .001), which was $82.22. Additionally, the Intraclass
Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in per capita spending rates
attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .605
(Davis & Scott, 1995).
Before adding the fixed effect of time, the per capita spending rate of the entire
state budget was added into the model as a covariate. Variations like inflation, state
budget shortfalls, or the general health of the state’s economy will have a less misleading
impact on the interpretation of the dependent variable if the model accounts for the
overall state budget. The state budget was entered group-mean centered, to reduce issues
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with multicollinearity and model convergence. The overall state budget per capita rate
was a significant predictor of the state community treatment per capita rate, so that, on
average across all states and years, for every dollar increase in the state budget, the
community mental health treatment budget increased 1.5 cents (t(118) = 11.501, p <
.001). For comparison, a separate model estimated with FIML examining only the fixed
effect of time on the total state budget showed that on average across states, the total state
budget per capita rate grew by $292.79 per year (t(169) = 43.13, p < .001) for a total of
$10,729.29 in 2015.
The Level 1 variance (random intercept only model: σ 2 = 1342.44648) was
reduced by 66% (residual variance: σ2 = 449.99744) by the addition of the state budget to
the model, indicating the total state budget explains 66% of the variance in the
community treatment budget (Level 1 dependent variable). Additionally, a nested model
comparison supported the inclusion of the state budget, (χ2(1) = 483.708, p < .001).
The research question for this hypothesis primarily centers on examining variance
in the rate of correctional spending as compared to the total state budget (i.e., does it
grow at the same rate?), as opposed to variance in the relationship between spending on
community treatment and the total state budget (i.e., for every dollar increase in the state
budget, how much does community treatment spending change?); therefore, the slope for
the total state budget was modeled only as a fixed effect to preserve parsimony and avoid
model convergence issues.
Prior to looking at the effect of time on community mental health spending while
controlling for the total state budget, the fixed effect of time alone was examined. Time
was added uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2016. Time was a significant
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predictor of change in spending trends, such that on average across states, each year
brought an increase of $3.93 per capita spending on community mental health services
(t(153) = 13.213, p < .001), with the average in 2016 being $119.78. In the random
intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 1342.44648, which was reduced to
629.23558 by the addition of time to the model, indicating time explains 53% of the
variance at Level 1. Additionally, a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of
time, (χ2(1) = 116.73623, p < .001).
Next, the fixed effect of time while controlling for total state budget was
examined. As the state budget is now in the model again, the interpretation of the time
coefficient is not just general change over time, but the unique pattern of change over
time of the community mental health budget, after accounting for the total state budget.
On average across states over time, for every dollar increase in the total state budget, the
community mental health budget increased only 1.6 cents (t(117) = 4.393, p < .001).
After controlling for the total state budget, the community mental health budget did not
have significant change over time, indicating it grew at the same pace as the total state
budget (β10 = -0.48, t(117) = -0.446, p = .657). The residual variance was reduced to 34%
(𝜎2 = 449.28481), and a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of both time
and the total state budget covariate, (χ2(1) = 368.585, p < .001).
When the effect of time was allowed to vary randomly across the states, there was
significant variation (χ2(9) = 99.837, p < .001), indicating states did not change their
community mental health budgets over time at the same rates. A nested model
comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states
(χ2(2) = 61.96, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 15% (σ 2 =
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264.15187).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type
(Level 2 predictor), each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and
slope for time. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so a value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. Only the Third Circuit, as represented by Pennsylvania had
significant results, such that Pennsylvania, was spending $188.57 more than other states
on average in 2016. On average across states over time, for every dollar increase in the
total state budget, the community mental health budget increased only .8 cents (t(108) =
2.508, p = .014). While the other states did not show change over time after accounting
for the total state budget (β10 = 1.013, t(8) = .952, p = .369), Pennsylvania’s community
mental health budget grew at a rate faster than the other states (β11 = 7.353, t(8) = 3.797, p
= .005). See Table 11 for additional detail on these analyses. Community mental health
treatment budget per capita rates over time are shown graphically in Figure 4 and total
state budget per capita rates over time are shown graphically in Figure 5.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the unique rate of change for the community mental health
budget across all years in the model, but only up to the break point, which was coded
separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead litigation. The new variable of the
post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the pre-litigation slope, again, only for
the community mental health budget’s unique effect after controlling for the total state
budget.
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In the new model, on average across all ten states, for every dollar increase in the
total state budget, the community mental health budget increased .8 cents (t(107) = 2.223,
p = .028). The pre-litigation community mental health budget did not significantly
change over time after accounting for the total state budget (𝛽10= 1.78, t(9) = 1.302, p =
.225), and the post-litigation period continued that trend (𝛽20= .213, t(107) = .334, p =
.739). The Level 1 variance was not reduced. This indicates that on average, states grew
their community mental health budget at the same rate as their general budget, and this
did not vary significantly after litigation.
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it remained
insignificant (t(9) = .182, p = .86). While there was significant variation in the postlitigation slope (χ2(9) = 41.1, p < .001), a nested model comparison was not significant
(χ2(3) = 0.033, p > .5). When the chi-square statistics conflict, it is best practice to defer
to the results of the chi-square difference test contained in the nested model comparison
(Singer & Willett, 2003); therefore, the post-litigation slope will not be allowed to vary.
Similarly, the jump was not significant on average (t(97) = -1.306, p = .195); however, it
showed significant variation between states (χ2(6) = 12.567, p = .050). A nested model
comparison indicates the jump is statistically significant, so it will be allowed to vary
randomly (χ2(4) = 25.539, p < .001).
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s community mental health spending growth trajectory by Olmstead response type,
both immediately and over time after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant
impact on the post-litigation jump and deviation. Each response type binary variable was
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entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so
value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type.
Statistically significant increases in mental health budget occurred only in the
states where there had been a DOJ intervention. On average across states over time, for
every dollar increase in the total state budget, the community mental health budget
increased only .8 cents (t(96) = 2.553, p = .012). Prior to litigation, states on average did
not change their community mental health budget over time significantly, after
controlling for the total state budget (β10 = 1.526, t(9) = 1.039, p = .326). This trend did
not change after litigation for states other than DOJ states (β20 = 0.557, t(96) = .701, p =
.485). However, DOJ states differed significantly from other states after litigation by
spending more (β21 = 4.035, t(96) = 2.172, p = .032). DOJ states also approached
significance for a decrease immediately after litigation that is beyond what would be
expected given the slopes of pre- and post-litigation change. See Table 12 for additional
detail on these analyses.
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). On average across
states over time, for every dollar increase in the total state budget, the community mental
health budget increased only .8 cents (t(96) = 2.514, p = .014). Prior to litigation, states
on average did not change their community mental health budget over time significantly,
after controlling for the total state budget (β10 = 1.523, t(9) = .995, p = .346). This trend
did not change after litigation for states other than DOJ states (β20 = 0.514, t(96) = .622, p
= .535). However, DOJ states differed significantly from other states after litigation by
spending more (β21 = 4.04, t(96) = 2.078, p = .04). DOJ states also approached

110
significance for a decrease immediately after litigation that is beyond what would be
expected given the slopes of pre- and post-litigation change.
There remained significant variation between states in their community mental
health budget per capita rate in 2016 (χ2(9) = 137.919, p < .001), average rate of increase
pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 90.159, p < .001), and in the average sharp change immediately
post-litigation (χ2(8) = 49.319, p < .001), encouraging consideration of additional factors.
A total of 86% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ 2 = 192.5717).
See Table 13 for more details.

Model 2B
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model (no
predictors) of the per capita spending rate for state psychiatric hospitals provided
statistical support for using GCM. Specifically, there was significant variation by state
(Level 2) in the mean amount of spending on state psychiatric hospitals over time (χ 2(9) =
344.222, p < .001), which was $33.18. Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for
Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in per capita spending rates attributable to
between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .676 (Davis &
Scott, 1995).
Before adding the fixed effect of time, the per capita spending rate of the entire
state budget was added into the model as a covariate. Variations like inflation, state
budget shortfalls, or the general health of the state’s economy will have a less misleading
impact on the interpretation of the dependent variable if the model accounts for the
overall state budget. The state budget was entered group-mean centered, to reduce issues
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with multicollinearity and model convergence. The overall state budget per capita rate
was a significant predictor of the state psychiatric hospital per capita rate, so that, on
average across all states and years, for every dollar increase in the state budget, the state
psychiatric hospital budget increased .07 cents (t(118) = 2.217, p = .029). For
comparison, a separate model estimated with FIML examining only the fixed effect of
time on the total state budget showed that on average across states, the total state budget
per capita rate grew by $292.79 per year (t(169) = 43.13, p < .001) for a total of
$10,729.29 in 2015.
The Level 1 variance (random intercept only model: σ 2 = 41.88091) was reduced
by 30% (residual variance: σ2 = 29.48985) by the addition of the state budget to the
model, indicating the total state budget explains 30% of the variance in the state
psychiatric hospital budget (Level 1 dependent variable). Additionally, a nested model
comparison supported the inclusion of the state budget, (χ2(1) = 274.98, p < .001).
The research question for this hypothesis primarily centers on examining variance
in the rate of spending on the state psychiatric hospital as compared to the total state
budget (i.e., does it grow at the same rate?), as opposed to variance in the relationship
between state psychiatric hospital spending and the total state budget (i.e., for every
dollar increase in the state budget, how much does state psychiatric hospital spending
change?); therefore, the slope for the total state budget was modeled only as a fixed effect
to preserve parsimony and avoid model convergence issues.
Prior to looking at the effect of time on state psychiatric hospital spending while
controlling for the total state budget, the fixed effect of time alone was examined. Time
was added uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2016. Time was a significant

112
predictor of change in spending trends, such that on average across states, each year
brought an increase of 28 cents per capita spending (t(153) = 3.826, p < .001), with the
average in 2016 being $35.86. In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance
(σ2) was 41.88091, which was reduced to 38.25225 by the addition of time to the model,
indicating time explains 9% of the variance at Level 1. Additionally, a nested model
comparison supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 13.986, p < .001).
Next, the fixed effect of time while controlling for total state budget was
examined. As the state budget is now in the model again, the interpretation of the time
coefficient is not just general change over time, but the unique pattern of change over
time of the state psychiatric hospital budget, after accounting for the total state budget.
Neither the total state budget (β20 = .0014, t(117) = 1.494, p = .138) nor time (β10 = 0.207, t(117) = -.760, p = .449) were significant predictors of state psychiatric hospital
spending when included in a model together. The residual variance was reduced to 70%
(𝜎2 = 29.33223), and a nested model comparison of the model with both showed
improvement when compared to time only (χ2(1) = 261.659, p < .001), but not when
compared to the total state budget only (χ2(1) = .664, p > .5).
When the effect of time was allowed to vary randomly across the states, there was
significant variation (χ2(9) = 111.066, p < .001), indicating states did not change their
state psychiatric hospital budgets over time at the same rates. A nested model
comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states
(χ2(2) = 49.472, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 32% (σ 2 =
15.86467).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type

113
(Level 2 predictor), each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and
slope for time. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so a value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. There were no significant results. See Table 14 for additional detail
on these analyses and state psychiatric hospital budget per capita rates over time are
shown graphically in Figure 6.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the unique rate of change for the state psychiatric hospital
budget across all years in the model, but only up to the break point, which was coded
separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead litigation. The new variable of the
post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the pre-litigation slope, again, only for
the state psychiatric hospital budget’s unique effect after controlling for the total state
budget.
In the new model, neither the total state budget (β30 = .001, t(107) = 1.105, p =
.272) nor time (β10 = .012, t(9) = .029, p = .977) were significant predictors of state
psychiatric hospital spending. Additionally, the post-litigation slope did not deviate from
the pre-litigation slope (β20 = -.264, t(107) = -.808, p = .421). The residual variance was
not reduced and a nested model comparison did not show significant improvement (χ 2(1)
= .618, p > .5).
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it remained
insignificant (t(9) = -.98, p = .353). There was not significant variation in the postlitigation slope (χ2(9) = 11.09, p = .269) and a nested model comparison was not
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significant (χ2(3) = 6.361, p = .094); therefore, the post-litigation slope will not be
allowed to vary. Similarly, the jump was not significant on average (t(106) = -1.103, p =
.383); however, it showed significant variation between states (χ2(9) = 18.274, p = .032)
and a nested model comparison was significant, so it will be allowed to vary randomly
(χ2(3) = 8.568, p = .035).
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s spending growth trajectory by Olmstead response type, both immediately and over
time after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant impact on the postlitigation jump and deviation. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered
and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated
engagement in that response type. The Ninth Circuit and Minnesota had significant
results. In both models, neither the total state budget (Ninth: β40 = -.0004, t(96) = -0.455,
p = .65; Minnesota: β40 = -.0004, t(96) = .561, p = .576) nor pre-litigation time (Ninth: β10
= .392, t(9) = 1.036, p = .327; Minnesota: β10 = .198, t(9) = .517, p = .618) were
significant predictors of state psychiatric hospital spending. In neither model did postlitigation spending deviate from the pre-litigation trajectory (Ninth: β20 = -.379, t(96) = 1.035, p = .303; Minnesota: β20 = -.303, t(96) = -1.080, p = .283). The Ninth circuit did
have an immediate increase in spending the year after litigation, while Minnesota had an
immediate decrease the year after litigation, but then continued to annually increase its
funding after litigation more than other states. See Table 15 for additional detail on these
analyses.
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). Neither the total state
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budget (β40 = -.00014, t(96) = -0.167, p = .868) nor pre-litigation time (β10 = .306, t(9) =
.767, p = .463) were significant predictors of state psychiatric hospital spending. The
post-litigation spending did not deviate from the pre-litigation trajectory (β20 = -.191,
t(96) = -.623, p = .535). The Ninth circuit did have an immediate increase in spending
the year after litigation, while Minnesota had an immediate decrease the year after
litigation. Minnesota then continued to annually increase its funding after litigation more
than other states, although this difference was just shy of significance.
There remained significant variation between states in their state psychiatric
hospital budget per capita rate in 2016 (χ2(9) = 212.11, p < .001), average rate of change
pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 70.122, p < .001), but not in the average sharp change immediately
post-litigation (χ2(7) = 12.344, p = .089), encouraging consideration of additional factors
for all but the latter. A total of 68% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final
model (σ2 = 13.53483). See Table 16 for more details.

Hypothesis 3
General descriptive statistics for dependent variables are available in Table 6. For
the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model (no predictors) of the
rate of people receiving mental health services in the community provided statistical
support for using GCM. Specifically, there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in
the mean rate of people receiving mental health services in the community over time
(χ2(9) = 207.868, p < .001), which was 14.86 instances per 1000 people in the state.
Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance
in per capita spending rates attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within
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state differences) was .592 (Davis & Scott, 1995).
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2017. Time was a significant predictor
of change in community mental health service rates, such that on average across states,
each year brought an increase of .436 instances per 1000 people (t(133) = 5.762, p <
.001), with the average in 2017 being 18.142. In the random intercept only model, the
Level 1 variance (σ2) was 887.018161, which was reduced to 17.92177 by the addition of
time to the model, indicating time explains 20% of the variance at Level 1. Additionally,
a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 29.649, p < .001).
There still remains significant between state variation in community mental health
service rates in 2017, encouraging consideration of additional factors to further explain
the variation (χ2(9) = 262.367, p < .001).
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 166.397, p < .001), indicating states did
not change their community treatment rates over time at the same pace. A nested model
comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states
(χ2(2) = 81.781, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 43% (σ2 =
8.26586).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type,
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all
years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so a value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. Minnesota grew its community treatment numbers at a significantly
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faster rate (𝛽 = 1.311, t(8) = 2.399, p = .043) than the other states on average (𝛽 = .298,
t(8) = 1.715, p = .125) from 2001 to 2017, with the average in 2017 being 16.32. See
Table 17 for additional details on these analyses. Community mental health treatment
rates over time are shown graphically in Figure 7.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead
litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the
pre-litigation slope. In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior
to litigation brought an increase of .633 people served in the community per 1000 people
(t(9) = 2.44, p = .037), and post-litigation, this rate slowed, but not significantly (𝛽20 = .312, t(123) = -1.335, p = .184), for an average in 2017 of 17.879. The Level 1 variance
was only slightly reduced by 1% to 8.02297, and a nested model comparison did not
show significant improvement (χ2(1) = 1.473, p = .223). This indicates that on average,
states did not change their growth rate of community treatment after litigation.
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it remained
insignificant (t(9) = -0.935, p = .374). However, there was significant between state
variation (χ2(6) = 31.86, p < .001), indicating states vary in the degree to which litigation
impacted their community treatment growth rate. A nested model comparison was also
significant (χ2(3) = 10.38, p = .015). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional
5% (σ2 = 6.82248). The potential for a “jump” (variation in linear change not adequately
accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in community treatment
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rates the year after litigation was tested. The effect was significant when fixed (𝛽30 = 2.576, t(113) = -3.113, p = .002) but not when allowed to vary (𝛽30 = -2.52, t(9) = -2.05,
p = .071; χ2(6) = 8.047, p = .234; nested model comparison: χ2(4) = 8.977, p = .061), so
the more parsimonious model with two slopes randomly varying and a fixed effect for the
jump was retained.
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s spending growth trajectory by Olmstead response type, both immediately and over
time after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant impact on the postlitigation jump and deviation. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered
and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated
engagement in that response type. There were no significant results. See Table 18 for
additional details on these analyses.
For the final model, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood
was used because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). The average
pre-litigation slope was not significant, indicating states were not modifying their
community treatment rates on average prior to their litigation. The exception was
Minnesota, which was growing their community treatment each year by 2.64 people per
1000 members of the general population. The post-litigation slope did not show
significant deviation from the pre-litigation slope; however, there was an average a jump
down in the rate of people seeking mental health treatment services in the community in
the year after litigation.
Overall, on average across states in 2017, almost 20 people out of every 1000
were receiving mental health services in the community. There remained significant
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variation between states in the community treatment rate in 2017 (χ2(6) = 167.123, p <
.001), average rate of change pre-litigation (χ2(5) = 84.989, p < .001), and average rate of
change post-litigation (χ2(5) = 34.143, p < .001), encouraging consideration of additional
factors. A total of 70% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ 2 =
6.77543). See the Table 19 for more details.

Hypothesis 4
The fourth hypothesis look at potential side effects of Olmstead policies. See
table 6 for descriptive statistics on all covariates and dependent variables in Hypothesis 4.

Models 4Ai-4Aiii
Models 4Ai, 4Aii, and 4Aiii all looked at variables related to disability benefits –
disability benefit recipient rates, disability benefit application rates, and disability benefit
application approval rates, respectively. Across all states and years, the variables were
significantly correlated with each other, although the rate at which applications were
approved was negatively associated with both the percentage of people receiving benefits
and the percentage of people filing applications (p < .001 for all; see Table 20).

Model 4Ai
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the
percentage of the general population receiving SSA disability benefits provided statistical
support for using GCM. Specifically, there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in
the mean percentage of people receiving SSA disability benefits over time (χ 2(9) =
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231.98, p < .001), which was 5.41%. Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for
Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in disability benefit rates attributable to between
state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .623 (Davis & Scott, 1995).
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are
available). Time was a significant predictor of change in disability benefit rates, such
that on average across states, each year brought an increase of .13% of the general
population receiving disability benefits (t(139) = 30.511, p < .001), with the average in
2015 being 6.32%. In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ 2) was
0.38928, which was reduced to .05089 by the addition of time to the model, indicating
time explains 87% of the variance at Level 1. Additionally, a nested model comparison
supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 284.851, p < .001).
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 376.479, p < .001), indicating states did
not change their disability benefits percentage over time at the same rates. A nested
model comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across
states (χ2(2) = 145.72, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 9%
(σ2 = .01407).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type,
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all
years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. The Ninth Circuit had the only significant result, with their disability
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benefit rates in 2015 being significantly lower than the other states, by 1.39%. The DOJ
and Third Circuit trended towards significance, both in being higher than other states in
their disability rates in 2015. See table 21 for additional details on these analyses.
Percentage of people receiving disability benefits over time are shown graphically in
Figure 8.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead
litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the
pre-litigation slope. In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior
to litigation brought an increase of .14% in the percentage of people receiving disability
benefits (t(9) = 9.142, p < .001), and the post-litigation time period was not associated
with a significant difference in that trend (t(129) = -1.063, p = .29), for an average in
2015 of 6.31%. The Level 1 variance was only slightly reduced to .01402, and a nested
model comparison did not show significant improvement (χ2(1) = 1.094, p = .296). This
indicates that on average, states did not change their trajectory of disability benefits
growth after litigation.
However, when the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state,
while the post-litigation deviation in slope remained insignificant (t(9) = -0.852, p =
.416), there was significant variation (χ2(6) = 59.627, p < .001), indicating states vary in
the degree to which litigation impacted their disability benefits growth trajectory. A
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nested model comparison was significant (χ2(3) = 30.672, p < .001). The Level 1
variance was reduced by an additional 1% (σ2 = .01001). Similarly, the “jump”
(variation in linear change not adequately accounted for by the slope in the pre- or postlitigation phase) in disability benefit rates the year after litigation was not significant on
average (t(119) = 1.224, p = .224), but it did show significant variation by state (χ2(6) =
32.371, p < .001) with a significant nested model comparison (χ2(5) = 20.079, p = .002).
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s disability benefits growth trajectory by Olmstead response type, both immediately
and for subsequent years after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant
impact on the post-litigation jump and deviation. Each response type binary variable was
entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so
value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type.
The Ninth Circuit as well as the DOJ had significant results, but each only for the
jump. In the model for the Ninth Circuit, the pre-litigation slope was 0.15 (t(9) = 7.772,
p < .001), meaning that prior to litigation, all states on average were increasing the
percentage of people receiving disability benefits by .15% per year. After litigation,
states outside the Ninth Circuit significantly deviated from this trajectory by slowing their
rate of increase (𝛽20= -0.063, t(8) = -2.653, p = .029), while the Ninth Circuit states did
not significantly deviate from their pre-litigation trajectory. However, the Ninth Circuit
did experience a jump down in their disability benefit recipient rate in the year
immediately following litigation, by .278%. On average, the other states did not have a
jump (𝛽30= 0.131, t(8) = 1.677, p = .132).
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In the model for the DOJ, the pre-litigation slope was 0.14 (t(9) = 7.569, p <
.001), meaning that prior to litigation, all states on average were increasing the
percentage of people receiving disability benefits by .14% per year. After litigation,
states with a DOJ settlement agreement deviated from this trajectory by slowing their rate
of increase, almost significantly. The other states, on average, did not have a change in
slope (t(8) = -0.819, p =.437). However, DOJ states did experience a jump up in their
disability benefit recipient rate in the year immediately following litigation, by .26%. On
average, the other states did not have a jump (𝛽30= -0.048, t(8) = -0.705, p = .501).
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). Interestingly, when
controlling for the Ninth Circuit’s immediate decrease in disability benefits recipients, the
DOJ’s immediate increase became insignificant (t(7) = 1.218, p =.263), indicating that
while the DOJ may have had a significant effect on the outcome in its own model, its
independent contribution was no longer significant when controlling for the changes in
the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, the DOJ jump was eliminated from the model for
parsimony. There remained significant variation between states in their disability rates in
2015 (χ2(6) = 223.633, p < .001), average rate of increase pre-litigation (χ2(6) = 311.813,
p < .001), average rate of increase post-litigation (χ2(6) = 20.151, p = .003), and average
sharp change immediately post-litigation (χ2(5) = 25.993, p < .001), encouraging
consideration of additional factors. A total of 98% of the Level 1 variance was explained
by the final model (σ2 = .00783). See Table 23 for more details.

Model 4Aii
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For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the filing
rate for SSA disability benefits provided statistical support for using GCM. Specifically,
there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean rate of people filing for
disability benefits over time (χ2(9) = 20.648, p < .001), which was 1.19. Additionally, the
Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in disability filing
rates attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was
.621 (Davis & Scott, 1995).
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are
available). Time was a significant predictor of change in disability benefit rates, such
that on average across states, each year brought an increase in filing rate for disability
benefits of .015 (t(139) = 6.727, p < .001), with the average in 2015 being 1.299. In the
random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 0.01952, which was reduced
to .01475 by the addition of time to the model, indicating time explains 24% of the
variance at Level 1. Additionally, a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of
time, (χ2(1) = 39.212, p < .001).
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 41.1, p < .001), indicating states did
not experience a change in filing rates for disability benefits over time at the same rates.
A nested model comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly
across states (χ2(2) = 14.923, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an
additional 14% (σ2 = .01207).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type,
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each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all
years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. There were no significant results, although the Ninth Circuit and the
Third Circuit approached significant differences in the filing rates of their respective
states in 2015. See table 24 for additional details on these analyses. Disability benefits
filing rate over time is shown graphically in Figure 9.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead
litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the
pre-litigation slope. In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior
to litigation brought an increase of .025 in the disability benefits filing rate (t(9) = 3.845,
p = .004), and the post-litigation time period did significantly slow from that pace by
.0167 units (t(129) = -2.087, p = .039), for an average in 2015 of 1.28. The Level 1
variance was reduced by an additional 3% (σ2 = .01152), and a nested model comparison
did show significant improvement (χ2(1) = 3.997, p = .043).
However, when the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it
became insignificant (t(9) = -1.343, p = .212). While there was significant variation in
the post-litigation slope (χ2(6) = 15.681, p = .016), a nested model comparison was not
significant (χ2(3) = 3.876, p = .274). When the chi-square statistics conflict, it is best
practice to defer to the results of the chi-square difference test contained in the nested
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model comparison (Singer & Willett, 2003); therefore, the post-litigation slope will not
be allowed to vary. Similarly, the jump was significant on average (t(128) = -2.291, p =
.024), and showed significant variation (χ2(9) = 17.005, p = .048), but a nested model
comparison was not significant (χ2(3) = 1.815, p > .500).
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s filing rate for disability benefits by Olmstead response type, both immediately and
for subsequent years after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant impact on
the post-litigation jump and deviation. Each response type binary variable was entered
uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1
indicated engagement in that response type.
The Third Circuit had significant results, but only for the jump. The pre-litigation
slope was 0.028 (t(9) = 4.912, p < .001), meaning that prior to litigation, all states on
average saw increases in people filing for disability benefits by .028% per year. After
litigation, states outside the Third Circuit slowed from this pace to .014% increases each
year, a change that was almost significant (t(126) = -1.9, p = .06), while the Third Circuit
slowed less than the other states, to a pace of .02% increases each year. Additionally,
while most states also experienced a jump down in disability filing rates (𝛽30= -0.091,
t(126) = -2.794, p = .006), the Third Circuit actually had a significant jump up (𝛽31=
0.249, t(126) = 2.376, p = .019). See table 25 for additional details on these analyses.
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). The results remained
substantially the same: while the majority of states slowed their rate of increase after
litigation, the Third Circuit had a significant increase immediately after litigation. There
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remained significant variation between states in their disability rates in 2015 (χ 2(9) =
141.216, p < .001) and average rate of change over time (χ2(9) = 34.011, p < .001),
encouraging consideration of additional factors. A total of 42% of the Level 1 variance
was explained by the final model (σ2 = 0.01138). See Table 26 for more details.

Model 4Aiii
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the
percentage of the approval rate of SSA disability benefits applications provided statistical
support for using GCM. Specifically, there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in
the mean percentage of people being approved for SSA disability benefits over time
(χ2(9) = 391.357, p < .001), which was 36.55%. Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation
(ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in disability approval rates attributable
to between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .718 (Davis &
Scott, 1995).
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are
available). Time was a significant predictor of change in disability benefits approval
rates, such that on average across states, each year brought a decrease of .82% of
disability applicants being approved (t(139) = -15.22, p < .001), with the average in 2015
being 30.84%. In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was
21.37287, which was reduced to 8.05132 by the addition of time to the model, indicating
time explains 62% of the variance at Level 1. Additionally, a nested model comparison
supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 136.68, p < .001).
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The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 146.862, p < .001), indicating states did
not experience a change in approval rates for disability benefits over time at the same
rates. A nested model comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary
randomly across states (χ2(2) = 75.478, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by
an additional 19% (σ2 = .01407).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type,
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all
years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. There were no significant results. See table 27 for additional details.
Disability benefits application approval rates over time are shown in Figure 10.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead
litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the
pre-litigation slope. In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior
to litigation brought an decrease of .985% in the percentage of approved disability
benefits applications (t(9) = -5.429, p < .001), and the post-litigation time period was not
associated with a significant difference in that trend (t(129) = 1.518, p = .131), for an
average in 2015 of 31.15%. The Level 1 variance was only slightly reduced to .3.995
(less than 1% change), and a nested model comparison did not show significant
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improvement (χ2(1) = 2.199, p = .134). This indicates that on average, states did not
change their trajectory of disability benefits approval rates after litigation.
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it not only
remained insignificant (t(9) = -0.852, p = .416), but did not show significant variation
(χ (6) = 10.962, p < .089), or survive a nested model comparison (χ (3) = 4.8, p =
2

2

.186). Therefore, the post-litigation slope will not be allowed to vary.
The jump was a non-significant addition to the model, on average (t(128) = 0.747, p = .456), and when allowed to vary randomly it remained insignificant (𝛽 = 30

.731, t(9) = -8.23, p = .432); however, the jump did show significant variation by state
(χ (9) = 21.774, p = .01) and a significant nested model comparison to the model with a
2

fixed effect for jump (χ (3) = 9.319, p = .025). Additionally, the addition of the jump
2

changed the fixed effects for the other parameters such that, on average across states, the
pre-litigation slope was now an annual decrease of -1.028 (t(9) = -7.722, p < .001), the
post-litigation slope was an annual increase of .431 (t(119) = 2.767, p = .007), for an
approval rating of 32.1% in 2015.
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s approval rate for disability benefits by Olmstead response type, both immediately
and for subsequent years after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant
impact on the post-litigation jump and deviation. Each response type binary variable was
entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so
value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type. There were no significant results
although the Third Circuit approached a significant immediate decrease in disability
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application approval rates immediately after litigation (𝛽 = -5.46, t(8) = -7.183, p <
31

.001). See Table 28 for more details.
The final model was ultimately the one described above, although it was run again
with restricted maximum likelihood because it is the better estimator for small samples
(Peugh, 2010). There remained significant variation between states in their disability
application approval rates in 2015 (χ (9) = 162.824, p < .001), average rate of change pre2

litigation (χ (9) = 55.972, p < .001), and average sharp change immediately post2

litigation (χ (9) = 21.759, p = .01), encouraging consideration of additional factors. A
2

total of 83% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ =
2

3.67375). See Table 29 for more details.

Model 4B
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the
suicide rate (occurrences per 100,000 members of the state population) provided
statistical support for using GCM. Specifically, there was significant variation by state
(Level 2) in the mean suicide rate over time (χ (9) = 258.34, p < .001), which was
2

12.03. Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the
variance in suicide rates attributable to between state differences, as opposed to change
within states) was .58 (Davis & Scott, 1995).
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2016 (most recent year data are
available). Time was a significant predictor of change in the suicide rate, such that on
average across states, each year brought an increase of .19 in the suicide rate (t(169) =
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15.215, p < .001), with the rate in 2016 being 13.65. In the random intercept only model,
the Level 1 variance (σ ) was 1.80092, which was reduced to 0.76254 by the addition of
2

time to the model, indicating time explains 58% of the variance at Level 1. Additionally,
a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of time, (χ (1) = 146.096, p < .001).
2

The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the
states, and there was significant variation (χ (9) = 76.592, p < .001), indicating state
2

suicide rates did not change over time at the same rates. A nested model comparison also
supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states (χ (2) = 37.067, p <
2

.001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 12% (σ = .01407).
2

To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type,
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all
years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. There were no significant results. See Table 30 for additional details
on these analyses. Suicide rates over time are shown graphically in Figure 11.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead
litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the
pre-litigation slope.
In the new model, on average across all ten states, the pre-litigation slope was no
longer significant (𝛽 = .079, t(9) = 1.56, p = .153), but the post litigation slope was (𝛽 =
10

20
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.214, t(159) = 4.142, p < .001), resulting in a 2016 average of 13.96. The Level 1
variance was reduced by 3% to 0.47972, and a nested model comparison showed
significant improvement (χ (1) = 12.51, p < .001). This indicates that on average, states
2

did not have a significant rate of change prior to litigation, but there was a significant
increase each year after litigation.
The post-litigation slope did not vary randomly by state (χ (9) = 15.061, p = .089),
2

or significantly improve the fit of the model when allowed to vary (χ (3) = 0.941, p >
2

.5). However, the jump, while insignificant on average (𝛽 = .239, t(158) = .825, p =
30

.411), did vary significantly (χ (9) = 32.516, p < .001). A nested comparison test also
2

supported allowing the jump to vary (χ (3) = 12.036, p = .008). Therefore, the post2

litigation slope will be modeled as fixed while the jump will be modeled as varying
randomly.
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s suicide rate by Olmstead response type, both immediately and for subsequent
years after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant impact on the postlitigation jump. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and
examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated
engagement in that response type. Florida, DOJ, and Minnesota had significant results.
In the model for the DOJ, the pre-litigation slope was 0.118 (t(9) = 20.546, p <
.001), meaning that prior to litigation, all states on average were increasing in their
suicide rate by .118 instances per year per 100,000 members of their population. After
litigation, this rate of increase was hastened by .103, for an annual increase of .221 each
year (t(149) = 2.339, p = .021). While there was not a change immediately after litigation
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on average for states (𝛽 = -0.387, t(8) = -1.495, p = .173), there was a significant jump
30

for DOJ states (See Table 31). Minnesota had the opposite pattern of results. The prelitigation slope was not significant (𝛽 = 0.074, t(9) = 1.807, p = .104). After litigation,
10

there was a significant increase of .196 on average annually for states (t(149) = 5.128, p <
.001). While there was not an increase immediately after litigation on average for states
(𝛽 = 0.433, t(8) = 1.397, p = .200), there was a significant jump down for Minnesota.
30

Florida’s slope also showed a significant slowing of the suicide rate growth. See table 31
for additional details.
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). Interestingly, when
controlling for the DOJ’s immediate increase in the suicide rate, Minnesota’s immediate
increase became insignificant (t(7) = -.826, p =.436), indicating that while Minnesota
may have had a significant effect on the outcome in its own model, its independent
contribution was no longer significant when controlling for the changes in the DOJ
states.
States on average, prior to litigation, had an increase each year of .126 (t(7) = .352, p =.662). After litigation, for states other than Florida, this annual rate of change
more than doubled, to .257 (𝛽 = 0.131, t(148) = 2.862, p = .005). In Florida, however,
the annual rate of increase slowed to .07 (𝛽 = -.187, t(148) = -3.528, p < .001). On
average, non-DOJ states did not have an immediate change after litigation significantly
above and beyond what would be expected given the average annual increases (𝛽 = -.341,
t(7) = -0.979, p = .36). DOJ states, on the other hand, had an immediate increase of
1.639, beyond their average annual increase (t(7) = 2.966, p = .021), which is a truly
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remarkable jump given that most of the annual variations are less than a tenth of that
jump. The average annual suicide rate in 2015 was 13.778 (t(9) = 18.967, p < .001).
There remained significant variation between states in their suicide rates in 2015 (χ (9) =
2

106.756, p < .001) and average rate of increase pre-litigation (χ (9) = 61.106, p < .001),
2

but not in the average change immediately post-litigation (χ (7) = 12.697, p = .079),
2

encouraging consideration of additional factors for all but the latter. A total of 77% of
the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ = 0.41965). See Table 32 for
2

more details.

Model 4C
Model 4C’s dependent variable, readmission to any psychiatric hospital within
thirty days of discharge from the state hospital, was missing 50% of its data. The model
was not estimated.

Model 4D
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the
percentage of employed SMHA clients provided statistical support for using
GCM. Specifically, there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean
employment rate over time (χ (9) = 250.157, p < .001), which was 18.41. Additionally,
2

the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in disability
benefit rates attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within state
differences) was .69 (Davis & Scott, 1995).
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Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2017 (most recent year data are
available). Time was a significant predictor of change in employment rates, such that on
average across states, each year brought an increase of .295% in the employment rate on
average across states (t(169) = 15.215, p < .001), with the rate in 2017 being 20.05%. In
the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ ) was 22.00469, which was
2

reduced to 21.07152 by the addition of time to the model, indicating time explains 4% of
the variance at Level 1. Additionally, a nested model comparison supported the inclusion
of time, (χ (1) = 4.259, p = .037).
2

The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the
states, and there was significant variation (χ (9) = 38.53, p < .001), indicating state
2

employment rates did not change over time at the same pace. A nested model
comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states
(χ (2) = 11.731, p = .003). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 22% (σ =
2

2

16.27390).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type,
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all
years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. Minnesota and the DOJ both had significantly different slopes from
the other states. In the model for the DOJ states, while on average other states’
employment rates grew slowly over time (𝛽 = .756, t(8) = 3.617, p = .007), the DOJ
10

states’ employment rate actually declined. In the model for Minnesota, the other states
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on average had no significant change (𝛽 = .116, t(8) = .624, p = .55) while Minnesota’s
10

employment rate grew quickly. See table 33 for additional details on these analyses.
Employment rates over time are shown graphically in Figure 12.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead
litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the
pre-litigation slope.
In the new model, on average across all ten states, the pre-litigation slope was no
longer significant (𝛽10= .319, t(9) = 1.192, p = .264), and neither was the post litigation
slope (𝛽20= -.35, t(86) = -0.195, p = .846), resulting in a 2017 average of 20.54%. The
Level 1 variance was not reduced, and a nested model comparison did not show
significant improvement (χ2(1) = .02783, p > .5). This indicates that on average, states
did not have a significant rate of change prior to litigation, and litigation did not
significantly change the trajectory of states on average.
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it remained
insignificant (t(9) = -0.685, p = .511). While there was significant variation in the postlitigation slope (χ2(4) = 10.789, p = .029), a nested model comparison was not significant
(χ2(3) = 3.876, p = .274). When the chi-square statistics conflict, it is best practice to
defer to the results of the chi-square difference test contained in the nested model
comparison (Singer & Willett, 2003); therefore, the post-litigation slope will not be
allowed to vary.
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However, the jump was significant on average, (𝛽20= 2.632, t(76) = 5.014, p <
.001), showed significant variation by state (χ2(4) = 28.425, p < .0001), and had a
significant nested model comparison (χ2(4) = 619.236, p = .031). To examine potential
differences in the degree to which litigation immediately impacted a state’s employment
rate by Olmstead response type, each approach was tested for a significant impact on the
post-litigation slope and jump. Each response type binary variable was entered
uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1
indicated engagement in that response type.
In the model for the DOJ, the pre-litigation slope was -1.392 (t(9) = -2.664, p =
.026), meaning that prior to litigation, all states on average were decreasing in their
employment rate by 1.39% per year. After litigation, this rate of decrease was not
significantly changed (𝛽30= 2.402, t(75) = 1.061, p = .292). There was an immediate
increase after litigation on average for states (𝛽20= -2.452, t(8) = 3.72, p = .006);
however, this jump was significantly smaller for DOJ states (See Table 34). Minnesota
had the opposite results. The pre-litigation slope was still significantly decreasing (𝛽10= 1.687, t(9) = 1.807, p = .104). After litigation, there was an immediate significant
increase of 2.318 on average for states (t(8) = 4.091, p = .003), which was even larger in
Minnesota (See Table 34). The post-litigation slope did not significantly deviate from the
pre-litigation slope (𝛽30 = -.219, t(75) = -.141, p = .888).
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). Interestingly, when
controlling for Minnesota’s immediate increase in the employment rate, DOJ’s states
immediate decrease fell just shy of significance, indicating that while DOJ may have had
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a significant effect on the outcome in its own model, its unique contribution not
significant after accounting for the changes in Minnesota. There remained significant
variation between states in their employment rates in 2017 (χ2(4) = 124.337, p < .001),
average rate of change pre-litigation (χ2(4) = 12.404, p = .015), as well as in the average
change immediately post-litigation (χ2(2) = 13.3, p = .002), encouraging consideration of
additional factors. A total of 46% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final
model (σ2 = 11.92855). See Table 35 for more details.

Models 4Ei-4Eiii
Models 4Ei, 4Eii, and 4Eiii all looked at components of state budgets,
specifically, the per capita spending rates for the judiciary, law enforcement, and
corrections. Across all states and years, the dependent variables were significantly
correlated with each other (p < .001 for all; see Table 36).

Model 4Ei
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of judicial
spending trends provided statistical support for using GCM. Specifically, there was
significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean per capita rate of judicial spending
over time (χ2(9) = 395.221, p < .001), which was $115.96. Additionally, the Intraclass
Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in judicial spending trends
attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .682
(Davis & Scott, 1995).
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Before adding the fixed effect of time, the per capita spending rate of the entire
state budget will be added into the model. Variations like inflation, state budget
shortfalls, or the general health of the state’s economy will have a less misleading impact
on the interpretation of the dependent variable if the model accounts for the overall state
budget. For reference, on average across states, the total state budget per capita rate grew
by $292.79 per year (t(169) = 43.006, p < .001) for a total of $10729.29 in 2015. The
state budget was entered group-mean centered, to reduce issues with multicollinearity and
model convergence. The overall state budget per capita rate was a significant predictor
of the state judicial budget per capita rate, so that for every dollar increase in the state
budget, the judicial budget increased 1.2 cents (t(169) = 27.033, p < .001). In the random
intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 635.75607, which was reduced to
119.98522 by the addition of the state budget to the model, indicating the variation in the
state budget explains 81% of the variance at Level 1. Additionally, a nested model
comparison supported the inclusion of the state budget, (χ2(1) = 283.466, p < .001). The
research question primarily centers on examining variance in the rate of judicial spending
as compared to the total state budget (i.e., does it grow at the same rate?), as opposed to
variance in the relationship between judicial spending and the total state budget (i.e., for
every dollar increase in the state budget, how much does judicial spending change?);
therefore, the slope for the total state budget was modeled only as a fixed effect to
preserve parsimony and avoid model convergence issues.
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are
available). As the state budget is already in the model, the interpretation of the time
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coefficient changes from change over time to the unique pattern of change over time of
the judicial state budget, after controlling for the total state budget. In 2015, for every
dollar increase in the total state budget, the judicial budget increased only 1.6 cents
(t(168) = 10.377, p < .001). On average, the judicial budget grew at a significantly
slower rate than the state total budget (𝜷10 = -1.17, t(168) = -2.519, p = .013). The Level
1 variance was only slightly reduced to 115.66921, and a nested model comparison
supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 6.228, p = .012).
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 92.211, p < .001), indicating states did
not change their judicial budgets over time at the same rates. A nested model comparison
also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states (χ2(2) = 43.304,
p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 6% (σ 2 = .01407).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type,
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all
years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. There were no significant results. See table 37 for additional details
on these analyses. The state judicial budget over time is shown graphically in Figure 13.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the unique rate of change for the judicial budget across all years
in the model, but only up to the break point, which was coded separately for each state as
the year of their Olmstead litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope
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represents any deviation from the pre-litigation slope, again, only for the judicial budget’s
unique effect after controlling for the total state budget. In the new model, on average
across all ten states, for every dollar increase in the total state budget, the judicial budget
increased 1 cent. Controlling for the post-litigation period, the pre-litigation judicial
budget did not grow at a rate significantly different from the total state budget (𝛽10= 1.26,
t(9) = 1.757, p = .113). However, the post-litigation period showed a significant slowing
of growth in the judicial state budget (𝛽20= -1.985, t(158) = -3.755, p < .001). The Level
1 variance was only slightly reduced by 1% to 73.46324, and a nested model comparison
showed significant improvement (χ2(1) = 12.58, p < .001). This indicates that on
average, states grew their judicial state budget at the same rate as their general budget,
until litigation, at which point it significantly slowed.
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, the postlitigation slope became insignificant (t(9) = -1.394, p = .197), but there was significant
variation (χ2(9) = 80.856, p < .001), indicating states vary in the degree to which
litigation impacted their judiciary budget growth trajectory. A nested model comparison
was significant (χ2(3) = 49.358, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an
additional 3% (σ2 = 51.72998). Similarly, the “jump” (variation in linear change not
adequately accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in judicial
budget the year after litigation was significant on average (t(148) = 2.5, p = .014), not
significant when allowed to vary randomly, (t(9) = .914, p = .384), but showed
significant variation by state (χ2(9) = 25.836, p = .003) with a significant nested model
comparison for adding both the jump fixed effect (χ2(1) = 5.992, p = .014) and variance
component (χ2(4) = 23.672, p < .001).
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To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s judicial budget growth trajectory by Olmstead response type, both immediately
and for subsequent years after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant
impact on the post-litigation jump and deviation. Each response type binary variable was
entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so
value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type. There were no significant results,
although Florida and Minnesota trended towards significance on their post-litigation
deviation and jump, respectively.
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). There remained
significant variation between states in their judicial budget per capita rate in 2015 (χ 2(9) =
78.653, p < .001), average rate of increase pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 137.133, p < .001),
average rate of increase post-litigation (χ2(9) = 93.928, p < .001), and average sharp
change immediately post-litigation (χ2(9) = 25.813, p = .003), encouraging consideration
of additional factors. A total of 93% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final
model (σ2 = 44.04746). See Table 39 for more details.

Model 4Eii
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of police
spending trends provided statistical support for using GCM. Specifically, there was
significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean per capita rate of police spending over
time (χ2(9) = 110.404, p < .001), which was $253.95. Additionally, the Intraclass
Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in police spending trends
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attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .358
(Davis & Scott, 1995).
Before adding the fixed effect of time, the per capita spending rate of the entire
state budget will be added into the model. Variations like inflation, state budget
shortfalls, or the general health of the state’s economy will have a less misleading impact
on the interpretation of the dependent variable if the model accounts for the overall state
budget. For reference, on average across states, the total state budget per capita rate grew
by $292.79 per year (t(169) = 43.006, p < .001) for a total of $10729.29 in 2015. The
state budget was entered group-mean centered, to reduce issues with multicollinearity and
model convergence. The overall state budget per capita rate was a significant predictor
of the police budget per capita rate, so that for every dollar increase in the state budget,
the police budget increased 3.2 cents (t(169) = 40.512, p < .001).
In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ 2) was 2022.797199,
which was reduced to 365.22496 by the addition of the state budget to the model,
indicating the variation in the state budget explains 91% of the variance at Level 1.
Additionally, a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of the state budget,
(χ2(1) = 402.212, p < .001). The research question primarily centers on examining
variance in the rate of police spending as compared to the total state budget (i.e., does it
grow at the same rate?), as opposed to variance in the relationship between judicial
spending and the total state budget (i.e., for every dollar increase in the state budget, how
much does police spending change?); therefore, the slope for the total state budget was
modeled only as a fixed effect to preserve parsimony and avoid model convergence
issues.
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Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are
available). As the state budget is already in the model, the interpretation of the time
coefficient changes from change over time to the unique pattern of change over time of
the police budget, after controlling for the total state budget. In 2015, for every dollar
increase in the total state budget, the police budget increased only 2 cents (t(168) = 7.783,
p < .001). However, over time, the police budget grew faster than the state budget (ꞵ10 =
3.85, t(168) = 7.783, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced to 34.57509, so that
92% of the variance at Level 1 was explained. A nested model comparison supported the
inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 23.129, p < .001).
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 187.068, p < .001), indicating states did
not change their judicial budgets over time at the same rates. A nested model comparison
also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states (χ 2(2) = 93953, p
< .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 4% (σ 2 = .01407).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type,
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all
years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. There were no significant results. See table 40 for additional details
on these analyses. The state police budget over time is shown graphically in Figure 14.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
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now no longer represents the unique rate of change for the police budget across all years
in the model, but only up to the break point, which was coded separately for each state as
the year of their Olmstead litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope
represents any deviation from the pre-litigation slope, again, only for the police budget’s
unique effect after controlling for the total state budget.
In the new model, on average across all ten states, for every dollar increase in the
total state budget, the police budget increased 2.1 cents (t(158) = 8.241, p < .001).
Controlling for the post-litigation period, the pre-litigation police budget grew
significantly over time, beyond what would be expected based on the total state budget
(𝛽10= 3.795, t(9) = 3.378, p = .008). The post-litigation did not significantly deviate from
the pre-litigation trend (𝛽20= -.726, t(158) = -.885, p = .377); essentially, on average
across the states, the police budget continued to grow faster than the state budget after
litigation, much as it did prior to litigation. Unsurprisingly, the Level 1 variance was not
reduced, and a nested model comparison did not show significant improvement (χ 2(1) =
.643, p > .5). An additional nested model comparison did not support allowing the postlitigation slope to vary randomly (χ2(3) = 7.534, p = .056).
However, the “jump” (variation in linear change not adequately accounted for by
the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in police budget the year after litigation was
not significant on average (t(157) = .917, p = .361), not significant when allowed to vary
randomly, (t(9) = .515, p = .619), but showed significant variation by state (χ2(9) =
59.282, p < .001) with a significant nested model comparison for allowing the jump to
vary randomly (χ2(3) = 26.388, p < .001). These results indicate that while there may not
be evidence for a jump for all states on average, the degree to which states experience a
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jump after litigation varies, so some states may have an effect while others may not.
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s police budget growth trajectory, both immediately and for the subsequent years,
by Olmstead response type, each approach was tested for a significant impact on the postlitigation slope and jump. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered
and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated
engagement in that response type. There were no significant results. See table 41 for
more details on these analyses.
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). There remained
significant variation between states in their per capita spending on police in 2015 (χ2(9) =
285.756, p < .001), average rate of increase pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 81.044, p < .001), and
average sharp change immediately post-litigation (χ2(9) = 58.647, p < .001), encouraging
consideration of additional factors. A total of 97% of the Level 1 variance was explained
by the final model (σ2 = 120.90089). See Table 42 for more details.

Model 4Eiii
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of
correctional spending trends provided statistical support for using GCM. Specifically,
there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean per capita rate of
correctional spending over time (χ2(9) = 282.75, p < .001), which was $210.28.
Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance
in correctional spending attributable to between state differences, as opposed within state
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differences) was .602 (Davis & Scott, 1995).
Before adding the fixed effect of time, the per capita spending rate of the entire
state budget will be added into the model. Variations like inflation, state budget
shortfalls, or the general health of the state’s economy will have a less misleading impact
on the interpretation of the dependent variable if the model accounts for the overall state
budget. For reference, on average across states, the total state budget per capita rate grew
by $292.79 per year (t(169) = 43.006, p < .001) for a total of $10729.29 in 2015. The
state budget was entered group-mean centered, to reduce issues with multicollinearity and
model convergence. The overall state budget per capita rate was a significant predictor
of the state correctional budget per capita rate, so that, on average across all states and
years, for every dollar increase in the state budget, the correctional budget increased 2
cents (t(169) = 26.196, p < .001).
In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ 2) was 1821.66094,
which was reduced to 361.67827 by the addition of the state budget to the model,
indicating the variation in the state budget explains 80% of the variance at Level 1.
Additionally, a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of the state budget,
(χ2(1) = 274.847, p < .001). The research question primarily centers on examining
variance in the rate of judicial spending as compared to the total state budget (i.e., does it
grow at the same rate?), as opposed to variance in the relationship between judicial
spending and the total state budget (i.e., for every dollar increase in the state budget, how
much does judicial spending change?); therefore, the slope for the total state budget was
modeled only as a fixed effect to preserve parsimony and avoid model convergence
issues.
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Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are
available). As the state budget is already in the model, the interpretation of the time
coefficient changes from change over time to the unique pattern of change over time of
the correctional state budget, after controlling for the total state budget. In 2015, for
every dollar increase in the total state budget, the correctional budget increased only 3.4
cents (t(168) = 13.52, p < .001). The correctional budget grew at a slower rate than the
state budget (β10 = -4.19, t(168) = -5.524, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced
by 3% to 306.63081, and a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of time,
(χ2(1) = 28.069, p < .001).
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 60.351, p < .001), indicating states did
not change their correctional budgets over time at the same rates. A nested model
comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states
(χ2(2) = 26.093, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 4% (σ 2 =
.01407).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type,
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all
years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. There were no significant results. See table 43 for additional details
on these analyses. State per capita correctional spending over time is shown graphically
in Figure 15.
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Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
now no longer represents the unique rate of change for the correctional budget across all
years in the model, but only up to the break point, which was coded separately for each
state as the year of their Olmstead litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope
represents any deviation from the pre-litigation slope, again, only for the correctional
budget’s unique effect after controlling for the total state budget.
In the new model, on average across all ten states, for every dollar increase in the
total state budget, the correctional budget increased 2.4 cents. Controlling for the postlitigation period, the pre-litigation correctional budget did not grow at a rate significantly
different from the total state budget (𝛽10= .29, t(9) = .237, p = .818). However, the postlitigation period showed a significant slowing of growth in the correctional state budget
(𝛽20= -4.057, t(158) = -4.674, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was only slightly reduced
by 1% to 212.95413, and a nested model comparison showed significant improvement
(χ2(1) = 16.352, p < .001). This indicates that on average, states grew their correctional
state budget at the same rate as their general budget, until litigation, at which point it
significantly slowed.
The post-litigation slope did not vary significant (χ2(9) = 6.476, p > .5), and did
not significantly improve the model when varying, therefore it will be modeled as fixed
(χ2(3) = .862, p > .5). However, while the “jump” (variation in linear change not
adequately accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in correctional
budget the year after litigation was not significant on average (t(157) = 1.42, p = .157),
not significant when allowed to vary randomly, (t(9) = .978, p = .354), it did show
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significant variation by state (χ2(9) = 27.205, p = .002) with a significant nested model
comparison (χ2(3) = 15.131, p = .002) .
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s correctional budget growth trajectory, both immediately and over subsequent
years, by Olmstead response type, each approach was tested for a significant impact on
the post-litigation slope and jump. Each response type binary variable was entered
uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1
indicated engagement in that response type.
The Ninth Circuit had a significant jump upwards in its per capita funding for
corrections immediately after litigation. The pre-litigation slope remained insignificant,
indicating the correctional budget did not grow beyond what would be expected given the
growth of the total state budget (𝛽10 = -.309, t(9) = -.302, p = .769). The post-litigation
slope showed significant stagnation, and was actually decreasing each year, after
controlling for the total state budget (𝛽20 = -3.021, t(147) = -3.607, p < .001). Other
states on average did not have a significant change immediately post-litigation (𝛽30 = 5.524, t(8) = -1.123, p = .294). Every dollar increase in the total state budget brought a
2.3 cent increase in the correctional budget (t(147) = .023, p < .001).
In the model for the Third Circuit, prior to litigation, the correctional budget was
not growing significantly, beyond what would be expected given the growth of the total
state budget (𝛽10 = .232, t(9) = .231, p = .823). After litigation, states other than
Pennsylvania, on average, were decreasing their correctional budget every year, after
controlling for the total state budget (𝛽20 = -4.052, t(147) = -6.259, p < .001).
Pennsylvania was significantly different from the other states by decreasing their
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correctional budget less than other states each year, after controlling for the total state
budget (𝛽21 = 2.212, t(147) = 2.072, p = .04). Neither Pennsylvania (𝛽31 = 1.395, t(8) =
.058, p = .956) nor the other states had an immediate change after litigation (𝛽30 = 7.574,
t(8) = 1.045, p = .327). Every dollar increase in the total state budget brought a 2.1 cent
increase in the correctional budget (t(147) = 7.762, p < .001). See table 44 for additional
details on theses analyses.
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). There remained
significant variation between states in their correctional budget per capita rate in 2015
(χ2(9) = 243.914, p < .001) and average rate of increase pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 21.992, p =
.009), but not in the average sharp change immediately post-litigation (χ2(8) = 3.875, p >
.5), encouraging consideration of additional factors for all but the latter. A total of 90%
of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ 2 = 189.00418). See Table 45
for more details.

Model 4F
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the
incarceration rate provided statistical support for using GCM. Specifically, there was
significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean rate of people incarcerated over time
(χ2(9) = 4150.99, p < .001), which was 4.05. Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation
(ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in disability benefit rates attributable to
between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .952 (Davis &
Scott, 1995).
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Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model. Time was added
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2016 (most recent year data are
available). Time was not a significant predictor of change in the incarceration rate when
examining 1996-2016 (𝛽10 = .002, t(199) = .358, p = .721). The average across states in
2016 was 4.06. The Level 1 variance (σ2) from the random intercept only model
(0.15131) was not reduced. Additionally, a nested model comparison showed the fixed
effect of time did not significantly improve the fit of the model, (χ2(1) = .12828, p > .5).
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 221.74, p < .001), indicating states did
not change their incarceration rate over time in the same way. A nested model
comparison showed allowing the effect of time to vary significantly improved the fit of
the model, as compared to the model with the fixed effect of time (χ2(2) = 115.415, p <
.001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by 51% (σ2 = 0.07345).
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type,
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all
years. Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in
that response type. The Ninth Circuit had the only significant result, with their
incarceration rates growing slower than other states, (𝛽11 = .06, t(8) = -2.33, p = .048).
See table 46 for additional details on these analyses. The incarceration rate from 19962016 is shown graphically in Figure 16.
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the
model. The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it
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now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead
litigation. The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the
pre-litigation slope. In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior
to litigation brought an increase of .048 in the incarceration rate (t(9) = 2.491, p = .034),
but the incarceration rate significantly slowed in the post-litigation period (𝛽20 = -.107,
t(189) = -7.492, p < .001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by 12% to 0.05583, and a
nested model comparison showed significant improvement (χ2(1) = 47.192, p < .001).
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it remained
significant (𝛽20 = -.107, t(9) = -4.656, p = .001) and significantly varied (χ2(9) = 18.849, p
= .026), indicating states vary in the degree to which litigation impacted their
incarceration rates. A nested model comparison was significant (χ2(3) = 16.653, p <
.001). The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 3% (σ2 = 0.05172). However,
the “jump” (variation in linear change not adequately accounted for by the slope in the
pre- or post-litigation phase) in incarceration rates the year after litigation was not
significant on average (t(179) = 1.665, p = .098), and did not show significant variation
by state (χ2(9) = 14.127, p = .117), and did not significantly improve the fit of the model
when allowed to vary randomly (χ2(4) = 1.218, p > .5). The jump was subsequently not
included in any future models.
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a
state’s incarceration rates by Olmstead response type, each approach was tested for a
significant impact on the post-litigation deviation. Each response type binary variable
was entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so
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value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type. There were no significant results,
although Florida and the Third Circuit approached significance; the Third Circuit’s
nested model comparison also approached significance (χ2(9) = 14.127, p = .117). See
Table 47 for additional details.
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010). The final model only
involved a pre- and post-litigation slope. There remained significant variation between
states in their incarceration rates in 2016 (χ2(9) = 1064.129, p < .001), average rate of
increase pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 47.017, p < .001), and average rate of increase postlitigation (χ2(9) = 18.716, p = .027), encouraging consideration of additional factors. A
total of 65% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ2 = 0.05195).
See Table 48 for more details.

Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 looked at the missing data from the other four hypotheses. For all
four hypotheses, there was no missing data at Level 2 (the state level). Membership in
each of the 5 Olmstead response types was individually coded as a binary Level 2
variable.
However, Level 1 (repeated measures) had multiple missing data points (see
Table 49). For Hypothesis 1, no data were available for 2003 on any states, and
Delaware (2001 & 2008), Florida (2005), Minnesota (2017), North Carolina (2004 &
2013), and New Hampshire (2004-2005) were all missing at least one year. For both
models in Hypothesis 2, Florida had no reported expenditures in 2013 and five states
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(California, Delaware, Florida, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania) did not report
expenditures for 2016 prior to these analyses.
In Hypothesis 3, no data were available for 2003 on any states, and California
(2005-2006), Delaware (2001-2002 & 2008), Florida (2004-2005), Maryland (2001 &
2004), Minnesota (2006 & 2017), North Carolina (2004), New Hampshire (2002 & 20042006), and Pennsylvania (2005) were all missing data. For Hypothesis 4, only Models
4C, 4D, and 4Ei-4Eiii were missing data at Level 1; for 4C, 50% of the data were
missing. California was missing all but 2010, Delaware was missing 2008, Florida was
missing 2013-2017, Georgia had no data, Maryland was missing 2013-2017, Minnesota
was missing 2014-2015, North Carolina was missing 2007-2008 and 2016-2017, New
Hampshire had no data, Pennsylvania was missing 2012-2017, and Washington was
missing no data.
For Model 4D, only three data points were missing: Delaware in 2008, and
Pennsylvania in 2015 and 2016. For Models 4Ei-4Eiii, BJS reports for 2001 and 2003
were inexplicably missing the variables used for this analysis in both the PDFs and the
spreadsheets. All missing data described here are summed in Table 50.
Total missing data for all analyses in the dissertation was 7.5%. Overall,
Minnesota had the least missing data, followed by the Ninth Circuit states, the Third
Circuit, the DOJ states, and Florida. Besides the dependent variable measuring
readmission to any psychiatric hospital within thirty days of discharge from the state
hospital, rates of mental health treatment in the community had the most missing data.
Incarceration rates, suicide rates, and rates for disability benefits were reported perfectly
for all states.
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Summary of Results
All states showed trends of deinstitutionalization across time. For non-DOJ
states, this trend slowed significantly after litigation, while DOJ states continued at the
same pace. Meanwhile, only Minnesota showed an increase in the number of people
receiving services in the community, and Minnesota’s rate of growth actually slowed
slightly after litigation.
On average over time, states grew their community mental health budget at the
same rate as their general budget. This rate of growth remained the same after litigation,
except for DOJ states which increased their spending faster than other states after
litigation. States funded their state psychiatric hospitals at the same rates both before and
after litigation, with no significant differences based on Olmstead response type.
The rate of people receiving disability benefits grew each year, but this rate of
growth slowed after litigation. The Ninth Circuit states saw a significant decrease
immediately after litigation and had a lower rate of people receiving disability benefits in
2015. The rate of people filing for disability benefits also increased each year, and this
rate of growth also slowed after litigation. The Third Circuit had a significant jump up in
the filing rate immediately after litigation. However, the approval rate for those filing for
disability benefits was decreasing each year, although the rate of decline slowed after
litigation.
Suicide rates on average were increasing over time, and the rate of growth
doubled after litigation for states other than Florida. Florida, however, cut its suicide rate
of growth in half after litigation. DOJ states saw a significant, immediate jump up in
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their suicide rates after litigation, although this trend seems to be drive by New
Hampshire alone.
For all states, the employment rates of consumers decreased each year, and this
trend did not significantly change after litigation. However, immediately after litigation,
there was a significant jump up in employment rates, which was smaller for DOJ states
and larger for Minnesota. The incarceration rate for states was slowly growing prior to
litigation, but then declined after litigation, with no significant differences between
Olmstead response types.
On average, states grew their judicial budgets significantly slower than the overall
state budget, but there were no significant differences between Olmstead response types
or pre/post litigation. On average, states grew their police budget significantly faster than
the overall state budget, but this rate of growth slowed after litigation. There were no
significant differences between Olmstead response types. For the state correctional
budget, prior to litigation, it grew at the same rate as the overall state budget, but after
litigation, the rate of growth significantly slowed, so that the correctional budget was
growing significantly slower than the overall state budget. The Third Circuit did not
slow as much after litigation as the other states, and the Ninth Circuit had an immediate
increase after litigation in correctional spending. See Table 48 for a summary of results.
DOJ states, the Third Circuit, and Florida had the highest rates of missing data
across all variables, (8.2-8.6%) while Minnesota had the lowest rate of missing data
(5.2%). The rates of disability applications, approvals, and beneficiaries, along with the
suicide rate, had no missing data, while the readmission rate to any psychiatric hospital
had the highest percentage of missing data at 50%. The present study had 7.5% missing
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data overall.

CHAPTER 9: THE PRESENT STUDY: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The discussion is divided into four parts: discussion of empirical results, legal
analysis of Olmstead applications in light of the empirical results, limitations of the
current study, and future directions for further research.

Empirical Results
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 examined changes in the hospitalization rate per
thousand members of the general population for the state psychiatric hospital only. The
original hypothesis was that most states, regardless of plan type, would be successful in
reducing the institutionalized population in their state. This hypothesis was supported; on
average, all states showed a trend of deinstitutionalization across all years.
When examining all states on average from 2001 to 2017, there was a significant,
general trend of deinstitutionalization, resulting in fewer people in state psychiatric
hospitals. Each year, the rate of hospitalization went down .032 instances per 1000
members of the state’s general population. In 2017, the average across states was .276
hospitalizations in the state psychiatric hospital for every 1000 people.
Upon closer examination, this trend varied between pre- and post-litigation
periods, and the DOJ states had significant deviations from the average post-litigation
trend as well. When all states’ effects were averaged together, there was a significantly
faster rate of deinstitutionalization prior to litigation than after. The annual decrease went
from .054 instances per 1000 to .022 instances per 1000. While considering these trends,
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it is important to note that three states - Florida, Maryland (Ninth), and Pennsylvania
(Third) – all had litigation in 2001, so they have only one data point in the pre-litigation
phase of this data analysis.
Once DOJ’s significant differences were accounted for in the model, other states
on average had a decrease of .068 instances per year prior to litigation but slowed after
litigation to an annual decrease of .011 instances. This change was just shy of significant.
DOJ states, however did not slow at all, maintaining an annual decrease of .07 instances.
The difference between DOJ’s post-litigation pace and the other states’ post-litigation
pace was significant. The final model accounted for 80% of the variance in
hospitalizations rates, indicating its explanatory power is remarkable.
Additionally, some states seem to have encountered a floor effect in the later
years, as seen in Figure 3. Several states maintained a steady, low rate of hospitalizations
beginning as early as 2001. This may have contributed to the significant slowing of
deinstitutionalization on average post-litigation. This finding is consistent with a need to
establish a baseline number of state psychiatric hospital beds to maintain in order to
ensure a full continuum of care is available to those who may need it.
Overall, these findings are remarkable because they show a national trend of
deinstitutionalization that was not quickened by Olmstead litigation. Rather, at best, DOJ
states were able to continue the pace of pre-litigation while other states on average
slowed. These findings call into question the assumptions of the courts that Olmstead
litigation would improve the state’s efforts at deinstitutionalization.
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Hypothesis 2 - Model 2A. Model 2A examined changes in the per capita funding
rate of community mental health treatment. The original hypothesis was that unless an
Olmstead plan included specific requirements for increasing community-based treatment
financial resources, such as required by the Ninth Circuit, community-based services will
be funded the same or less, despite expected increases in their service population due to
deinstitutionalization. This hypothesis was partially supported.
When examining all states on average in available years from 1997 to 2016, there
was a significant, general trend of increased funding for community mental health
treatment. Each year, states increased funding by $3.93. In 2016, the average across
states was $119.78 spent on community mental health resources per member of the state
population.
However, once the effect of the total state budget was included in the model,
community mental health funding did not have a unique predictive effect, indicating that
there was no change in community mental health funding above what would be expected
based on the changes in the overall state budget. Pennsylvania (the Third Circuit) was
significantly different from other states; over the years, it was increasing its spending by
$7.35 more each year than other states, ending in 2016 with a per capita rate $188.57
more than the average of other states.
Once the model was split in pre- and post-litigation periods, DOJ states were the
significant spenders, instead of Pennsylvania. After litigation, only DOJ states increased
their spending significantly more rapidly than other states, by about $4 per year.
However, Pennsylvania’s differential increase in funding post-litigation only approached
significance (p = .08). On average, other states’ community mental health budgets grew
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at the same rate as their general budget, and this did not vary significantly after litigation.
The final model accounted for 86% of the variance in community mental health funding,
indicating its explanatory power is remarkable.
Overall, this hypothesis was only partially supported because the Third Circuit did
not bear out the hypothesis. Florida and the Third Circuit were the only response types to
not require either an increase in funding or substantial community mental health resource
development. Florida did not significantly deviate from the average state trend, which
was increasing in step with the total state budget both before and after litigation.
Therefore, Florida was not getting additional funding to their community treatment
resources, despite the arguably expected increase in need for community treatment due to
a continuing trend of deinstitutionalization. Conversely, Pennsylvania had significant
spending increases over the entire observed time period, showing strong funding support
for its community treatment resources, beyond what would be expected just from growth
of the overall state budget. However, this trend existed before litigation, therefore, was
not a product of it. A review of Figure 4 shows Pennsylvania clearly out spending other
states, while Florida’s line remains flat at the bottom of the graph.

Hypothesis 2 - Model 2B. Model 2B examined changes in the per capita funding
rate for state psychiatric hospitals. When examining all states on average in available
years from 1997 to 2016, there was a significant, general trend of increased funding for
state psychiatric hospitals. Each year, states increased funding by 28 cents. In 2016, the
average across states was $35.86 spent on state psychiatric hospitals per member of the
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state population. On average across all years and states, for every dollar increase in the
total state budget, the state psychiatric hospital budget increased .07 cents.
Once the total state budget and time were modeled together, neither had unique
predictive utility for the state psychiatric hospital budget. As both were significant
predictors independently, it is likely there was too much overlap between the two
predictors for either of them to make a unique contribution. This is supported by the
finding that including both predictors, with the slope for time allowed to vary randomly,
reduced the residual variance and significantly improved the fit of the model, as indicated
by a nested model comparison.
On average, states did not significantly change their state psychiatric hospital
budget post-litigation, immediately or over time. However, both the Ninth Circuit and
Minnesota had interesting differences from the other states. The Ninth Circuit had an
immediate increase in funding the year after litigation, while Minnesota had an
immediate drop. The final model accounted for 68% of the variance in state psychiatric
hospital funding, indicating its explanatory power is quite high.
Of note, the Ninth Circuit cases all found in favor of the state, while most other
cases resulted in a judgment against the state or a settlement agreement requiring
substantial development of community resources to meet the requirements of Olmstead.
It is possible that surviving a lawsuit increased confidence in the state psychiatric
hospitals, thereby creating a protective effect on funding.
Additionally, Minnesota faced four additional years of negotiating a settlement
agreement after litigation ended. Each settlement agreement rejected by the trial court
over those years was rejected because it was too vague or did not meet the needs of
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enough people. Minnesota may have dipped its funding of the state psychiatric hospital
immediately after litigation in anticipation of needing funds for the community services
its settlement agreement would ultimately require. Minnesota did increase its funding
each year post-litigation by more than other states on average, but this difference fell just
shy of significance.

Hypothesis 3. Model 3 examined changes in the rate of people receiving mental
health treatment in the community. The original hypothesis was that the numbers served
in the community would not show a significant increase, despite a significant
deinstitutionalization trend, leaving open the possibility of transinstitutionalization or
people with SMI otherwise not being adequately treated in the community. This
hypothesis was supported. Overall, Minnesota was the only Olmstead response type to
show significant growth in the rate of people receiving mental health services in the
community, and this was primarily before their litigation.
On average from 2001 to 2017, states were increasing the occurrence of
community mental health treatment by .436 instances per 1000 people, with a 2017
average of approximately 18 per 1000 receiving mental health services in the community.
However, this growth trend seemed to be driven by Minnesota. Minnesota alone was
increasing its community treatment numbers by 1.31 instances per 1000 people each
year; after parsing out Minnesota’s effect, the other states on average did not show a
significant annual increase.
Dividing the model into pre- and post-litigation periods revealed that on average,
states increased people receiving community services by .633 instances per 1000 per year
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prior to litigation, and this rate slowed, but not significantly, after litigation. While
considering these trends, it is important to note that three states - Florida, Maryland
(Ninth), and Pennsylvania (Third) - all had litigation in 2001, so they have only one data
point in the pre-litigation phase of this data analysis. Again however, after untangling
Minnesota’s effect, the other states did not have an increase on average, before or after
litigation. Meanwhile, Minnesota increased by 2.53 instances each year before litigation,
and .93 instances each year after litigation. The final model accounted for 70% of the
variance in the rate of people receiving mental health services in the community,
indicating its explanatory power is quite high.
Overall, the growth trend was less than would be expected if all
deinstitutionalized people were adequately receiving services in the community as
numbers were lowered in the state psychiatric hospital. These findings are especially
remarkable in light of other research which has shown a general increase of people
seeking mental health services across all walks of life during the observed years
(Mackenzie, Erickson, Deane, & Wright, 2014). Most of those individuals are receiving
mental health treatment from their primary care providers in the form of
psychopharmaceuticals (Mackenzie et al., 2014), and thereby, would not be seeking
services from the state mental health agency. However, even ripples of that trend do not
seem to be showing in this analysis.
Perhaps most significant is that no Olmstead response type, regardless of overall
growth over time, showed an increase, significant or otherwise, after litigation. This
again confounds the express expectation of the courts that after litigation, formerly
hospitalized people will be absorbed into community services. While people in the
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general community may be accessing services through private practitioners, people with
SMI are more likely to have insurance through Medicare or Medicaid and subsequently,
receive services through state mental health agencies (McAlpine & Mechanic, 2000).
This finding raises significant questions about how people, especially people with SMI,
are accessing services in the community.

Hypothesis 4 - Hypothesis 4 examined changes in ten variables related to access
to mental health and supportive services (e.g., supported employment, etc.) in the
community, such as suicide rates in the general population and employment rates among
SMHA consumers. The original hypothesis was that Olmstead response types that
focused only on deinstitutionalization, like the Third Circuit, or substantially limiting
consumer choice and agency, like the DOJ model would be associated with more
negative, collateral outcomes, such as an increase in suicide rates and lower employment
rates. The hypothesis had mixed support.

Model 4Ai. Model 4Ai examined changes in the percentage of people receiving
disability benefits. When examining all states on average from 2001 to 2015, there was a
small but significant increase of .13% every year. In 2015, the average across states
indicated that 6.32% of the general population received disability benefits. The analysis
did not reveal any significantly different growth rates over all observed years, but Ninth
Circuit states did have significantly lower percentages of people receiving disability
benefits in 2015. Both the Third Circuit and the DOJ states had rates in 2015 that
approached being significantly higher than the averages of the other states.
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Once the model was broken into pre- and post-litigation sections, overall, there
was a small increase of .15% every year that slowed to .10% after litigation, an almost
significant change. The Ninth Circuit states had a significant, immediate decrease in the
growth rate of the percentage of people receiving disability benefits the year after
litigation, and the DOJ had the opposite effect. However, when modeled together, the
DOJ’s increase became insignificant, indicating that the Ninth Circuit had the stronger
effect. While considering these trends, it is important to note that three states - Florida,
Maryland (Ninth), and Pennsylvania (Third) - all had litigation in 2001, so they have only
one data point in the pre-litigation phase of this data analysis. The final model accounted
for 98% of the variance in the rate of people receiving disability benefits, indicating the
model explains almost all of the variance in disability benefit rates.
These findings indicate there may be a connection between Olmstead response
type and disability benefit rates. The Ninth Circuit approach was characterized by
personalized assessments for services needed in the community and funding for
community services, so it is possible that with this approach, as people are being
transferred into the community, they are having more success in employment, and are
subsequently less reliant on benefits. Additionally, just as disability benefits are available
to all people with disabilities, whether physical or mental, Olmstead response types affect
all people with disabilities, not only people with SMI. The association between the Ninth
Circuit and lower disability benefits rate may be driven by people with physical
disabilities, people with mental health related disabilities, or both.
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Model 4Aii. Model 4Aii examined changes in the rate of people filing for
disability benefits. Looking at trends from 2001 to 2015, there was a significant increase
each year of .015 for an average filing rate in 2015 of 1.3. When examined in pre- and
post-litigation periods, the filing rate increased by .028 units each year prior to litigation,
but then significantly slowed after litigation to average annual increase of .014.
While Olmstead response types did not show significant differences when
examining all years combined, the Third Circuit did show a significantly different trend
after litigation. Specifically, on average, all other states had a jump down - a decrease in
the filing rate beyond what would be expected given the general trend of change over
time. In the year immediately following litigation, the other states on average had a
decrease of .089; however, the Third Circuit actually had a jump up, by .236. While
considering these trends, it is important to note that three states - Florida, Maryland
(Ninth), and Pennsylvania (Third) - all had litigation in 2001, so they have only one data
point in the pre-litigation phase of this data analysis. The final model accounted for 42%
of the variance in the rate of people filing for disability benefits indicating its explanatory
power is very good, although additional significant predictors would be useful.
These findings further support a potential connection between Olmstead response
type and disability benefit rates. The Third Circuit’s Olmstead response type was
characterized by an emphasis on discharging people from the hospital, without additional
requirements. If people are discharged but unable to connect to services in the
community to support employment, an increase in applications for disability benefits
could be a natural consequence.
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Model 4Aiii. Model 4Aiii examined changes in the rate at which applications for
disability benefits were approved. When examining all states on average from 2001 to
2015, there was overall trend of declining approval rates for applications. Specifically,
each year the approval rate dropped by .82%, on average. By 2015, the average approval
rate was 30.84%.
Upon closer examination, this trend varied between pre- and post-litigation
periods. Prior to litigation, states were decreasing their approval rates by 1.03% each
year, on average, while after litigation, states on average were diminishing their approval
rates by .61% each year – a significant shift. Looking both at all observed years and at
the pre- and post-litigation model, no Olmstead response types showed significant
differences in the rate of disability benefits application approvals. Again, it is important
to note that three states - Florida, Maryland (Ninth), and Pennsylvania (Third) - all had
litigation in 2001, so they have only one data point in the pre-litigation phase of this data
analysis. The final model accounted for 83% of the variance in disability approval rates,
indicating the explanatory value of the model is remarkable.
Considering all three of the models developed for part A of Hypothesis 4 shows
an overall trend of disability benefits rates increasing, filing rates increasing, and
approval rates decreasing. All three rates slowed after litigation, which is somewhat
counterintuitive. If many people are being integrated into the community from the state
psychiatric hospital, it would make sense for some of them to be ready for employment
while others may find necessary support in disability benefits, at least for some time after
discharge. Also, it should be noted that several other major economic shifts happened
during the observed time period, not the least of which was the Great Recession in 2008.
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However, while specific economic events such as that may be a confound for an
individual state, it should not be a confound for the overall model as states had rolling
litigation dates from 2001 to 2013.

Model 4B. Model 4B examined changes in the annual suicide rate in the general
population. When examining all states on average from 1999 to 2016, there was an
overall trend of gradual growth. Specifically, each year brought an average increase of
.19 in the suicide rate, with the rate in 2016 being 13.65. Upon closer examination, this
trend varied between pre- and post-litigation periods, and Florida and DOJ states had
significant deviations from the average trend as well.
Prior to litigation, each state had an average annual increase of .126, which
doubled after litigation, except for Florida. Florida’s rate actually slowed, by more than
half, after litigation. However, DOJ states also experienced a remarkable jump, above
and beyond its annual increase growing faster. The jump up was an increase over ten
times that of the average annual increase. The average across states in 2016 was 13.78.
The final model accounted for 77% of the variance in the suicide rate, indicating its
explanatory power is quite high.
Upon examination of individual states’ rates of growth (see Figure 11), it is clear
there is one state that seems to be driving the DOJ increases – New Hampshire. Without
an in-depth policy review of all major shifts in the New Hampshire policies or economic
outcomes around the exponential growth of the suicide rate, it may be difficult to
understand the factors that contributed to this change. However, one fact that was
different for New Hampshire, as compared to other DOJ states, is obvious upon review of
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Table 2 (p. 68). Among the DOJ states, New Hampshire has the least development
required for crisis services, with only a handful of crisis apartments and a mobile unit
required – no centers and no hotline. Additionally, no required community education for
police, correctional settings, or other community services on the available crisis response.
It is possible that a lack of crisis services in New Hampshire contributed to the dramatic
increase in suicide rates in that state in the last few years. As Olmstead litigation
primarily involves finding ways to shift people into the community, it is crucial to
understand how different approaches may provide differing levels of support to people
once they are in the community, and how this may impact their ability to cope and adjust
to the new challenges they face.

Model 4C. Model 4C was intended to examine changes in the readmission rate to
any psychiatric hospital within thirty days of discharge from the state psychiatric
hospital. As noted in the methods and results section, 50% of the data necessary to test
this model was unavailable. While many dependent variables chosen for this dissertation
had missing data, this was the only variable with so much missing data that a model
could not be estimated. Missing data is addressed by Hypothesis 5.

Model 4D. Model 4D examined changes in the employment rate among SMHA
consumers. When examining all states from 2007 to 2017, there was overall trend of
growth, such that on average, each state had an annual increase of .3% for a 2017 average
of about 20%. However, upon closer examination, this rate of growth seemed to be
driven primarily by Minnesota’s growing employment numbers. When Minnesota’s
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effect was parsed out, other states on average showed no growth, while Minnesota’s
employment rate was quickly increasing. The DOJ was also significantly different, but in
the opposite direction; non-DOJ states (including Minnesota) showed slow but steady
growth, while DOJ states were actually slowly declining.
Once the observed years were split into pre- and post-litigation periods,
Minnesota and DOJ states were again significantly deviating from the average trend as
well. In both cases, other states were showing a significant annual decrease prior to
litigation, which switched to an annual increase after litigation, but the change was not
significant. For all states, there was an immediate jump up in the employment rate, more
than would be expected based on the average annual increase. For Minnesota, this jump
was even higher than for other states. In the DOJ states however, the jump was less; this
difference was significant when modeled on its own, but not significant in the model with
Minnesota, indicating that the effect from Minnesota was stronger. While considering
these trends, it is important to note that five states - Florida, Maryland (Ninth), California
(Ninth), Washington (Ninth), and Pennsylvania (Third) - all had litigation before 2007, so
they have only post-litigation in these analyses. However, Florida, the Ninth Circuit, and
the Third Circuit did not have any significant deviations from the post-litigation trends.
The final model accounted for 46% of the variance in the employment rate, indicating its
explanatory power is very good.
The employment rate results are interesting for several reasons. First, the DOJ
settlement agreements always included ACT teams (which include supported
employment specialists) and quite often also included requirements to develop general
supported employment services for hundreds, if not thousands, of consumers. The lack
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of significant increases in employment rates among SMHA consumers raises concerns
about how consumers are being served by supported employment services. Additionally,
with only Minnesota showing marked increases, these findings support viewing
Minnesota’s response type to Olmstead as an example of how to connect consumers to
positive outcomes, including increased employment rates.

Models 4Ei-4Eiii. Model 4Ei examined changes in the spending patterns of states
on their judicial system. When examining all states on average from 1996-2015, for
every dollar increase in the total state budget, judicial budget per capita spending
increased 1.6 cents. After controlling for the total state budget, the judicial budget
actually decreased each year by a little over a dollar. When the observed years were
divided into pre- and post-litigation periods, the judicial budget prior to litigation
changed as would be expected given the overall state budget, but after litigation, it
slowed significantly, and was losing almost two dollars every year. None of these results
varied significantly as a result of Olmstead response type. The final model accounted for
93% of the variance in judicial spending, indicating that explanatory power of the model
is remarkable.
Model 4Eii examined changes in the spending patterns of states on law
enforcement. When examining all states on average from 1996-2015, for every dollar
increase in the total state budget, law enforcement budget per capita spending increased 2
cents. After controlling for the total state budget, the law enforcement budget was still
rapidly increasing each year by almost four dollars. When the observed years were
divided into pre- and post-litigation periods, there was not a significant difference; police
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budgets were outpacing the total state budget before litigation and they continued to do so
after. None of these results varied significantly as a result of Olmstead response type.
The final model accounted for 97% of the variance in law enforcement spending,
indicating that explanatory power of the model is remarkable.
Model 4Eiii examined changes in the spending patterns of states on their
correctional system. When examining all states on average from 1996-2015, for every
dollar increase in the total state budget, correctional budget per capita spending increased
3.4 cents. After controlling for the total state budget, correctional spending was actually
decreasing each year by a little over four dollars. When the observed years were divided
into pre- and post-litigation periods, the correctional budget prior to litigation changed as
would be expected given the overall state budget, but after litigation, it slowed
significantly, and was losing over four dollars every year, very similar to judicial system
spending trends. Correctional spending did show significant variation by Olmstead
response type; the Ninth Circuit states saw a drastic bump in spending immediately after
litigation while the Pennsylvania slowed its correctional spending after Olmstead
litigation significantly less than other states on average did. The final model accounted
for 90% of the variance in correctional spending, indicating that explanatory power of the
model is remarkable.
Overall, all three models explained 90-97% of the variance in their per capita
spending rates. Most of that explained variance was accounted for after the total state
budget was included in the model. Judicial spending and correctional spending were less
than would be expected, given the growth of the total state budget, but only after
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litigation. Police spending, however, consistently outpaced the general state budget, both
before and after litigation.

Model 4F. Model 4F examined changes in the incarceration rates of states. When
examining all states on average from 1996 to 2016, there was no consistent change over
time. The average incarceration rate in 2016 was 4.06. The Ninth Circuit states were
decreasing their incarceration rate over all observed years, while the other states on
average showed no change. This finding is particularly remarkable in light of the fact
that the Ninth Circuit states had such a dramatic bump in correctional spending
immediately after litigation. Ninth Circuit states had litigation in 2001 and 2005 – both
years in the first half of the observed period. It is possible that the increase in spending
was for programming that helped reduce future recidivism.
The lack of growth over all observed years reveal significant shifts when parsed
into pre- and post-litigation periods. On average, all states were increasing their
incarceration rate prior to litigation by .05 instances per year, and then significantly
slowed after litigation by .06 instances per year. Both Florida and Pennsylvania
approached being significantly different from the post-litigation trend by increasing their
instances of incarceration each year by .06 instances. Florida’s results should most likely
be ignored, in light of the caveat from data collection that administrators modified the
data collection method during the post-litigation period, which resulted in a significant
jump upwards not otherwise accounted for by the linear slope. The final model
accounted for 65% of the total Level 1 variance, indicating that this model’s explanatory
power is quite high.
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These findings are significant because after deinstitutionalization, a major concern
was transinstitutionalization, including shifting people from the state psychiatric hospital
into the state correctional systems. A major hypothesis of this dissertation was that
approaches to Olmstead that mimicked deinstitutionalization without reflection, like the
Third Circuit, could leave open the door for states to repeat the same mistakes
deinstitutionalization made sixty years ago. While this correlational data is insufficient to
draw any firm conclusions, the associations between the response type and incarceration
rate open the possibility that those relationships have been created.

Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5 examined differences in reporting practices by states.
The original hypothesis was that many states would fail to collect data on outcomes other
than the institutionalized population in their state, especially if that is the primary
outcome required by their circuit court or noted in their Olmstead plan. This hypothesis
was partially supported. While the utilization rate of the state psychiatric hospital was
actually one of the more poorly reported dependent variables, missing a little over 10% of
its data across states, Minnesota, the Olmstead response type with the most required
development and outcomes, had the best tracking rate for a diverse range of dependent
variables. The Ninth Circuit was next in reporting performance, beating out the Third
Circuit and Florida, which did not require the state to show improvement on any markers
other than the state psychiatric hospital census.

Legal Analysis of Each Olmstead Response Type
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Olmstead v. L.C. has been referred to as the Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
for people with disabilities (e.g., Cerreto, 2001). Olmstead focused on issues of
segregation and took aim at the stereotypes of incompetence that so often keep people
with disabilities from experiencing more complete integration into the community. The
decision was a watershed moment for disability rights that avoided destroying the
protections that the ADA had so carefully crafted – specifically, the recognition of
unjustified segregation as discrimination.
The opinion was thoughtfully tailored to acknowledge the heterogeneous clinical
needs of individuals with SMI. Justice Ginsburg explicitly recognized a place in the
treatment continuum for inpatient care, even long-term inpatient care. Each argument in
the opinion contributed to an overarching theme – while unjustified segregation was
discrimination, the segregation was only unjustified when both the patient and the
treatment team agreed there was no reason for the segregation to continue. If the only
reason for the segregation was the state’s incompetence in developing quality inpatient
care, efficient transition programs, and adept community treatment options, that was
institutionalized discrimination.
However, for all its directness in defining discrimination in this context, the
Olmstead opinion is simultaneously vague, in the way that Supreme Court opinions
typically are. The bulk of the confusion seems to cluster around the affirmative defense
the Court described at the end of its opinion, almost as an afterthought. Under this
defense, even though the state is violating the ADA, it could survive a lawsuit on the
grounds that not discriminating in the litigated circumstances would fundamentally alter
the state’s administration of its programs and cause discrimination against others, by
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forcing the state to deliver benefits in an uneven manner. Justice Ginsburg gave two
examples of an attempt at this defense: one that would work, and one that would not.
The example given as inadequate was simply the state contending that finances did not
allow for the plaintiffs’ needs to be met. Alternatively, a state showing a plan to move
people into the community as quickly as possible, with a reasonably paced waiting list,
could provide protection against an Olmstead claim.

Florida
Florida’s lawsuit in 2001 provided one of the only examples of a state not being
found in violation of the ADA. The court held that Florida’s initiation of discharge
planning upon admission and quick placements after a determination of readiness for
discharge did not violate the ADA. This finding seems consistent with the Olmstead
holding; if people are being prepared for discharge upon admission and quickly placed
when appropriate, there is no unjustified segregation. The most remarkable outcome
associated with Florida was that while suicide rates were increasing among all the other
states, Florida’s rate decreased after litigation in 2001. Florida was the only Olmstead
response type to show this outcome.
Meanwhile, the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, the DOJ states, and Minnesota all
took different approaches to defining the affirmative defense left open by the Court.
Minnesota and the DOJ states, as settlement agreements rather than court opinions, are
far more detailed in their requirements than the Ninth or Third Circuit.

Third Circuit
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The Third Circuit decided its approach only two years after the original Olmstead
decision, in 2001. The first district court decision was a remarkably toothless application
of Olmstead. All of the parties and even the court agreed there was discrimination via
unjustified segregation under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act – approximately one
hundred people were being unnecessarily institutionalized against their wishes at any
given moment during the litigated time period. However, the court accepted the
defendants’ averment that the hospital did the best it could with the resources it had,
despite the lack of any formal procedures even closely approximating the example plan
given in the plurality opinion of the Olmstead court. There is no standard for
development of even a few community placements at a time or requirement for more
formal discharge-ready lists to monitor more uniformly the amount of time people wait
for community placements. Under this analytic framework, it is difficult to imagine any
improvement to the NSH discharge process that would not be considered a fundamental
alteration of services.
While the Third Circuit’s final holding was an improvement over this early
attempt, and even included a passionate discourse on the rights of people with SMI, it
still had several fatal flaws. First, the court had a shift in language from its analysis to its
conclusory holding that was subtle but eviscerated this crucial decision’s potency. In its
critique of DPW’s plan, the court refers to “eligible patients” waiting for discharge. The
facts of the case indicate that, at any given time, approximately one-third of the 300 to
40016 class members (non-forensic patients at NSH) were considered clinically

16

The class had grown to 410 individuals by the second district court decision.
Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004b, p. 3.
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appropriate for discharge by their treatment teams and preferred to live in the community;
essentially, they are members of the group the Olmstead opinion explicitly considered to
have a valid claim of discrimination via unjustified segregation (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring, 1999, p. 598).
However, the Third Circuit ultimately required of DPW that it provide specific
dates for discharge of an approximate number of patients, in the context of continuing its
overall trend of deinstitutionalization since the 1950s, and after criticizing the state’s goal
of closing up to 250 hospital beds annually as being too vague. In the middle of its
opinion, the Third Circuit switched from “eligible patients” to all hospital residents. If
the Third Circuit requires Pennsylvania to close a certain number of hospital beds each
year, eventually, there will be no place for people with SMI to receive long-term inpatient
services. This would directly violate the insistence of both Justice Ginsburg that the
ADA does not require States to close all institutions and “plac[e] patients in need of close
care at risk,” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 604) as well as Justice Kennedy
that “it would be a tragic event, then, were the… ADA to be interpreted so that States had
some incentive, for fear of litigation, to drive those in need of medical care and treatment
out of appropriate care and into settings with too little assistance and supervision”
(Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 610). The Third Circuit would have been
better advised to select more narrowly tailored brightline, measurable markers.
Another major flaw was the court’s reasoning when it came to judicial review of
the state budget. Separation of powers is a fundamental component of our government;
managing the state budget has historically been allocated to the executive and legislative
branch. However, the Third Circuit court seemed to imagine that placing any
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requirements on how the state complied with the ADA would require a line by line
review and approval of the state budget, which was not an argument even entertained by
any court in any other case. If a court were to issue an opinion with a new state budget
and dictate that the legislature should accept it, in the name of interpreting and applying
the ADA, that would certainly violate the separation of powers. Conversely, if the court
were to allow the state to defend against allegations of discrimination, in any form, by
merely averring it has money problems, then the court is no longer serving its role as
interpreter and enforcer of statutory and constitutional rights. It would be ridiculous for a
state to successfully defend itself against alleged Equal Protection clause violations, such
as the racial discrimination banned by Brown v. Board of Education (1954), by simply
saying the court did not have the authority to tell the state how to allocate its publicschool budget.
A related logical flaw in the Third Circuit’s final opinion was its myopic focus on
the state psychiatric hospital census. Without requirements to develop alternative
treatment delivery systems in the community, the court leaves vulnerable those who are
discharged. Arguably, the court is trying to instigate the state psychiatric hospitals to
discharge more people than ever before, and yet it fails to require the state to develop the
community options to support such an influx. In Olmstead, the state hospital had tried to
discharge one of the plaintiffs to a homeless shelter, which the Court found reprehensible,
yet the application of Olmstead by the Third Circuit fails to consider how to prevent an
outcome such as this. As predicted, the Third Circuit (and everywhere but Minnesota)
failed to show that the numbers being treated in the community increased after litigation.
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When considering the policy outcomes of the Third Circuit analyzed by this
dissertation, several interesting trends surfaced. First, despite the Third Circuit’s
emphasis on lowering the state psychiatric hospital census, it did not have a significantly
faster rate of deinstitutionalization. The Third Circuit relied heavily upon the reasoning
that brightline markers would force the state to quickly and efficiently discharge people
from the state hospital, but they did so with no more success than other states on average.
The Third Circuit did have a few collateral effects that should also be noted. On
none of the collateral outcomes did the Third Circuit fair significantly better than the
other states. Instead, the Third Circuit experienced a significant immediate increase in
the filing rate for disability benefits immediately after litigation, higher incarceration
rates in the years following litigation, and it decreased its spending on corrections less
than other states in the years following litigation.
Overall, the Third Circuit show a number of logical, legal, and policy flaws in its
application of Olmstead. The Third Circuit did not display a significantly faster rate of
deinstitutionalization – it’s one requirement. It failed to apply the spirit of Olmstead with
fidelity, as shown by its lack of appreciation for the role of long-term inpatient services in
the continuum of care for people with SMI as well as its undue hesitation to hold a state
accountable for discrimination, even if it costs the state money. The Third Circuit also
ended up with a number of problematic collateral effects, including incarceration rates
and spending, as well as disability applications.

Ninth Circuit
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Like the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit emphasized a lowered state psychiatric
hospital census but did not require specific numbers by a specific date. The Ninth Circuit
did, however, go beyond the Third Circuit by requiring that states also show funding for
community services, while lowering the state psychiatric hospital census. Interestingly,
the Ninth Circuit showed the opposite pattern of results from the Third Circuit – a drop in
disability benefit recipients the year after litigation and an overarching decrease in the
incarceration rate both before and after litigation. The Ninth Circuit did have a
significant, immediate bump in correctional spending after litigation, but not a sustained
change over time.
The Ninth Circuit’s approach cured many of the issues in the Third Circuit’s
approach, including having more comprehensive requirements and not balking at
requiring funding shifts. However, the Ninth Circuit did perpetuate the emphasis on
uncapped deinstitutionalization. In the cases arising from Washington and California, the
court lauded the trend of deinstitutionalization while failing to consider where a
reasonable end might lie.
For the purposes of this dissertation, Maryland was included in the Ninth Circuit
Olmstead response type because while it was clearly not geographically in the Ninth
Circuit, the ideology represented by its district court decision closely matched the
rhetoric and reasoning of the Ninth Circuit appellate court. Maryland flirted with a more
nuanced view of how to lower hospitalization rates while appreciating the role of
inpatient services, but ultimately fumbled the execution.
Specifically, Maryland introduced the idea of a cap on deinstitutionalization for
the purpose of preserving high-intensity services for those who need them, either acutely
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or chronically (Williams v. Wasserman, 2001). This approach more comprehensively
acknowledged the dynamic and complex nature of providing services to people with
developmental and psychiatric disabilities. However, while the Maryland District Court
acknowledged the need for some hospital beds to remain available permanently, it
nonsensically undercut its own valuation of inpatient services by applauding the state for
prioritizing community programs over “institutional” programs. If the state
acknowledges the need for programs with high-intensity services, those programs should
logically be equally valued and (financially) supported as part of a comprehensive
treatment continuum. Overall, the Ninth Circuit got closer, but still failed to accurately
respect the subtlety of valuing inpatient services while still fighting to end discrimination
via unjustifiable segregation.

Department of Justice
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has litigated many cases related to Olmstead but
the cases most applicable to the issues addressed by this dissertation took place in 20102013 in Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire, and North Carolina. Those settlement
agreements were chosen because they impacted people with mental illness on a statewide
level. They consistently required substantial infrastructure development for community
mental health services, such as ACT teams, scattered-site supported housing, supported
employment, and peer services, along with crisis services, short-term residential, and
inpatient services for psychiatric stabilization in the community.
Notably, the DOJ also had settlement agreements with nursing homes that served
primarily adults with SMI, including in New York and Missouri (U.S. v. Marion County
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Nursing Home District, 2013; U.S. v. State of New York, 2013). Similar to the other cases
noted, the DOJ required substantial development of scattered-site housing. Unlike the
other cases noted, housing seems to be the only required change. One theme that seems
to be consistent across all of these settlement agreements is a one-size-fits-all model for
community integration. According to the DOJ, to best integrate into the community from
a hospital or nursing home, one should preferably live alone in an apartment in a building
with fewer than 10% of the units occupied by someone with a disability known to the
state, work in supported employment, and receive mental health services through an ACT
team. Additionally, should one decline to move into such a setting and voice a
preference for staying in an assisted living facility, even after being informed of the
opportunity to engage in such services, community service providers are required to
regularly check in and devise strategies to overcome one’s objections to community
integration. Integrate, the way they say, or be pursued until you do.
It would be difficult to convincingly argue that the DOJ model does not limit
choice; typically, only one style of housing is acceptable, along with set routes for
community treatment and supportive services. While consumers are ostensibly put at the
center of planning for community integration, the DOJ has clearly defined what is
appropriate and acceptable for them to choose, making their “person-centered planning”
seem superficial. This approach to community integration, while it wraps itself in
evidence-based services that have been championed by the recovery movement (e.g.,
Becker, Drake, & Naughton, 2005), seems incongruent with the recovery principles of
self-determination and empowerment due to its lack of choice (e.g., Rappaport, 1987).
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Beyond these ideological concerns, DOJ states have shown an association with
some problematic collateral outcomes. While DOJ states did not slow on
deinstitutionalization rates after Olmstead litigation as most states did, and DOJ states did
increase spending on community mental health services more than other states postlitigation, there were some concerning associations with suicide rates and employment
rates. While most states were decreasing their employment rates each year, there was
also a significant immediate increase after litigation which DOJ states experienced only
to a muted degree. Additionally, while suicide rates on average among the ten states
were increasing prior to litigation (.12 instances increase per year), and then doubled after
litigation (.25 instances increase per year), DOJ states also had a significant immediate
jump up the year after litigation that was over ten times the average annual increase prior
to litigation (1.64 instances). As noted in the discussion earlier, this sharp increase
seemed to be driven primarily by New Hampshire, which did have fewer crisis services
developed as a result of the DOJ settlement than many other DOJ states.

Minnesota
Finally, Minnesota’s litigation began in 2011 but its settlement agreement was not
accepted by the court until 2015. Of all the Olmstead response types, Minnesota’s
approach seems to be the most comprehensive. It involved all the development of a DOJ
settlement with none of the choice restriction, as well as the community treatment
alternatives funding championed by the Ninth Circuit without an unwarranted emphasis
on lowering the state psychiatric hospital numbers without a cap.
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Minnesota was the only Olmstead approach style to actually show an increase in
the rate of people receiving mental health services in the community, although this trend
was present prior to their litigation date. Additionally, while Minnesota’s state
psychiatric hospital had an immediate decrease in funding after litigation, it had its
funding increased more than the other states each year, potentially signaling support for
the state psychiatric hospitals as part of the treatment continuum. Finally, Minnesota had
a jump up in employment rates immediately after litigation that was significant when
compared to the other states, and particularly noticeably in comparison to DOJ states.
Ultimately, the legacy of Olmstead is only as valuable as the enforcement of its
integration mandate. As the courthouse is proving the primary battleground for civil
rights, including disability rights, how courts interpret and apply Olmstead intimately
impacts its likelihood of creating the desired change. Consideration of the observed,
associated outcomes can only aid courts in their task of applying Olmstead to
complicated fact patterns.

Limitations
There are many limitations in the results and conclusions of this dissertation,
perhaps the most pressing of which is the fact that these analyses are correlational in
nature. There exist too many potential confounds in a non-experimentally designed
study, such as other state mental health policies, uncontrolled and/or unexpected events,
and unknown moderators. On a practical level, however, a truly experimental approach
will almost certainly never be feasible on the required scale. The results of the present
study reinforced the credibility of the analytical approach applied here; while this
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correlational data is insufficient to draw any firm conclusions, the associations between
the response type and dependent variables open the possibility that these relationships of
interest have been created.
Observed years varied from analysis to analysis depending on availability of data;
some states in some analyses only had one year prior to litigation, which is not ideal.
Conversely, some states, particularly DOJ states, experienced Olmstead litigation quite
recently and have not had the chance to show change over many years. Additionally, this
dissertation only looked at ten states, which is a fairly limited number of cases. Many
sources of data were inconsistent across states or across years, by failing to operationally
define data in the same way or failing to collect it consistently. Data collection was so
poor in some respects that one model could not be estimated at all given the gross lack of
data.

Future Directions
Future research has many directions to go from here, as this area of research is
relatively new. First, this line of research could be expanded to include more states. It is
likely there are more states that have developed Olmstead plans that would fit into one of
these categories (or create their own) but did so outside of litigation and subsequently
were not part of this review. DOJ has intervened in multiple other state mental health
systems and psychiatric hospitals, but not technically on Olmstead grounds (e.g., Civil
Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act [CRIPA]); therefore, there may be states with
essentially DOJ-Olmstead policies that were not included in this review. Similarly, it is
likely there are more relevant outcomes that could be addressed for each state.
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While future directions in this line of research could benefit by zooming out, as in
collecting data on additional states and additional outcomes, it could also benefit by
zooming in, and looking at states individually, on a case level basis, to determine how
policies, whether related to Olmstead or not, have influenced major outcomes.
Eventually, it would be helpful to narrow down overall state approaches to major policy
problems and individual active ingredients that could be generalized across multiple
settings.

CHAPTER 10: RECOMMENDATIONS
The work of this dissertation has led to a number of recommendations which are
based on empirical findings, ideological considerations, and legal analysis.

1) States should develop a base number of state psychiatric hospital beds, as
well as a base number of short-term psychiatric hospital beds, considering
population and need, and fund their psychiatric hospitals appropriately
given this base number.

Despite acknowledgements by several courts that even long-term inpatient
psychiatric units have a legitimate place in the treatment continuum, state psychiatric
hospitals continue to be the pariah of mental health treatment. The Treatment Advocacy
Center (2016) notes that compared to other similarly developed countries only New
Zealand, Chile, Italy, Turkey, and Mexico provided fewer state psychiatric inpatient beds
per capita than the United States. While many researchers identify 40-60 beds per
100,000 members of the general population as a foundational guide (Treatment Advocacy
Center, 2016), each state should realistically identify its own need for short- and long-
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term hospitalization beds.

2) States should consistently collect data and provide resources for its analysis
to improve services.
Much of this dissertation’s idealized analyses have been limited by the
availability of data. Specifically, better counts of mental health service provision, both
inpatient and outpatient, should be collected. Inpatient services should have additional
information available, such as the type of services provided (e.g., competency restoration
versus risk reduction for not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), etc.), diagnosis, length
of stay by reason committed, and length of wait for community placement after
determination of discharge readiness. All data should be made publicly available to
encourage transparency and public policy research. When providing data on civil and
forensically involved clients, data points should include whether the individual is
committed civilly for danger to self, danger to others, or grave disability, and whether the
individual is forensically committed for competency evaluation, competency restoration,
NGRI risk reduction, or sexually violent risk.

3) States should ensure that their Olmstead plans preserve choice for
consumers.

Providing consumers with meaningful, informed choice is required to be
ideologically consistent with the recovery movement. Choice should be available across
services provided in the community - housing, medication management, employment
opportunities, psychological services, and case management. This requires a continuum
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of services to be offered from which consumers can freely choose, rather than the
designation of preferred recovery path to the exclusion of alternatives.

4) States should ensure that community providers are providing quality
services and are sufficiently funded to provide services for those leaving the
state psychiatric hospital.

It is unrealistic and unfair to expect community providers to be able to
accommodate an influx of individuals discharged from the state psychiatric hospitals
without providing appropriate resources. Furthermore, community providers who care
for those discharged from the state psychiatric hospital should be evaluated regularly to
ensure quality provision of services. The quality assurance mechanisms in the DOJ
settlement agreements provide a helpful starting framework for this type of quality
evaluation.

5) States should provide for coordination of services between the state
psychiatric hospital and community providers.

The empirical results of Hypothesis 3 of this dissertation suggest that individuals
being discharged from the state psychiatric hospital are not being absorbed into available
community mental health services, outside of possibly Minnesota. Coordination of
services between the state psychiatric hospital and community providers can contribute to
consumers receiving the services they need in the community. Additionally, lack of
coordination between the state psychiatric hospital and community mental health centers
is commonly considered a major factor in the trends of transinstitutionalization observed
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after deinstitutionalization; providing this coordination now would help states ensure
their Olmstead plans do not unreflectively repeat the mistakes of deinstitutionalization.

6) States should develop comprehensive crisis services available in the
community.
New Hampshire’s data shows an alarming recent spike in suicide rates across
several years. While the present study does not establish a causal link between
availability of crisis services in the community and suicide rates, such a relationship is
not only possible, but logical. Even in the absence of empirical support, there are
ideological and ethical reasons to provide comprehensive crisis services for consumers
experiencing psychiatric emergencies.

CONCLUSION
Olmstead was a landmark disability rights case, with nationwide implications.
The Court held that if a person who has been institutionalized for developmental, mental,
or physical disability wants to move into a less restrictive setting and is found to be
appropriate for that level of care by a mental health professional, the state must have
reasonable accommodations in place to allow that person to do so. Failure to comply
with these standards is a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and not
justified solely by a lack of state resources.
Not all circuits interpreted the Olmstead case similarly, creating nationally
disjointed criteria for a “good” Olmstead plan. For some states, the plans or policies put
forward in response to Olmstead seem to be merely extensions of the
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deinstitutionalization policy that gained traction nationally in the 1950s by requiring only
long-term hospitalization bed reduction. Other states took a more comprehensive
approach, requiring considerable development of community resources.
This dissertation began with legal research, which identified five Olmstead
response types in the litigation subsequent to the original U.S. Supreme Court decision.
These Olmstead response types are distinct sets of criteria for how states are to comply
with the requirements of Olmstead, such as decreasing the state psychiatric hospital
census, generally funding community resources, or developing particular types of
services in the community. This dissertation investigated the relationship between these
Olmstead response types and fifteen dependent variables over twenty years, including
parts of the state budget, employment rates, suicide rates, pursuit of disability benefits,
incarceration rates, mental health treatment rates, and data collection.
All states showed lower state psychiatric hospital census numbers, but only
Minnesota showed an increase in community treatment rates. The Ninth Circuit states
had lower rates of people on disability benefits, while the Third Circuit had a significant
increase in filings for disability benefits immediately after litigation. Suicide rates were
much lower in Florida but showed alarming increases in the DOJ state of New
Hampshire. Minnesota had greater increases in employment rates after litigation, and all
states had slower incarceration rates after litigation. States managed their budgets in
different ways after litigation, but the most remarkable finding is that there was not an
increase in funding for community mental health treatment after litigation outside of DOJ
states. DOJ states, the Third Circuit, and Florida had the highest rates of missing data
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across all variables, (8.2-8.6%) while Minnesota had the lowest rate of missing data
(5.2%).
Overall, the results of the present study have important implications for how
states apply Olmstead. These findings can be used to guide policy makers as they
attempt to craft mental health policy that honors the spirit of Olmstead while creating
outcomes that meaningfully contribute to consumers’ quality of life. The findings can
also be used to apply Olmstead in ways that are ideologically consistent with the recovery
movement.
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Appendix of Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Nationwide average daily census of the state psychiatric hospitals from 1903 to
2003. Citations for the seven anchored points on the chart are provided throughout the
text of this section.
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Figure 2. Procedural history of the Olmstead case. United States Supreme Court opinion
addressed in this section is indicated in the procedural history by being bolded and
underlined.
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Figure 3. State psychiatric hospitalization rates over time.
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Figure 4. Community Mental Health Treatment Budget per capita rates over time.
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Figure 5. Total state budget per capita rates over time.
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Figure 6. State psychiatric hospital budget per capita rates over time.
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Figure 7. Community Mental Health Treatment rates.
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Figure 8. Rates of people receiving disability benefits over time.
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Figure 9. Disability benefits filing rates over time.
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Figure 10. Disability benefits application approval rates over time.
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Figure 11. Suicide rate over time.
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Figure 12. Percentage of employed consumers over time.
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Figure 13. State judicial budget per capita rates over time.
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Figure 14. State police budget per capita rates over time.
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Figure 15. State correctional budget per capita rates over time.
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Figure 16. Incarceration rate over time.
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Table 1. Side by side comparison of the language from the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, § 202 and from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504. Corresponding
passages marked by matching underlining, italicizing, or bolding for ease of comparison.
“No otherwise qualified handicapped

“No qualified individual with a disability shall,

individual in the United States… shall, solely

by reason of such disability, be excluded from

by reason of his handicap, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or

the services, programs, or activities of a

be subjected to discrimination under any

public entity, or be subjected to

program or activity receiving federal

discrimination by any such entity.”

financial assistance.”
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 202
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Table 2. Comparison of major terms of Department of Justice settlement agreements by
state.
North
Carolina
(2012)

New Hampshire

SMI
-Adult Care
Homes
-SPH
-Homeless or
unstable
housing
-Diverted
from adult
care home due
to this
settlement

SMI
-Adult care
homes
-SPH
-Frequent SPH
or ER admits
-Criminal justice
involvement due
to mental health
-Unable to get
services in the
community

2 centers

Centers

4 apartments

3 res programs

1 acute unit

Acute units

Mobile Unit-1 hr

35 hosp beds

4 apartments

Hotline

18 apartments

Hotline

Mobile Unit-1
hr

Hotline

Mobile Unit-1
hr

DOJ
Services by
State

Georgia
(2010)

Target
Population

DD & SMI
(~9000 SMI)
-Forensic
status
-Chronically
homeless
-Currently in
SPH
-Frequent SPH
or ER admits
-To be released
inmates

Crisis
Services

6 centers

Delaware
(2011)
SMI
-Forensic
status
-Chronically
homeless
-Currently in
SPH or
private
hospital
-Frequent
SPH or ER
admits
-Criminal
justice
involved

(2013)

Mobile Unit-1
hr
Community
Education

None

Police,
Police,
Corrections,
Corrections,
Hospitals on
Hospitals on
Crisis services Crisis services
Judges &
Police on
services for
forensic pop

None
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ACT

22 teams
7-10 members
10:1 clients
Dartmouth

11 teams
7-10 members
10:1 clients
Dartmouth

50 teams
Dartmouth or
TMACT

50 teams
10:1 (except
psychiatrist)

Case
Management

8 teams, 3-4
members,
20/30:1

4 intensive, 10
members
25:1

Community
support teams
and case
management

None

14 intensive, 10
members,
20/30:1

25 individual,
1:35

3000 slots,
2750 scatter
site

600 slots,
increase to
prevent > 6
month wait, all
scatter site,
which is only 2
or 10%

45 individual,
1:50
Supported
Housing

Up to 9000
50% scatter
Bridge funding

All needs met
All scatter
Bridge
funding

medically
complex housing
available, 16
each
Supported
Employment

550
EBP model

1100 SE
1100 rehab

2500
EBP

1000
Dartmouth

Family and
Peer
Supports

Peer - all in
ACT & CSTs +
835

1000

Peer and
Psychosocial
Rehab

Family - yes
Peer - 3 centers
open 44 hrs/wk

Transition
Planning

Each SPH gets a
case manager
and transition
specialist

Every
hospitalized
person meets
with a team
with 5 days,
then every 30
days, escalate
case if not
discharged,

Starts
Starts
immediately,
immediately,
done within
diverse team, list
90 days
barriers and steps
(escalated if
to overcome;
not), disability
post-transition
cannot be a
visits by
barrier to
community
discharge,
providers to
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team includes
a community
provider

psychiatric
check adjustment
advance
directives, and
crisis plans

Improper
admissions

From SPH to
ASL or SNF,
unless
medically
required or
“they were
informed when
they chose to do
so”

None

People with
People with
SPMI to adult
SPMI to adult
care homes; if
care homes; if
they insist,
they insist, must
must
document efforts
document
made and
efforts made continue in-reach
and continue
in-reach

Client/
Guardian
Counseling

None

None

Provide visits
to community
providers,
consults with
current
community
clients, and
monitor
anyone who
declines

Provide visits to
community
providers,
consults with
current
community
clients, and
annually
recontact anyone
who declines

Quality
Assurance

Annual review:
In person
interviews
Records review
Outcome data
Network
analysis - cost
and availability

Community
provider
contracts are
performance
based;
reviewed
every other
year; collect
outcome
variables;
public annual
report

Sufficient
providers;
QofL surveys;
outcome
variables for
overall goals;
public annual
report

Sufficient
providers, each
reviewed every
two years;
performancebased contracts;
assess common
transition
barriers & gaps
in services
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Table 3. Summary of case information.
Case Name

State

Year

Model

Outcome

US v. Georgia

Georgia

2010

DOJ

Settlement Agreement

US v. Delaware

Delaware

2011

DOJ

Settlement Agreement

US v. North
Carolina

North Carolina

2012

DOJ

Settlement Agreement

US v. New
Hampshire

New
Hampshire

2013

DOJ

Settlement Agreement

Frederick L. v.
Dept. of Public
Welfare

Pennsylvania

2001

Third
Circuit

Trial court ruling in
favor of the state
vacated and remanded
by appellate court

Sanchez v.
Johnson

California

2005

Ninth
Circuit

Trial court ruling in
favor of the state
affirmed by appellate
court

Arc of
Washington
State, Inc. v.
Braddock

Washington

2005

Ninth
Circuit

Trial court ruling in
favor of the state
affirmed by appellate
court

Williams v.
Wasserman

Maryland

2001

Ninth
Circuit

Trial court ruling in
favor of the state

Jensen v.
Minnesota Dept.
of Human
Services

Minnesota

2011
(finalized
in 2015)

Minnesota

Settlement Agreement

Johnson v.
Murphy

Florida

2001

Florida

Trial court ruling in
favor of the state
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Table 4. Summary of Olmstead Response Types
Olmstead
Response Type

States

Description

Third

Pennsylvania

● Written
● Set dates by which an approximate
number of people will be discharged
from state hospitals
● Explicit discharge criteria
● “a general description of the
collaboration required between the local
authorities and the housing,
transportation, care, and education
agencies to effectuate integration into the
community”

Ninth

California,
Washington,
Maryland

● Increases in funding for community
services, including waiver programs,
despite budget constraints
● Regular, personalized evaluations for
readiness to transition and community
services needed
● A general deinstitutionalization trend

DOJ

New Hampshire,
North Carolina,
Delaware,
Georgia

Minnesota

Minnesota

Florida

Florida

● Intensive community service
development, included crisis services,
ACT teams, and other supportive services
● Process development for transition
planning
● Quality assurance systems
● Intensive community service
development, including affordable
housing, supported employment, and
mental health services
● Consumer choice among services
● Trend of deinstitutionalization
● Consumer input in development
● Discharge planning started at admission
● Coordination with community providers
for discharge
● Typically no waiting list, most
discharged 30-60 days from eligibility
determination - delay was for
coordination of services
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Table 5. Dependent Variables, Covariates, and Data Sources.
Dependent
Variable

Model

Data Source

Available at

1

NRI/SAMHSA
data, 2001-2017

http://www.nri-incdata.org/ &
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/

NRI/SAMHSA
data,
1990, 1997, 20012007, 2009-2016

http://www.nri-incdata.org/ &
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/

NRI/SAMHSA
data, 1990, 1997,
2001-2007, 20092016

http://www.nri-incdata.org/ &
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/

NRI/SAMHSA
data, 2001-2017

http://www.nri-incdata.org/ &
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/

4Ai

SSA Disability
Claim Data, 20012015

https://catalog.data.gov/datase
t/ssa-disability-claim-data

Filing rate for
disability benefits

4Aii

SSA Disability
Claim Data, 20012015

https://catalog.data.gov/datase
t/ssa-disability-claim-data

Approval rate for
disability benefits

4Aiii

SSA Disability
Claim Data, 20012015

https://catalog.data.gov/datase
t/ssa-disability-claim-data

Annual suicide rate

4B

CDC’s National
Vital Statistics
System, 1999-2016

https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvs
s/index.htm

Readmission to any
psychiatric hospital

4C

SAMHSA’s
Uniform Reporting
System, 2007-2017

https://www.samhsa.gov/data/

Employed
percentage of
SMHA consumers

4D

SAMHSA’s
Uniform Reporting
System, 2007-2017

https://www.samhsa.gov/data/

BJS Justice

https://www.bjs.gov/index.cf

Rate of people
served in the state
psychiatric hospital
Per capita
expenditures for
community mental
health services
Per capita
expenditures of the
state psychiatric
hospital
Rate of people
served by
community mental
health providers
Percent of general
population receiving
disability benefits

Per capita

2A

2B

3
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expenditures on
judicial system

Per capita
expenditures on law
enforcement

Per capita
expenditures on
corrections

4Ei

4Eii

4Eiii

Expenditure and
Employment
publication series,
1996-2015

m?ty=dcdetail&iid=286

BJS Justice
Expenditure and
Employment
publication series,
1996-2015

https://www.bjs.gov/index.cf
m?ty=dcdetail&iid=286

BJS Justice
Expenditure and
Employment
publication series,
1996-2015

https://www.bjs.gov/index.cf
m?ty=dcdetail&iid=286

Rate of people
incarcerated

4F

BJS National
Prisoner Statistics
Program, 19962016

https://www.bjs.gov/index.cf
m?ty=dcdetail&iid=269

Per capita
expenditures on total
state budget

2A,
2B,
4Ei4Eiii

BJS Justice
Expenditure and
Employment
publication series,
1996-2015

https://www.bjs.gov/index.cf
m?ty=dcdetail&iid=286

230
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for covariates and dependent variables in Hypotheses 1-4.
Model

N

Mean

S.D.

Range

Skew

Kurtosis

1 - SPH rate

153

.525

.404

.12-1.92

1.687

2.122

2A - Com Tx
spending

164

82.47

58.103

11.19-281.43

1.199

1.525

2B - SPH
spending

164

33.248

11.314

13.29-60.71

.326

-.594

3 - Com Tx rate

144

14.859

7.313

.88-33.02

.767

-.445

4Ai - disability
benefits

150

5.41

.986

3.61-7.67

.32

-.657

4Aii - disability
filing rates

150

1.191

.228

.72-1.71

.343

-.607

4Aiii disability
approval rates

150

36.554

8.73

23.84-66.22

1.032

.723

4B - suicide

180

12.031

2.076

8.2-18.6

.36

-.155

4C readmission

55

9.92

6.392

0-40

2.404

8.946

4D employment

107

18.48

8.489

4-39

.99

.256

4Ei - judicial
spending

180

115.963

44.805

50.08-252.45

1.176

1.028

4Eii - LEO
spending

180

253.95

78.074

125.8-427.7

.432

-.759

4Eiii correctional
spending

180

210.278

67.879

73.34-391.62

.399

-.229

4F incarceration
rate

210

4.048

1.775

1.11-9.01

.699

.282

Covariate - total
state budget

129

8718.72

1872.86

4658-13123

-.038

-.666
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Table 7. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in hospitalization rates over time.
Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

-0.017

-0.082

.937

Ninth circuit - slope

.029

1.000

.346

DOJ - intercept

.074

.311

.764

DOJ - slope

-.057

-2.114

.067

Florida - intercept

.001

.003

.998

Florida - slope

.039

.864

.413

Third Circuit - intercept

-.153

-.482

.643

Third Circuit - slope

.022

.48

.644

Minnesota - intercept

-.007

-.021

.984

Minnesota - slope

.022

0.473

.649
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Table 8. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on hospitalization rates
growth rate. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit

.012

.606

.561

DOJ

-.105

-7.623

<.001

Florida

.03

1.139

.288

Third Circuit

-0.005

-.17

.87

Minnesota

.042

1.135

.289
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Table 9. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 1.
Fixed Effect

Coefficient

Standard
error

t-ratio

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

0.257162

0.069993

3.674

9

0.005

-0.068159

0.022888

-2.978

9

0.016

0.057059

0.026857

2.125

8

0.066

-0.058886

0.017404

-3.383

8

0.010

For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10

For POSTLIT slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20
DOJ, β21
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Table 10. Correlations for dependent variables in models 2A & 2B. All correlations are
significant (p < .001).
Models 2A & 2B

Community Tx PC

SPH PC

Total State PC

Community Tx PC

***

***

***

SPH PC

.764

***

***

Total State PC

-.286

-.485

***
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Table 11. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state per capita spending on
community mental health over time. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

6.439

.131

.899

Ninth circuit - slope

.256

.127

.902

DOJ - intercept

-60.784

-1.455

.184

DOJ - slope

-2.746

-1.649

.138

Florida - intercept

-97.431

-1.42

.193

Florida - slope

-3.803

-1.338

.218

Third Circuit - intercept

188.567

4.255

.003

Third Circuit - slope

7.353

3.797

.005

Minnesota - intercept

54.576

.755

.472

Minnesota - slope

3.119

1.081

.311
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Table 12. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a
state’s per capita spending on community mental health. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - jump

.406

.022

.983

Ninth circuit - slope

-0.536

-0.541

.59

DOJ - jump

-37.834

-2.284

.052

DOJ - slope

4.035

2.172

.032

Florida - jump

-15.821

-.517

.619

Florida - slope

-.601

-.485

.629

Third Circuit - jump

53.651

1.982

.083

Third Circuit - slope

-1.425

-1.164

.247

Minnesota - jump

16.148

.57

.584

Minnesota - slope

3.046

.798

.427
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Table 13. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 2A.
Fixed Effect
Coefficient
Standard
t-ratio
error
For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00
37.007326
42.427750 0.872
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10
1.522745
1.530932
0.995
For POSTLITS slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20
0.514873
0.827686
0.622
DOJ, β21
4.040242
1.944383
2.078
For JUMP slope, π3
INTRCPT2, β30
11.197716
11.825354 0.947
DOJ, β31
-38.779687 17.940041 -2.162
For TOTSTPC slope, π4
INTRCPT2, β40
0.008239
0.003277
2.514

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

9

0.406

9

0.346

96
96

0.535
0.040

8
8

0.371
0.063

96

0.014
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Table 14. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state per capita spending on
the state psychiatric hospital over time. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

4.757

.549

.598

Ninth circuit - slope

.684

1.474

.179

DOJ - intercept

10.105

1.349

.214

DOJ - slope

.101

.213

.836

Florida - intercept

-18.026

-1.504

.171

Florida - slope

-.147

-.188

.856

Third Circuit - intercept

-8.348

-.649

.534

Third Circuit - slope

-1.017

-1.443

.187

Minnesota - intercept

-10.507

-.827

.432

Minnesota - slope

-.668

-.897

.396
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Table 15. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the state’s per capita
spending on the state psychiatric hospital. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - jump

7.861

3.595

.007

Ninth circuit - slope

.339

.825

.411

DOJ - jump

-1.976

-0.726

.488

DOJ - slope

-0.346

-0.436

.664

Florida - jump

-3.109

-.544

.601

Florida - slope

.635

1.042

.30

Third Circuit - jump

-2.736

-.484

.641

Third Circuit - slope

-.849

-1.506

.135

Minnesota - jump

-8.833

-2.665

.029

Minnesota - slope

2.881

2.057

.042
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Table 16. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 2B.
Fixed Effect
Coefficient Standard
t-ratio
error
For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00
37.245040 10.633127 3.503
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10
0.305497
0.398239
0.767
For POSTLITS slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20
-0.191288
0.306857
-0.623
MINN, β21
2.770001
1.413458
1.960
For JUMP slope, π3
INTRCPT2, β30
-2.334069
1.901595
-1.227
NINTH, β31 6.301491
2.173770
2.899
MINN, β32
-7.947018
3.239407
-2.453
For TOTSTPC slope, π4
INTRCPT2, β40
-0.000142
0.000854
-0.167

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

9

0.007

9

0.463

96
96

0.535
0.053

7
7
7

0.259
0.023
0.044

96

0.868
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Table 17. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in community treatment rates
over time. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

-4.324

-0.654

.532

Ninth circuit - slope

-0.134

-0.299

.773

DOJ - intercept

-5.024

-0.822

.435

DOJ - slope

-0.517

-1.324

.222

Florida - intercept

-9.019

-0.91

.389

Florida - slope

-0.356

-0.523

.615

Third Circuit - intercept

14.414

1.559

0.158

Third Circuit - slope

.71

1.091

.307

Minnesota - intercept

17.986

2.092

.07

Minnesota - slope

1.311

2.399

.043
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Table 18. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on a state’s community
treatment growth rate. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - slope

.148

.725

.489

Ninth circuit - jump

-1.897

-1.00

.319

DOJ - slope

-.538

-1.628

.142

DOJ - jump

.112

.065

.948

Florida - slope

-.031

-.116

.91

Florida - jump

2.151

.684

.496

Third Circuit - slope

.26

.84

.425

Third Circuit - jump

1.173

.388

.699

Minnesota - slope

.74

1.549

.16

Minnesota - jump

4.597

1.634

.105
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Table 19. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 3.
Fixed Effect
Coefficient
Standard
t-ratio
error
For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00
19.848541
3.057508
6.492
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10
-0.108047
0.410245
-0.263
MINN, β11
2.639673
1.115875
2.366
For POSTLIT slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20
0.452460
0.564740
0.801
MINN, β21
-2.045298
1.735373
-1.179
For JUMP slope, π3
INTRCPT2, β30
-2.130260
0.904915
-2.354

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

9

<0.001

8
8

0.799
0.046

8
8

0.446
0.272

113

0.020
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Table 20. Correlations for dependent variables in models 4Ai-4Aiii. All correlations are
significant (p < .001).
Models 4Ai-4Aiii

% receiving benefits

Filing Rate

Approval Rate

% receiving benefits

***

***

***

Filing Rate

.764

***

***

Approval Rate

-.286

-.485

***
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Table 21. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the percent of people receiving
disability benefits over time. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

-1.386

-2.866

.021

Ninth circuit - slope

-.044

-1.644

.139

DOJ - intercept

0.975

1.85

.102

DOJ - slope

.036

1.402

.199

Florida - intercept

.072

.072

.944

Florida - slope

-0.024

-.53

.61

Third Circuit - intercept

1.71

2.04

.076

Third Circuit - slope

.04

.907

.391

Minnesota - intercept

-1.147

-1.235

.252

Minnesota - slope

-.01

-.214

.836
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Table 22. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on a state’s disability
benefits growth rate. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - jump

-.278

-2.925

.019

Ninth circuit - slope

.048

2.098

.069

DOJ - jump

.261

2.786

.024

DOJ - slope

-.065

-2.208

.058

Florida - jump

-.221

-1.03

.333

Florida - slope

-.003

-.073

.943

Third Circuit - jump

.161

.718

.493

Third Circuit - slope

.043

1.265

.242

Minnesota - jump

.25

1.394

.201

Minnesota - slope

-.031

-.607

.561
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Table 23. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Ai.
Coefficient

Standard
error

t-ratio

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

6.239522

0.313652

19.893

9

<0.001

0.149022

0.019770

7.538

9

<0.001

-0.046256

0.021325

-2.169

9

0.058

0.145100

0.083494

1.738

8

0.120

-0.342450

0.091994

-3.723

8

0.006

Fixed Effect
For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10

For POSTLITS slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20
For JUMP slope, π3
INTRCPT2, β30
NINTH, β31
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Table 24. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the filing rate for disability
benefits over time. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

-0.269

-2.028

.077

Ninth circuit - slope

-.013

-1.553

.159

DOJ - intercept

0.078

.533

.609

DOJ - slope

.0001

.007

.995

Florida - intercept

.293

1.314

.225

Florida - slope

.014

1.065

.318

Third Circuit - intercept .0384

1.841

.103

Third Circuit - slope

.013

1.002

.346

Minnesota - intercept

-.254

-1.119

.296

Minnesota - slope

.002

.155

.881
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Table 25. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on a state’s disability
benefits filing growth rate. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - jump

.032

.505

.614

Ninth circuit - slope

.005

.606

.546

DOJ - jump

-.038

-.549

.584

DOJ - slope

-.027

-1.522

.13

Florida - jump

.081

.743

.459

Florida - slope

.009

.872

.385

Third Circuit - jump

.249

2.376

.019

Third Circuit - slope

.006

.579

.564

Minnesota - jump

-.049

-.413

.68

Minnesota - slope

-.003

-.088

.93
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Table 26. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Aii.
Fixed Effect
Coefficient Standard
t-ratio
error
For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00
1.344303
0.074119
18.137
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10
0.027969
0.006120
4.570
For POSTLITS slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20
-0.013963
0.007700
-1.813
For JUMP slope, π3
INTRCPT2, β30
-0.088821
0.032780
-2.710
THIRD, β31 0.235764
0.107187
2.200

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

9

<0.001

9

0.001

127

0.072

127
127

0.008
0.030
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Table 27. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the percent of people being
approved for disability benefits over time. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

0.836

.214

.836

Ninth circuit - slope

.256

.832

.43

DOJ - intercept

2.21

0.615

.556

DOJ - slope

-.055

-.185

.858

Florida - intercept

-3.698

-.631

.546

Florida - slope

.267

.555

.594

Third Circuit - intercept

-3.51

-.598

.567

Third Circuit - slope

-.47

-1.012

.341

Minnesota - intercept

-.635

-.106

.918

Minnesota - slope

-.248

-.517

.619
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Table 28. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of
people being approved for disability benefits. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - jump

-.392

-.209

.84

Ninth circuit - slope

.026

.10

.921

DOJ - jump

.842

.47

.651

DOJ - slope

.088

.182

.856

Florida - jump

-1.53

-.532

.609

Florida - slope

-.023

-.068

.946

Third Circuit - jump

-5.338

-2.118

.067

Third Circuit - slope

-0.492

-1.634

.105

Minnesota - jump

3.092

1.031

.333

Minnesota - slope

.707

.91

.365
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Table 29. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Aiii:
Fixed Effect
Coefficient
Standard t-ratio
error
For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00
32.115060
2.003999 16.025
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10
-1.025067
0.152514 -6.721
For POSTLITS slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20
0.422552
0.165851 2.548
For JUMP slope, π3
INTRCPT2, β30
-0.735949
0.942719 -0.781

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

9

<0.001

9

<0.001

119

0.012

9

0.455
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Table 30. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state suicide rate over
time. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

-1.94

-1.551

.16

Ninth circuit - slope

-.061

-.988

.352

DOJ - intercept

.591

.458

.659

DOJ - slope

.016

.263

.8

Florida - intercept

2.182

1.083

.31

Florida - slope

-.06

-.626

.549

Third Circuit - intercept

1.111

.529

.611

Third Circuit - slope

.088

.93

.38

Minnesota - intercept

-.341

-.16

.877

Minnesota - slope

.072

.756

.471
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Table 31. Effect of Olmstead response type on differences in the degree to which
litigation impacted a state’s suicide rate. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - slope

.037

.585

.559

Ninth circuit - jump

-.891

-1.435

.189

DOJ - slope

-.011

-.104

.917

DOJ - jump

1.726

3.725

.006

Florida - slope

-.214

-3.207

.002

Florida - jump

-.844

-.853

.418

Third circuit - slope

.042

.495

.622

Third circuit - jump

-1.129

-1.172

.275

Minnesota - slope

.011

.058

.954

Minnesota - jump

-1.965

-2.339

.047
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Table 32. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4B.
Fixed Effect
Coefficient Standard
t-ratio
error
For INTRCPT1, π
INTRCPT2, β
13.777789 0.726402
18.967
For TIME slope, π
INTRCPT2, β
0.125918
0.042367
2.972
For POSTLIT slope, π
INTRCPT2, β
0.130907
0.045736
2.862
FLORIDA, β -0.187113
0.053042
-3.528
For JUMP slope, π
INTRCPT2, β
-0.340885
0.348181
-0.979
DOJ, β
1.639002
0.552609
2.966
MINN, β
-0.667877
0.808642
-0.826

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

9

<0.001

9

0.016

148
148

0.005
<0.001

7
7
7

0.360
0.021
0.436

0

00

1

10

2

20

21

3

30

31

32
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Table 33. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state employment rate over
time. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

-5.396

-.97

.36

Ninth circuit - slope

.312

.603

.563

DOJ - intercept

.01

.002

.999

DOJ - slope

-1.168

-3.535

.008

Florida - intercept

-1.139

-.128

.901

Florida - slope

-.065

-.081

.937

Third Circuit - intercept

-2.195

-.242

.815

Third Circuit - slope

.753

.933

.378

Minnesota - intercept

16.454

2.271

.053

Minnesota - slope

1.72

3.004

.017

258
Table 34. Effect of Olmstead response type on differences in the degree to which
litigation impacted a state’s employment rate. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - slope

-8.264

-1.188

.239

Ninth circuit - jump

-.488

-.546

.6

DOJ - slope

-0.02

-.008

.994

DOJ - jump

-1.165

-3.324

.01

Florida - slope

-3.312

-.294

.77

Florida - jump

-.753

-.569

.585

Third circuit - slope

-4.649

-.411

.683

Third circuit - jump

.12

.088

.932

Minnesota - slope

.189

.051

.959

Minnesota - jump

1.999

3.732

.006

259
Table 35. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4D.
Fixed Effect
Coefficient
Standard
t-ratio
error
For INTRCPT1, π
INTRCPT2, β
18.629480
4.055918
4.593
For TIME slope, π
INTRCPT2, β
-1.395262
0.602288
-2.317
For JUMP slope, π
INTRCPT2, β
2.151445
0.661954
3.250
DOJ, β
-0.902142
0.428759
-2.104
MINN, β
1.739253
0.510765
3.405
For POSTLIT slope, π
INTRCPT2, β
1.946639
1.853417
1.050

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

9

0.001

9

0.046

7
7
7

0.014
0.073
0.011

76

0.297

0

00

1

10

2

20

21

22

3

30
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Table 36. Correlations for covariates and dependent variables in models 4Ei-4Eiii. All
correlations are significant (p < .001).
Models 4Ei4Eiii

Total State
Budget

Police
Budget

Judicial
Budget

Corrections
Budget

Total State
Budget

***

***

***

***

Police Budget

.767

***

***

***

Judicial Budget

.752

.749

***

***

Corrections
Budget

.695

.717

.808

***
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Table 37. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the judicial budget over time.
Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

t

p

36.57

1.31

.227

-.14

-.188

.856

-21.19

-.772

.463

.421

.612

.558

-16.677

-.363

.726

Florida - slope

-.685

-.606

.561

Third Circuit - intercept

-.104

-.002

.998

Third Circuit - slope

.442

.389

.707

Minnesota - intercept

-12.33

-.268

.796

Minnesota - slope

-.583

-.519

.618

Ninth circuit - intercept
Ninth circuit - slope
DOJ - intercept
DOJ - slope
Florida - intercept

Coefficient
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Table 38. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a
state’s spending trajectory for the judiciary. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - jump

4.528

.5

.63

Ninth circuit - slope

-.716

-.502

.629

DOJ - jump

6.992

.861

.414

DOJ - slope

.361

.188

.856

Florida - jump

13.445

.988

.352

Florida - slope

-3.31

-1.909

.093

Third Circuit - jump

-4.003

-.272

.792

Third Circuit - slope

1.787

.87

.409

Minnesota - jump

-26.156

-1.964

.085

Minnesota - slope

.772

.236

.819
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Table 39. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Ei.
Fixed Effect
Coefficient Standard
t-ratio
error
For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00 115.375776 10.281684 11.221
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10 1.361884
0.764618
1.781
For POSTLITS slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20 -1.433964
1.447019
-0.991
For JUMP slope, π3
INTRCPT2, β30 4.394083
4.924145
0.892
For TOTSTPC slope, π4
INTRCPT2, β40 0.008873
0.001344
6.602

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

9

<0.001

9

0.109

9

0.348

9

0.395

139

<0.001
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Table 40. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the police budget over time.
Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

31.144

.765

.466

Ninth circuit - slope

-.79

-.536

.607

DOJ - intercept

-37.83

-1.014

.34

DOJ - slope

.389

.281

.786

Florida - intercept

94.447

1.672

.133

Florida - slope

2.815

1.345

.216

Third Circuit - intercept

-76.93

-1.301

.229

Third Circuit - slope

-3.604

-1.84

.103

Minnesota - intercept

10.51

.165

.873

Minnesota - slope

1.574

0.713

.496
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Table 41. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a
state’s spending trajectory for the police. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - slope

-.784

-.683

.496

Ninth circuit - jump

2.562

.175

.866

DOJ - slope

2.916

1.251

.213

DOJ - jump

9.532

.671

.521

Florida - slope

.06

.041

.967

Florida - jump

-3.734

-.165

.873

Third circuit - slope

.076

.052

.958

Third circuit - jump

-35.57

-1.821

.106

Minnesota - slope

3.969

.963

.337

Minnesota - jump

-26.858

-1.094

.306
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Table 42. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Eii.
Fixed Effect
Coefficient Standard t-ratio
Approx.
error
d.f.
For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00 107.361425
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10 3.628343
For POSTLITS slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20 -1.120258
For JUMP slope, π3
INTRCPT2, β30 3.954319
For TOTSTPC slope, π4
INTRCPT2, β40 0.021448

p-value

31.371188 3.422

9

0.008

1.100376

3.297

9

0.009

0.769212

-1.456

148

0.147

7.641481

0.517

9

0.617

0.002431

8.821

148

<0.001
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Table 43. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the per capita rate of
correctional spending over time. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - intercept

78.963

2.218

.057

Ninth circuit - slope

1.826

2.001

.08

DOJ - intercept

-34.075

-.872

.408

DOJ - slope

-.29

-.294

.776

Florida - intercept

-18.994

-0.286

.782

Florida - slope

-2.322

-1.57

.155

Third Circuit - intercept

14.429

.218

.833

Third Circuit - slope

.479

.3

.772

Minnesota - intercept

-88.845

-1.484

.176

Minnesota - slope

-1.649

-1.093

.306
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Table 44. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a
state’s correctional spending trajectory. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - slope

-.44

-.458

.647

Ninth circuit - jump

42.311

4.548

.002

DOJ - slope

-1.676

-.625

.533

DOJ - jump

-25.529

-2.073

.072

Florida - slope

-1.258

-1.207

.229

Florida - jump

-17.593

-.747

.476

Third circuit - slope

2.218

2.072

.04

Third Circuit - jump

1.395

.05

.956

Minnesota - slope

6.79

1.463

.146

Minnesota - jump

-17.697

-.88

.405
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Table 45. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Eiii
Fixed Effect
Coefficien Standard
t-ratio

Approx.

p-value

t

error

d.f.

5.898549

33.394996

0.177

9

0.864

-0.195836

1.008736

-0.194

9

0.850

-3.626070

0.699438

-5.184

147

<0.001

1.963789

1.070871

1.834

147

0.069

-4.693997

5.042134

-0.931

8

0.379

NINTH, β31 42.392700

9.538792

4.444

8

0.002

0.002730

8.097

147

<0.001

For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10

For POSTLITS slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20
THIRD, β21
For JUMP slope, π3
INTRCPT2, β30

For TOTSTPC slope, π4
INTRCPT2, β40

0.022106
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Table 46. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the incarceration rate over
time. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit intercept

-1.13

-1.09

.308

Ninth circuit - slope

-.06

-2.33

.048

DOJ - intercept

1.166

1.218

.258

DOJ - slope

-0.014

-0.476

.647

Florida - intercept

1.554

.97

.36

Florida - slope

.054

1.195

.266

Third Circuit intercept

.156

.093

.928

Third Circuit - slope

.072

1.691

.129

Minnesota - intercept

-2.182

-1.429

.191

Minnesota - slope

.05

1.083

.311
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Table 47. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth of a state’s
incarceration rate. Significant results bolded.
Degrees of Freedom = 8

Coefficient

t

p

Ninth circuit - slope

-.033

-1.06

.32

DOJ - slope

-.062

-1.563

.157

Florida - slope

.117

1.807

.108

Third Circuit - slope

.119

1.854

.101

Minnesota - slope

-.014

-.213

.837
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Table 48. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4F.
Fixed Effect
Coefficient Standard
t-ratio
error
For INTRCPT1, π0
INTRCPT2, β00
3.832945
0.502542
7.627
For TIME slope, π1
INTRCPT2, β10
0.040431
0.012355
3.273
For POSTLIT slope, π2
INTRCPT2, β20
-0.108038
0.023800
-4.539

Approx.
d.f.

p-value

9

<0.001

9

0.010

9

0.001
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Table 49. Summary of Results for Hypotheses 1-4.
Growth Curve Model
Model
Number.
Dependent
Variable
(Years)

Trend for
all states on
average
over all
observed
years

1. Number
of people
Each year,
served in the there was a
state
decrease of
psychiatric
.032
hospital in
instances
the past year
per 1000
per 1000
people, with
members of the average
the state
in 2017
general
being .276
population
(2001-2017)

Trends
over all
observed
years for
specific
Olmstead
response
types
No
significant
differences,
although
DOJ
approached
a
significantly
faster
deinstitution
- alization
rate (𝛽 = .057, p =
.067)

2A. Per
Each year,
Each year,
capita
states
the Third
expenditures
increased
Circuit
for
spending by increased its
community $3.93, for an spending by
mental
average in
$7.35 more
health
2016 of
than the
services
$119.78;
other states
(1990, 1997,
when the
2001-2007,
total state
2009-2016)
budget is
controlled
for, time
was not a
significant
predictor

Piecewise Growth Curve Model

Prelitigation
trends

Each year,
there was a
decrease of
.054
instances
per 1000
people on
average
across states

Postlitigation
trends for
all states on
average

Postlitigation
trends for
specific
Olmstead
response
types

After
Non-DOJ
litigation,
states:
this pace
decrease of
slowed
.068
significantly;
instances
there was an
per year
annual
and slowed,
decrease of
almost
.022
significantl
instances per
y, after
1000 people;
litigation
no jump
DOJ states:
did not
slow after
litigation

After
controlling
No
for the total
significant
budget,
changes on
there was no average postchange over
litigation
time prior to
litigation

DOJ
increased
its
spending
$4.04 more
than other
states postlitigation
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2B. Per
Time and
capita
total state
expenditures budget were
of the state
significant
psychiatric
predictors
hospital
individually,
(1990, 1997,
but when
2001-2007,
modeled
2009-2016)
together,
neither had
unique
predictive
utility

3. Number
of people
Each year,
served by
there was an
community
increase of
mental
.436
health
instances
providers in
per 1000
the past year people, with
per 1000
the average
members of
in 2017
the state
being 18.14
general
population
(2001-2017)

No
significant
differences

Time and
total state
budget were
not
predictive
when
modeled
together

No
significant
changes on
average postlitigation

Minnesota
Each year,
grew its rate there was an On average,
of people
increase of
states
receiving
.633
continued to
mental
instances
not
health
per 1000
significantly
services in
people on
change;
the
average
however,
community
across
there was an
faster than
states;
immediate
other states,
however,
decrease of
by 1.31
this average
2.576
instances
increase was instances per
per year
driven
1000 the year
solely by
after
Minnesota
litigation
(2.64
increase per
year; other
states
together had
no
significant
annual
increase
when
controlling

Ninth:
immediate
increase
after
litigation
Minnesota:
immediate
decrease
after
litigation,
then
annually
increased
funding
more than
other states
(p = .053)
Minnesota’
s rate of
growth
slowed, but
not
significantl
y
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for
Minnesota)
4Ai. % of
Each year,
The Ninth
Each year,
general
there was an Circuit had a there was an
population
increase of 1.39% lower increase of
receiving
.13%, with rate in 2015,
.14% on
disability
the average as compared
average
benefits
in 2015
to the other across states
(2001-2015) being 6.32%
states

After
litigation,
this rate
slowed on
average,
almost
significantly
(𝛽 = -.046, p
= .058)

The Ninth
Circuit’s
slope after
litigation
did not
vary, but
there was a
significant
jump down
the year
after
litigation
(𝛽 = -.343)

4Aii. Filing
rate for
disability
benefits
(2001-2015)

Each year,
there was an
increase of
.015, with
the average
in 2015
being 1.299

No
significant
differences

Each year,
on average
across
states, there
was an
increase of
.025

The prelitigation
pace
significantly
slowed after
litigation, by
.0167

The Third
Circuit had
a
significant
jump up in
filing rate
immediatel
y after
litigation

4Aiii.
Approval
rate for
disability
benefits
(2001-2015)

Each year,
there was a
decrease of
.82%, with
the average
in 2015
being
30.84%.

No
significant
differences

Each year,
on average
across
states, there
was a
decrease of
1.03%

The
prelitigation
decreasing
pace
significantly
slowed after
litigation to
.61%
decreases
each year

No
significant
differences

4B. Annual
suicide rate
per 100,000
members of
the general
population
(1999-2016)

Each year,
there was an
increase of
.19, with the
average in
2016 being
13.65

No
significant
differences

No
significant
annual
change

Each year,
there was an
increase of
.21

Florida’s
annual
increase
slowed
significantl
y, but DOJ
states
quickened
significantl

276

y
4C.
Readmissio
n to any
psychiatric
hospital
within 30
days of
discharge
from the
state
psychiatric
hospital
(2007-2017)

Insufficient
data to run a
model

4D.
Each year,
Employed there was an
percentage
increase of
of SMHA
.3%, with
consumers
the average
(includes
in 2017
those “not in
being
the
20.05%
workforce,”
e.g., on
disability
benefits)
(2007-2017)

DOJ saw
decreasing
rates of
employment
, while
Minnesota
saw
increases
much higher
than other
states

No annual
change

No annual
change

DOJ had an
almost
significantl
y
immediate
decrease in
employmen
t postlitigation
while
Minnesota
had a
significant
immediate
increase

4Ei. Per
Grew slower
capita
than the
expenditures
state total
on judicial
budget
system
(1996-2015)

No
significant
differences

Grew at the
same rate as
the total
state budget

Slowed
significantly

No
significant
differences

4Eii. Per
capita
expenditures
on law
enforcement
(1996-2015)

No
significant
differences

Grew faster
than what
would be
expected
given the
growth in
total state
budget

Did not vary
significantly
from the prelitigation
trend

No
significant
differences

Grew faster
than the
total state
budget
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4Eiii. Per
Grew slower
capita
than the
expenditures
total state
on
budget
corrections
(1996-2015)

No
significant
differences

Grew as
would be
expected
given the
total state
budget

Significantly
slowed

Third
Circuit
spending
did not
slow as
much as the
other states
(p = .069)
while the
Ninth
Circuit had
a
significant
immediate
increase

4F. Number
No
of people
significant
incarcerated
annual
per 1000
change, with
members of an average
the state
in 2016 of
general
4.06
population
(1996-2016)

Ninth
Circuit
actually
showed a
decrease
over all
years

Each year,
there was an
average
increase of
.048

This
significantly
slowed, so
each year
there was an
average
annual
decrease of
.06

No
significant
differences
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Table 50. Total numbers and percentages of missing data by Olmstead response type and
dependent variable.
Dependent
Variable (#
of years
observed)

Ninth
Circuit

Third
Circuit

DOJ

SPH
3 (5.88%) 1 (5.88%) 10
hospitalizatio
(14.71%)
n (17)

Florida

Minnesota

2 (11.8%) 2
(11.77%)

Totals

18
(10.6%)

SPH
spending
(17)

1 (1.96%) 1 (5.88%) 2 (2.94%) 2 (11.8%) 0 (0%)

6
(3.5%)

Community
Tx spending
(17)

1 (1.96%) 1 (5.88%) 2 (2.94%) 2 (11.8%) 0 (0%)

6
(3.5%)

Community
Tx (17)

7
(13.73%)

2
(11.77%)

11
(16.18%)

3 (17.7%) 3
(17.7%)

26
(15.3%)

Disability
benefits (15)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Disability
filing (15)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Disability
0 (0%)
approval (15)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Suicide rate
(17)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Rehospitaliza 15
tion rate (11) (45.46%)

6
(54.55%)

27
(61.36%)

5 (45.5%) 2
(18.18%)

55
(50%)

Employment
rate (11)

0 (0%)

2
(18.18%)

1 (2.3%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

3
(2.7%)

Judicial
spending
(20)

6 (10%)

2 (10%)

8 (10%)

2 (10%)

2 (10%)

20
(10%)

Police
spending
(20)

6 (10%)

2 (10%)

8 (10%)

2 (10%)

2 (10%)

20
(10%)

0 (0%)
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Correctional
spending
(20)

6 (10%)

2 (10%)

8 (10%)

2 (10%)

2 (10%)

20
(10%)

Incarceration
rate (21)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Totals (233)

47
(6.72%)

19
(8.16%)

77
(8.26%)

20
(8.58%)

12
(5.15%)

174
(7.48%)

